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Hume refers to general rules throughout the three books
of the Treat i se

.

portant role,

for him,

It

is

clear that these rules play an imin

the formation of both causal and

moral judgments, and in the genesis or direction of the passions.

Also, his theory of justice is based on an elaborate

hierarchy of general rules.

Yet,

in spite of the pervasive

presence of general rules in his philosophy, he never offers
a

detailed analysis of their nature

the human understanding.

and their

contribution

Fortunately, when his various

references to general rules and scattered remarks about them
are pieced together, one has an ample basis for constructing
a

coherent and unified account of their nature and the role

they play in the interlocking theories that Hume develops in
the Treatise

.

My principal aim in this work is to construct

such an account.

In doing so,

I

views on general rules provide

number

try

to

important

show

how Hume's

insights

into

a

of aspects of his philosophy, particularly his natu-

ralism, his views on rational method, and his skepticism.
iv
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INTRODUCTION
Hume refers to general rules throughout
the three books
of

the

Treatise.

portant

It

is

regulative role,

clear that these rules play an imfor him,

in

the formation of both

causal and moral judgments, and in the genesis
or direction
of the passions.
Also, his theory of justice is based on an

elaborate hierarchy of general rules.

pervasive presence of general
never offers

rules

Yet,

his

in

various

spite of the

philosophy,

he

detailed analysis of their nature and their

a

contribution to the human understanding.
his

in

references

to

general

rules

Fortunately, when
and

scattered re-

marks about them are pieced together, one has an ample basis
for constructing a coherent and unified account of their na-

ture

and

that

Hume

what

follows IS to construct such an account.

I

the

role

develops

they
in

play
the

in

the

Treatise

.

interlocking
My

theories

principal

aim

In doing

in

so,

try to show how Hume's views on general rules provide im-

portant insights into

a

number of aspects of his philosophy,

particularly his naturalism, his views on reason and rational method, and his skepticism.

To

provide

appreciate
Treatise

,

the
I

the

basic background material

specific

begin with

tive features of Hume's

function
a

of

general

necessary to
rules

in

the

general discussion of the distinc-

theory of the understanding.

preliminary discussion will constitute Chapter

1

I.

This

In Chap-

ter

II,

I

provide

a

detailed analysis of the structure and

formation of the general rules associated
with causal judgment.

m

Chapter ill,

i

(in

Hume's view)

discuss the justi-

fication of general rules and its relation
to Hume's skepticism "with regard to reason".
Finally, in Chapters IV and
V,

examine the role of general rules in three
other areas
of Hume's philosophy:
the passions, morals, and the theory
I

of justice.

2

CHAPTER

I

HUME ON THE UNDERSTANDING

In

a

work on Hume's theory of general rules,

chapter

a

devoted to Hume's theory of the understanding
requires some
explanation.
Apart from the general benefits of viewing
particular aspects of a philosopher's work in
light

more comprehensive framework,
sons

for

ment,

and

functioning

mechanisms

belief,

of

detailed

imagination,

general
in

a

have two more specific rea-

approaching the topic in this manner.

formation
various

I

of

rules

Hume's

First,

depends on the

discussion of

and custom. Thus,

the

it

is

judg-

impossi-

ble to explain the operation of general rules without first

explaining these features of
standing.
ate

does

Yet

understand

to

general rules in Hume's philosophy.
for devoting

ments

of

under-

simply understanding how general rules oper-

help us

not

Hume's theory of the

the

important

role of

Thus, my second reason

chapter to the discussion of the basic ele-

a

Hume's

theory of

the background material

the

understanding

is

provide

to

necessary for understanding and for

appreciating the importance of this role.

Judgment

Hume's view of the understanding is, in part,
opment

of

the

Cartesian

more

or,

3

specifically,

a

the

develMale-

branchian

theory of natural

judgments.

According

to

the

Cartesians, natural judgments depend entirely
on human physiology.

As they saw it, such

judgments

limited truths about objects,

only

very

the

rela-

indicating at best

tion of objects to our bodies.
to

supply

Their general view was that,

enable us to preserve our bodies, God fashioned
us with

the

ability to make natural

immediate environment.
these things

judgments

it

standing.

According to Descartes,

lect

are

innate;

in

our

they thought, from our natural

judgments;

is

things

Our knowledge of the real nature of

not derived,

is

about

attained by the

according

to

intellect
the

or

pure under-

ideas of the

Malebranche,

they

intel-

are

ideal

archetypes in the mind of God, which our pure understanding

directly apprehends.

In

either case our natural

judgments

are regulated and corrected by these "intellectual" ideas.

Hume's account of the understanding differs from these
views

i

dispensing

entirely with

understanding or intellect.
such faculty.
the

that

plish

the

an

the

pure

According to him, we possess no
leaves him with

alternative explanation of how we

regulate and correct those low-level judgments

Cartesians

this

faculty of

His conviction on this point

task of providing

are able to

the

task

in

termed
a

"natural".

He

aimed

to

thoroughly naturalistic way;

accomthe

key

elements in the mechanism he described were general rules.
Although Hume continued to speak of judgments, he rejected the received view of them expounded in the Port Royal

4

Logi£.

He described

[11

that view as dividing the "acts of

the understanding into conception

judgment and reasoning ":

,

Conception is defin'd to be the simple
survey of one or more ideas: Judgment to
be the separating or uniting of different ideas:
Reasoning to be the separating or uniting of different ideas by the
interposition of others, which show the
relation they bear to each other. [2]
Hume

did

what we call

not

deny

that

'conception',

there

are

differences between

'judgment',

and

'reasoning'; but

he did deny that the differences are as indicated
here.

Hume

was

convinced

more than one idea.

God.
as

thermore,
than

"we

two

serve

inference
.

.

.

may

"

and

is

we

such as "God

from each other ... .What-

to be

existent "

having

.

and

are

.

.

.

al

but

The

conception" (p.97n)

a

cause

Fur-

.

employing

recourse to

them" (p 97n)
.

(p. 67)

third to

a

Causal

immediately

more

inference,
in causal

from

its

Hume concluded that "these three acts of

.

underst anding

involve

and to reflect on it

reason without

our

without

"infer

(p. 97n)

nothing

not

"a true species of reasoning", yet

the

jects....

exert

medium betwixt

a

for example,

ef feet

we conceive

ideas,

as

simply,

are nothing different

ever we conceive,

need

separate idea joined to the idea of

a

"To reflect on anything

existent,

judgment

a

in judgments of existence,

existence is not

is",

that

resolve

themselves

into

the

first,

particular ways of conceiving our ob-

act
.

1

of

mind

[3]

5

exceeds

not

a

simple

The relevant distinction does not
concern the number of
Ideas involved in the conception
or how they are joined and
separated, but the manner of their
conception.
"The only

remarkable
lief

to

difference,

the

which

conception,

what we conceive" (p.97n)

occurs... is when we

and

are

join

be-

perswaded of the truth of

The difference between the "sim-

.

ple conception" of God and the judgment
that God exists is
not one of content.
Both involve one and the same idea.
The difference is that in the judgment "God
exists" the idea
of God

is

conceived in

a

different manner.

This different

manner of conception is, according to Hume, belief.
ment

IS

simply

a

belief and

belief is

a

a

A judg-

particular manner

of forming a conception.

To avoid

ments

that

confusion, there is

should

be

kept

a

mind

in

final point about judgin

what

follows.

Hume

repeatedly refers to judgments as "acts of mind", leaving no
doubt

that

he

views

judging

as

a

form of mental

activity.

His practice here is entirely in keeping with his view that

belief is

a

not,

Hume,

for

ositions".
to

manner of conception.

what

Judgments are therefore

philosophers

nowadays

When Hume speaks of judgments, he

specific

sorts

of

mental

acts

involving

call
is

"prop-

referring

conceptions or

beliefs; he is not referring to sentences, abstract objects,
or

anything

ositions.

approximating

contemporary views

of

prop-

This point might seem fairly obvious, but it has

been overlooked or ignored by

a

6

surprising number of commen-

.

tators
of

In the Appendix,

criticisms

ments as
aim

of

Hume

that

treat

his

comments

number

a

about

judq-

though they were comments about
propositions.

mentioning

in

shall, in fact, examine

i

reader to

this

sort

of

error here

is

to

alert

My
the

and thereby avoid any problems that may
arise

it

from mistakes of this sort.

Belief

There
belief.

are

Not

difficulties

presenting Hume's theory of

in

only does he make

number of different

a

and

apparently incompatible claims about the nature of belief in
the

text

what
At

of

appears

least

lems

be yet

to

part

of

with Hume's

pointed out,
is

the Treatise but,

another,

the appendix,

he presents

equally incompatible view.

the difficulty can be attributed to prob-

style.

As

numerous commentators have

Hume's method of presentation in the Treatise

often very misleading

pared reader.

in

and

likely to bewilder

an

unpre-

Often the problem lies in Hume's present-

[4]

ing a highly simplified account of some basic doctrine with-

out

indicating

count.

to

the

reader

that

it

is

a

simplified

ac-

As the Treatise progresses, he fills in the original

account,

often

a

bit

at

a

time,

forcing the reader to con-

tinually read the later additions back into the initial account

.

[

5]

This

is

certainly

true

of

7

Hume's

account

of

belief.

But

it

would be

mistake to assume that the problems
with

a

interpreting Hume's account can be
attributed wholly to stylistic infelicities.
Hume's initial account was not merely
simplified;
quacies,

it

was

Hume was

inadequate.

forced to make significant changes.

end

result

was

incompatible with his

of

these changes was

considered account
Treatise

dealing with its inade-

in

an

initial

The

account of belief that

account.

This final and

presented in the appendix to the

is

.

The best way to avoid confusion about Hume's
theory of

belief is to trace its development, noting the
problems and

ambiguities

that

led

to

modifications

and,

eventually,

to

the reformulation of the theory in the appendix.

Hume

s

initial

account

of belief

middle of his discussion of causal
tempting

to

is

inferences.

He

is

at-

explain how we form beliefs about objects that

are not present to the memory or senses.

we form such beliefs as
al

introduced in the

inference,

in

turn,

a

is

His answer is that

result of causal inference.

Caus-

the result of our experience of a

"constant conjunction" between objects.
We have no other notion of cause and effect, but that of certain objects, which
have always conjoin'd together, and
which in all past instances have been
found inseparable.
We cannot penetrate
into the reason of the conjunction.
We
only observe the thing itself, and always find that from a constant conjunction the objects acquire an union in the
imagination. When the impression of one

8

.

becomes present to us, we immediately
form an idea of its usual attendant;
and
consequently we may establish this as
one part of the definition of an
opinion
or belief, that 'tis and idea related
to
or associated with a present
impression. (p. 93)

While

this

explains

how we

arrive

at

the

absent object, it does not explain our belief.

idea

idea.

But, Hume asks,

an

Obviously we

can have an idea or conception without believing
it.
IS more than a mere

of

Belief

"wherein consists

the difference betwixt believing and disbelieving
any prop-

osition?”

In cases of knowledge, Hume claims,

the answer is

clear
The answer is easy with regard to propositions, that are prov'd by intuition
or demonstration.... The person, who
assents not only conceives the ideas according to the proposition, but is necessarily determin'd to conceive them in
that particular manner... Whatever is
absurd is unintelligible, nor is it possible for the imagination to conceive
any
thing
contrary
to
a
de-

monstration.
In fact,

as

his

section

(p.

95)

the answer cannot be as simple as Hume claims,

comments in later sections make clear.
1,

In

Hume claims:
In all the demonstrative sciences
the rules are certain and infallible;
but when we apply them, our fallible and
uncertain faculties are very apt to depart from them, and fall into error.
We
must, therefore, in every reasoning,
form a new judgment, as a check or con-

9

part VI,

troul

on

lief

our

(p.

first

judgment

or

180)

be-

Clearly people sometimes make judgments
such as 7+5=11.
If judgment is simply a manner of
conceiving,

But

and it is "im-

possible for the imagination to conceive
any thing contrary
to a demonstration,"

person

suspect

that

not

is

doing when he

is
^

in his

it

all clear just what a

at

makes

such

false

judgments as

Kemp Smith was essentially correct

observation of Hume's early comments on the distinc-

tion between knowledge and belief.
In distinguishing between knowledge and
belief, what chiefly interests Hume is
the use to which he proposes to put the
distinction, namely, as delimiting the
sphere of knowledge.
So long as this is
achieved and in the rough it is
achieved the nature and grounds of
'ideal' knowledge need only be indicated; and though this too
may be said to
have been achieved, the last thing which
we need to look for in this section is
any really consistent statement of the
grounds upon which the fundamental distinction rests. [6]

—

At

ferent

any rate,

with

supposes that

non-demonstrative

from causation,
lute

Hume

necessity

the situation is dif-

judgments.

"In

and concerning matters of fact,

cannot

take

place,

and

the

free to conceive both sides of the quest ion"

both

sides

believed.

are

conceived

understood,

or

According to Hume,

10

reasonings
this

abso-

imagination
(p.

95).

only one

is

While
side

is

belief is distinguished from

mere

conception by its degree of force
and vivacity

His

first full account of belief is
presented as follows:
All the perceptions of the mind
are
of two kinds,
viz., impressions and
Ideas, which differ from each other
only
in their different degrees of
force and
vivacity.
Our ideas are cop'd from our
impressions, and represent them in all
their parts.
When you wou d any way
vary the idea of a particular object,
you can only encrease or diminish
its
force and vivacity.
if you make any
other change on it, it represents a different object or impression.... So that
as belief does nothing but vary the manner, in which we conceive any object, it
can only bestow on our ideas an additional force and vivacity.
An opinion,
therefore, or belief may be most accurately defin'd, A LIVELY IDEA RELATED TO
'

OR

ASSOCIATED

PRESSION.

(p.

WITH

PRESENT

A

IM-

96)

There are two parts to this initial definition.
lieved idea is

impression.
a

(1)

lively and

(2)

associated with

a

A be-

present

The parts are related because the liveliness of

believed idea is "transferred" or "communicated" from the

impression to its associated idea.

"When any impression be-

comes present to us, it not only transports the mind to such
ideas

as

are

related

to

but

it,

likewise

them a share of its force and vivacity"
ly,

sion,

(p.

"when the mind is once enliven'd by
It

proceeds to form

a

communicates
98).

a

to

Consequent-

present

impres-

more lively idea of the related

objects, by a natural transition. .."

(p.

99).

Having defined belief, Hume is immediately faced with

11

a

problem.

An impression may give rise
to an associated idea
by any of the three associative
relations: resemblance, contiguity or cause and effect.
But an idea related to a present impression by resemblance
or contiguity is usually not
a

belief.

Hume presents the problem as follows:

For it may be said, that if all
the
parts of that hypothesis be true,
viz.,
that
these three species of relations
are deriv'd from the same principles;
their effects in inforcing and inlivening our ideas are the same; and
belief is nothing but a more forcible and vivid conception of an idea, it
shou'd follow, that that action of the
mind may not only be deriv'd from the
relation of cause and effect, but also
from those of contiguity and resemblance.
But we find by experience, that
belief arises only from causat ion. .
(p.
^
.

107)

Hume
ly,

a

poses.

s

.

.

solution to this problem is complex; fortunate-

detailed

account

Essentially,

his

is

not

reply

necessary for present
is

that,

in

causal

pur-

associa-

tion, the mind feels determined to form a particular type of

idea

upon

there is no

experiencing

a

certain type of impression.

But

manner of necessity for the mind to feign any

resembling and contiguous objects, and if

it

feigns

such,

there is as little necessity for it always to confine itself
to

the same, without any difference or

variat ion"

(p.

109).

Because the associative principles of resemblance and contiguity are "fluctuating and uncertain", they can never "operate with any considerable degree of force and constancy"

12

(p.

109

.

)

This solution requires
nal definition.

if,

modification in Hume's origi-

a

in fact,

ideas related to a present im-

pression by resemblance and contiguity
are not beliefs, then
It IS more accurate to say
that belief is a lively idea
related to or associated with a
present impression.
Yet this definition also runs into
difficulties.

—

Hume has
made the manner of production part
of the very definition of
belief.
This means that nay idea or conception
that

causally associated with
belief.
al

a

is not

present impression could not be

a

But, once Hume shifts his attention away
from caus-

inference,

he

is

forced

to

modify his view once again,

for he admits that there are beliefs that do
not result from

causal association with
In

the

sections

a

present impression.

following

the

one

where

the

initial

definition appears, Hume introduces various types of belief
that

do

Hume

admits

not

depend
that

on

causal

beliefs

association.

For

instance,

produced from education

(what

we

would call indoctrination) arise "without any of [the] curious

and

almost

artificial preparation required for the in-

ference of causal reasoning"
such
not
or

(p.

116).

"education" depend on custom

Beliefs arising from

(repetition)

but

they do

depend on the observed constant conjunction of objects
the

liefs

impression of similiar objects.
that

do not

even depend on custom,

There are also befor instance,

beliefs that arise from madness or "poetical enthusiasm".
13

the

^en

the imagination, from any extraordinary ferment of the blood and
spirits,
acquires such a vivacity as disorders
all Its powers and faculties,
there is
no means of distinguishing betwixt
truth
and falsehood; but every loose
fiction
or idea, having the same influence
as
the impressions of the memory, or
the
conclusions of the judgment, is receiv'd
on the same footing, and operates
with
equal force on the passions.
A present
impression and customary transition are
now no longer necessary to inliven our
ideas ....
We may observe the same effect of
poetry in a lesser degree; only with
this difference, that the least reflection dissipates the illusions of poetry..
'Tis, however, certain, that in
the warmest of poetical enthusiasms, a
poet has a counterfeit belief, and even
a kind of vision of his objects
(p.
^
.

.

123)

Hume has clearly abandoned the view that the manner of

production is part of the nature of belief.
what was

initially the

lief is a lively idea.

'first'

part

of his definition:

In

It

equivalent to a lively idea;

(2)

produces belief;

produces

idea; and

describing

(4)

a

belief

"lively" is simply

believed idea.

is

not at all

various passages Hume seems to

suggest four different and incompatible views:

(3)

be-

But this aspect of Hume's theory is

also the source of considerable problems.

clear what Hume means.

He is left with

the

a

(1)

belief is

liveliness of an

idea

the liveliness of an

way of characterizing

or

In early passages Hume clearly

states that the liveliness of an idea is, at least in part.

14

What constitutes

a

belief.

"An opinion ... or belief may
be

most accurately defin'd, A lively
idea related to or assocl £t^
a Eresent impression " (p.
96).
"Belief is a more
Vivid and intense conception of an
idea...”(p. 103)
"Belief IS no thing
a strong and lively idea
..."(p. 105)
But, in later sections, Hume
implies that, at least on most
occasions, beliefs are not equivalent
to lively ideas but,
rather, produced by the liveliness of
ideas.
in contrasting beliefs produced by causal
.

^

.

inference with

beliefs

arising from education, Hume states that,
with beliefs produced by education, Hume states that, with
beliefs arising
from education, "we must not be contented
with saying, that
the vividness of the idea produces belief.

We must maintain

that they are individually the same” (p. 116).

Elsewhere, Hume implies that belief produces the liveliness of the idea:
The effect,
then, of belief is to raise
us a simple idea to an equality with our
impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the passions. This effect is
can only have by making a idea approach
an impression in force and vivacity....
Belief,
therefore, since it causes an
idea to imitate the effects of the impression, must make it resemble them in
these qualities. ... (p. 119-20).

On the basis of the text alone it is impossible to de-

cide which,

original

if

view.

any,

But,

of

by

these

three views

referring

15

to

represent

Hume's

Hume's

appendix

ac-

:

count,

it

possible to determine his final
and considered
opinion on how his earlier
comments are to be Interpreted.
I shall now turn to
the appendix account.
is

Recall

that

Hume originally argued that the
only difference between ideas and
impressions is their different degrees of force and vivacity. This
led him to claim that the
only difference there could be between
a mere conception and
a belief is a difference
in the force and vivacity of the
Ideas involved in the conception.
In the appendix, Hume acknowledges a fundamental error in his
original argument, an
error which, he says, "more mature
reflection has discover'd
to me in my reasoning" (p. 636).
His description is as follows

The error ... may be found in Book I,
page 96 where I say, that two ideas of
the same object can only be different by
their different degrees of force and vivacity.
I believe there are other differences among ideas, which cannot properly be comprehended under these terms.
Had I said, that two ideas of the same
object can only be different by their
different feeling
I
shou'd have been
nearer to the truth. (p. 636)
,

In abandoning the view that the only difference between

an idea and its corresponding impression is the latter's de-

gree of force and vivacity, Hume is repudiating his initial
argument

leading

to

his

definition of belief as

idea related to a present impression.

offer a different

He is,

then,

a

lively
free to

account of the nature of belief and this
16

IS

exactly what he does in the
appendix.

appendix
feeling.

pression

account,

belief consists

in

a

According to his

particular sort of

Hume does not mean that belief
is

joined

to

an

idea.

He

a

describes

distinct im-

this

erroneous

view as follows:

Belief, beside the simple conconsists in some impression or
distinguishable from the conIt does not modify the conceprender it more present and in-

ception,
feeling,
ception.
tion and
tense:
the same

is only annex'd to it after
manner that will and desire are
annex'd to particular conceptions of
good and pleasure
(p. 625)

Hume offers
First,

It

four

"it is directly contrary to experience, and
our imme-

diate consciousness"
our

reasons for rejecting this view.

thoughts

or

conclusions but

(p.

ideas"

625).

and

ideas..."

voice in the hall,

l

Reasoning is "an operation of
"nothing
625).

(p,

ever

When

enters
I

hear

into

friend's

a

conclude that he is in the hall.

conclusion contains only ideas.

our

This

These ideas are "different

to the feeling; but there is no distinct or separate impres-

sion attending them"(p. 625).
This case can be contrasted with cases where there is

distinct impression or feeling attending an idea.
am

in

doubt

about

some

with the conception,

particular matter of
have

a

Suppose

fact.

feeling of uneasiness.

a
I

Along
I

am

then presented with an argument that resolves the doubt.

I

I
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arrive

at

a

belief and feel

satisfaction.

The uneasiness

and

satisfaction are particular feelings
distinct from and
added to the conception.
Hume's other reasons for rejecting
the view that belief

involves

a

separate impression are:

explicable without

supposing

any

(1)

Belief is fully

such distinct

impression;

The causes of belief can be explained
without reference
any separate impression; and
The effects of belief
(3)

(2)

to

can be explained without reference to any
separate impression.
Hume asks, "Why then look any farther, or
multiply

suppositions without necessity?"

Belief is, then, an idea with

nomenological feel.

626).

(p.
a

particular kind of phe-

In claiming that belief is a "manner of

conception", Hume does not mean to refer to how the
idea is

produced but to the way
not

of

it

is

experienced.

in the nature and order of our

their conception,

629)

"An

.

cious idea"

idea
(p.

and

ideas, but in the manner

their

feeling

to

the

assented to fee 1 s different from

mind"(p.
a

ficti-

629).

While belief is not
volve a feeling,
fined.

in

"Belief consists

and

Accordingly,

a

distinct impression,

it

does in-

feelings can be described but not deHume does

not

finition of belief in the appendix.

attempt

to

offer

a

de-

Instead he attempts to

characterize belief in the same manner as he characterized
simple impressions:

he offers a description of the feeling

and gives its causes and effects.
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The feeling of belief may

be described as "a superior
force
or f irmness

,

,

or vivacity , or solidity

or steadiness" (p. 627).

,

Hume acltnowledges that

such descriptions are bound to
be imperfect.

"'Tis impossi-

ble to explain perfectly this feeling
or manner of conception.
We may malce use of words, that express
something near
It.

But its true and proper name is belief
..." (p. 629)

The

cause

of

belief

generally custom,

is

.

[7]

although

in

cases where there is an "extraordinary ferment
of the blood
and spirits" such as madness, "a present
impression and cus-

tomary transition are

...

In

causal

the

conclusions

to

no

longer necessary ..."

inferences,

this

(p.

123).

custom con-

sists in our experience of constantly conjoined objects;
in
the

case

of

education,

single conception.
our thoughts
sent

to

us

and actions.

portance;

the repetition of a

"renders realities more pre-

it

than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the

and imaginat ion" (p.

and

in

The effect of belief is its influence on

thought, and gives them

force

consists

it

superior influence on the passions

Likewise, "it gives

629).

influence;
infixes

a

them

makes
in

them

the

appear of greater

mind,

and

governing principles of all our actions"
Thus,

[ideas]

(p.

renders

them

more
imthe

629).

in Hume's final view, belief is not equivalent to

the force and vivacity

(or

the cause or effect of a

liveliness)

of an idea nor is it

lively idea.

Therefore, Hume can

consistently maintain that an idea can be forceful and vivid

19

without being believed.

There is, then, no problem with
his

view that "poetical enthusiasm"
can make an idea lively
without

producing belief.

"How great

be, to which the vivacity rises,

soever the pitch may

'tis evident,

that in poet-

ry It

never has the same feeling with that
which arises in
the mind, when we reason, tho'
even upon the lowest species
of probability" (p. 630).
Because belief does not consist in
the force and vivacity of an idea,
Hume can also consistently maintain that a believed idea can
be less forceful and
vivid than an idea that is not believed.
These points are particularly important in
understanding

the role of general rules

in Hume's

epistemology.

Ac-

cording to Hume, "a reflexion on general rules keeps
us from

augmenting our beliefs upon every increase of the force
and

vivacity of our ideas"
return

to

this

(p.

important

632).

in a

point

to

later chapter,

show the

I

will

importance

of

general rules in regulating our beliefs.
Imagination

Hume's view of the nature of the imagination is basi-

cally

Cartesian

While

Malebranche

psychological

and

or,
'

s

more

specifically,

treatment

of

physiological,

the

Hume

Malebranchian.

imagination

concentrates

is

on

[8]

both
the

psychological aspects and, for the most part, "neglects the
advantages"

of

presenting

a

physiological account.

[9]

Al-

though Hume follows Malebranche in his account of the nature
20

of

the

imagination,

he develops a completely
original view

of the role of the imagination
in human thought and action.
To understand Hume's departure
from Malebranche, it is first
important to understand their agreement
with respect to the
nature of the imagination.

According to both Descartes and Malebranche,
mind or soul that thinks and perceives.
in

Itself

ideas

of

and

the

from

pure

the

understanding

mentioned earlier,

ideas

are

contained

ideal
in

The
or

first

pure

from the

sort

are

intellect.

the
As

I

Descartes believed these ideas are in-

nate, while Malebranche,

such

senses.

the

is

The ideas involved

thinking and perceiving come from two sources:

mind

are

it

following Augustine, believed that

archetypes

God,

not

in

the mind of God.

the human mind,

in

intellect directly apprehends them in God.

but

They

the pure

The second sort

of ideas are obtained when the mind directs its attention
to

the

body and perceives via the

Malebranche,
senses.

the

"There

imagination
is

such

a

imagination.

is

close

According

intimately related

to

to

the

relationship between

the

senses and imagination that they should not be separated.....
The differences between these two faculties is but on e of

degree. "[10]

The

imagination

is

the

faculty by which

the

mind reproduces what has been previously experienced by the
senses.

Memories are thereby included under

imagination.

21

ideas

of

the

of

Like Descartes, Malebranche
supposed that the processes
the imagination depended on
the activity of animal

spirits in the brain.

"The imagination consists only
in the

soul's power of forming images
of objects producing changes
in the fibers of the brain.
.."(n 1.1,88). Malebranche implies, but does not specifically
state, that memories are
distinguished from other ideas of the
imagination by the
fact that they reproduce ideas in
the order of the original
sensations.
Our brain fibers, having once received
certain
impressions through the flow of animal
spirits and by the

actions of objects, retain some facility
for receiving these
same dispositions for some time
Memory consists only in
this facility"(ll 1.5,106).

Sensation consists in the understanding's perception
of
something "upon occasion of the appropriate natural
events
taking place in the organs of the body...(l 1,3).

When the

sense organs are stimulated by an object, the "agitation"
of
the

fibers

brain

via

parts

of

spirits

in

the

animal

sense

are

"communicated"

spirits— "the most

the blood" (II

leaves

organs

"traces"

1.2,91).
in

refined

and

to

the

agitated

The passage of animal

the brain.

Both the force with

which objects strike the senses, and the frequency with
which

the

same

kind

of

object

is

presented

to

the

senses

determine the depth of the traces and, thus, the strength of
the

consciousness of sensation.

are

"a kind of weak and

Imagining and remembering

languid sensation the mind receives
22

,

only because of certain traces
being produced or arous6d in
the brain by the flow of
spirits" {Conclusion, 261).
When
either according to the will
or in so^e other manner, animal
spirits flow into the brain
traces made by previous impresEions of the senses, those
impressions are "revived" and we
imagine or remember.
The

similarity between Malebranche and
Hume is nicely
summarized by Charles McCracken:
Both sensation and imagination
occur,
Descartes and Malebranche supposed, because a rush of animal spirits to the
brain imprints traces there that occasion an 'image' in consciousness; if
these spirits flow forcefully, as happens when our sense organs are stimulated, a deep trace is made on the brain,
and the images produced are fortes
et
vives
such
images we call sensation.
If, however, the spirits flow weakly, as
is usual when the cause of the flow is
internal to the body, they produce a superficial trace on the brain, which occasions in consciousness that espece de
sensation f aibles et languissates thaT
we term imagination.
While Hume does
not engage in this sort of speculative
physiology, he and Malebranche are in
complete accord here about the difference between sensation and imagination.
Indeed, Hume's terminology follows Malebranche: where one speaks of sensations
as
fortes et vives
the other speaks
of their 'force and liveliness'; and
where one describes ideas of the imagination as
f aibles
et
languissantes
the other says they are 'faint and
languid . [11]
;

'

'

,

'

'

,

'

Later

I

will

show that

Hume does at

23

least

once quite

explicitly "engage
and

that

there

is

in

this

good

sort

reason

of

speculative physiology"

to

suppose that he accepted

Malebranche's physiological model.

For now it is sufficient

to

note

an

important

point

neglected by McCracken.

This

point concerns the different focus
in the methods of distinguishing sensing from imagining
in the discussions of Descartes, Malebranche and Hume.
Descartes's manner of distin-

guishing sensing from imagining

is

objective:

it

is

focused

on their physical causes or manner
of production:

When external objects act on my senses,
they print on them an idea, or rather
a
figure, of themselves; and when the mind
attends to these images imprinted on the
[pineal] gland in this way, it is said
to perceive.
When on the other hand the
images on the gland are not imprinted by
external objects but by the mind itself,
which fashions and shapes them in the
brain in the absence of external objects, then we have imagination.
The
difference between perception and imagination is thus really just this, that in
perception the images are imprinted by
external objects which are actually present, whilst in imagination the images
are imprinted by the mind without any
external objects, and with the windows
shut, as it were. [12]

Malebranche presents the difference between sensing and
imagining in terms of both the objective difference and the

subjective difference

— their

feeling to inner consciousness.

The difference to consciousness is the different degrees of

force and liveliness.

their manner

of

The objective difference lies in

production.
24

Sensation arises from the

:

action of external objects
on the senses, imaginings
arise
when the will or some other
internal event causes animal
spirits to flow into the traces
left by previous sensations.

Hume

interested

is

in

the

examination of

the understanding and his primary concern
is with the contents of
consciousness.
His presentation of the difference
between
sensing and imagining is directed
toward the subjective difference or difference to consciousness.
The objective difference is a subject that he claims
"belongs more to anatomists and natural phi losophers
” (p.
8).
.

.

Another

aspect

of

.

Malebranche

'

s

view adopted by Hume

deals with the connection between ideas
of the imaqination.
According to Malebranche, the connections
between ideas of
the imagination depend on the connections
between brain
traces.
There are three primary types of connections
between traces:
on

identity

blance.

(1)

in

natural connections,
time,

and

(3)

(2)

connections based

connections based

on

resem-

Natural connections are described by Malebranche as

follows

There are traces in our brains that
are naturally tied to one another, and
even certain emotions of the spirits,
because that is necessary to preservation of life.... For example, the trace
of a great elevation one sees below oneself, and from which one is in danger of
falling ... is naturally tied to the one
that represents death to us, and to an
emotion of the spirit that disposes us
25

.

to flight

Hume,

in

passage

a

1.5,106)

(I

reminiscent

of

Malebranche,

describes

this connection as

"deriv'd solely from custom and
experi-

ence" {p.

But,

148). [13]

as

will show in my discussion of

I

custom, Hume's view of what
constitutes

a

natural connection

both more extensive and more
complex than that of Malebranche
IS

The

of

second type of connection depends
on the identity

time when traces are made.

”it

is

enough that many

traces were produced at the same time
for them all to rise
together again" (II 1.5,106).
From his examples it is clear
that by "Identity in time" Malebranche
meant to include

traces produced in succession.
by experiencing

The original traces produced

two objects at the same time or one immedi-

ately following another will be only weakly
connected,
such

connections will be easily broken.

are continually conjoined

will

cut

a

in

experience,

one of these objects,

the

idea

with it.
is

some

when objects

the animal spirits

deep path between the traces occasioned by the

two objects, forming a strong connection.

traces will

But

and

Upon experiencing

the animal spirits that flow into its

continue on into the connected trace producing

of

the

object

that

has

been frequently conjoined

The result is that men frequently judge that there

real

connection between objects that are often

joined in their experience.
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Men never fail to judge that
a thing is
the cause of a given effect
when the two
are conjoined, given that the
true cause
of the effect is unknown to
them.
This
IS why everyone conclude
that a moving
ball which strikes another is
the true
and principal cause of the
motion it
communicates to the other, and that
the
soul s will is the true and
principal
cause of movement in the arms, and
other
such prejudices because it always
happens that a ball moves when struck
by
another, that our arms move almost every
time we want them to and that we do
not
sensibly perceive what else could be the
cause of these movement s .( I l l 2.3,224)

—

The

third

resemblance.
and these,

sort

of

connection between ideas depends on

Resembling objects produce resembling traces,

in turn,

produce resembling ideas.

This can lead

both to errors in sensation and errors in
judgment
can

lead

one

object

to

instance,
and

error
to

be

that

in

[14]

it

sensation because we mistakenly take

another resembling object.

we

.

have

experienced

two

thus have two similar brain traces.

Suppose,

resembling

for

objects

When we are later

presented with" one of these objects, animal spirits may flow
into the

traces occasioned by the other resembling object.

The result

is

that,

in

a

sense, we actually experience the

non-present object resembling the present object.

generally occurs when one of the objects

is

[15]

This

more common or

familiar than the other.

Familiar objects have made deeper

traces

flow of

from

the

frequent

animal

spirits.

When

a

less familiar object is presented and this object bears some
27

.

resemblance to the familiartanuliar object, the animal
spirits flow
into the deeper traces left
by the familiar object.
•when
the spirits have passed
through traces many times, they
enter there more easily than
other places nearby, through
which they have never passed,
or have not passed as often.

(II

.

212,

Errors

134)

of

judgment

another resembling
as

that

found

in

arise

idea.

from mistaking

one

idea

for

This mistake has the same source

sensation.

-The animal spirits that were

directed by the action of external
objects, or even by orders of the soul [i.e. by the will],
to produce certain
traces in the brain often produce others
that truly resemble
them in some things, but that are not
quite the traces of
these same objects, nor those the soul
desired to be represented ..."( n 212,134-35)
.

Hume's principles of association among ideas
are similar
in

to

some

Malebranche's connections of ideas, yet they differ
important respects.

are resemblance,
ing

that

to

Hume,

they are

naturally

The principles of

contiguity, and cause and effect.

these
the

are

"natural"

universal

introduces

connections

principles

another"

(p.

10).

ing

and

But

the association of

would

then

be

Accordthe

in

"by which
We

can,

combine and relate ideas in any way we choose.
relating

association

attributable

one

of

sense
idea

course,

Such combinto

the

will.

ideas by resemblance, contiguity and

28

cause and effect is an
activity of the imagination
and does
not depend on the will.
with respect to resemblance.
Home
IS in complete agreement
with Malebranche.
But in place of
Malebranche's identity in time,
Hume substitutes the principles Of contiguity in space
and time and cause and
effect.

Both

these

principles

have

features

branche's principle of identity.

in

common with

Male-

According to Hume, the im-

agination associates ideas of
objects that we have experienced to be contiguous in time
or space.
According to Malebranche, identity accounts for
the following
situation:

If ... a man finds himself
in some public ceremony, if he notes all
the circumstances and all the principal
persons
assisting at it, the time, place,
day,
and all the other particulars,
it will
suffice for him to remember the
place,

or even some less noteworthy
circumstance of the ceremony, to have
all
the others recur to him.fli 1 5
105
/
,

For Hume,

)

this would be explained by the associative
rela-

tion of contiguity in space and time.
On Malebranche

time

that

objects

conjunction
that

we

's

that

suppose

account

are

it

is

the

(near)

expe r i e nc ed --, t h e i r

identity in

constant

leads us to connect their ideas so closely
a

causal

connection.

Unlike Malebranche,

Hume believes that there are causal connections between
objects,

yet

he

agrees with Malebranche that the strong con-

nection between
stant

ideas

conjunctions

in

leads

the
us

imagination produced by conto
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mistakenly suppose that we

know of some necessary
connection between objects.
So far I have dealt
primarily with similarities
between
Hume's and Malebranche s
accounts of the imagination.
There
are two differences that
bear eKamlnation.
'

The first dif-

ference

is

superficial, but can be misleading.

difference is both fundamental
and crucial.
tal

in

that

it

The second

fundamen-

is

it

distinguishes Malebranche the Cartesian
rationalist from Hume the empiricist.
It is crucial in understanding why general rules are
so important for Hume's epistemology.
I
will begin by examining the
superficial,
but

possibly misleading, difference.
When comparing Hume's and Malebranche
imagination,

ference.

one cannot

Hume's

'

s

accounts of the

help but notice one pervasive dif-

account

lacks

physiology found in Malebranche.

the

constant

appeal

to

McCracken explains this by

claiming that "Hume had little taste for
such purported
physiological explanations of association and
sometimes derided that 'imaginary dissection of the brain
'".[16]

Cracken's claim is based on
sage in question.

presentation
take

of

advantage

recognition

careless reading of the pas-

Hume is pointing out that, in his initial
the

of

that

a

Mc-

principles

the

some

of

association,

physiological
such

account

he

explanation.

underlies

the

did

not

But

his

facts

of

association is made clear by the passage following the one
quoted by McCracken.

Hume continues:
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"But

tho'

I

have ne-

glected
topic
must

any advantage,

in

explaining

the

I

proceeds

to

Malebranche

'

s

have drawn

m

ideas,

I

a.

fro.

this

afraid

i

order to account for the

arise from these relat ions"

present

arising

„ight

relations of

here have recourse to it,

mistakes that

rors

which

(p.

60).

He then

a

physiological explanation of the
erfrom resemblance which is
clearly similar to
account.

As the mind is endow'd
with a power of
exciting any idea it pleases;
whenever
It dispatches the spirits
into that rebrain, in which the idea is
piac d; these spirits always
excite the
Idea, when they run into the
proper
traces, and rummage that cell,
which belongs to the idea.
But as their motion
IS seldom direct, and naturally
turns a
little to the one side or the other;
for
this reason the animal spirits,
falling
into the contiguous traces, present
other related ideas in lieu of that
which the mind desir'd at first to
survey.
(p.

Whether

or

explanations,

not
I

60-61)

Hume

had

a

distaste

for

physiological

cannot pretend to determine.

But there are

two more obvious reasons for his general
reluctance to make
such appeals.
First, his main concern is with the phenomena
of consciousness themselves, not with the
underlying physio-

logical

causes.

Hume

is

interested

in

examining

certain

facts of our experience to determine the "extent and force"
of the understanding.
is

something

that,

like

The physiology underlying such facts
the examination of our

sensations,

belongs more to anatomists and natural phi losophers
31

.
.

.

"

(p.

.

8).

second, Hume recognized
the danger of placing too
much
emphasis on physiology.
The discovery of a mistake
in the
physiological account could lead
readers to suppose that the
facts of consciousness being
explained are also unwarranted.
But it is evident that he
is concerned about the
possibility
of such a mistake on the
part of his readers in the
disclaimer that preceeds the
physiological explanation cited
above

shall only premise, that we must
distinguish exactly betwixt the phenomenon
Itself, and the causes, which
l
shall
assign for it; and must not imagine
from
any uncertainty in the latter,
that the
former is also uncertain. The phenomena
may be real, tho' my explication be
chimerical.
The falsehood of one is no
consequence of that of the other; tho'
at the same time we may observe,
that
'tis very natural for us to draw such
a
consequence
(p. 60)
I

.

The

second

difference between Hume

and

Malebranche

best approached through the subject of error.

Malebranche,

is

According to

"error is the cause of men's misery;

it

is

the

sinister principle that has produced the evil in the
world
...

and we may hope for sound and genuine happiness only
by

seriously laboring to avoid it"
the main

tasJcs

(I

1,1).

Accordingly, one of

Malebranche sets himself is to "examine the

causes and nature of our errors... "(I 1,1).

The most

derly

error

and

illuminating"

method

of

examining

that considers them in "their birth and origin"
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(I

is

1.1).

"orone

Be-

cause

the

senses

and

imagination

depend

on physiological
processes of the body, the
examination of the birth and
origin of their errors requires
an examination of this
physiology.
The errors of the imagination
are first traced to
certain general principles:
the connecting of

ideas of the

imagination
These

according

principles

of

to

resemblance and identity in time.

connections

among

ideas

are

plained according to their
physiological origins.
Like Malebranche, Hume recognizes
that

of

association inherent

in

the

the

then

ex-

principles

imagination are apt to lead

to errors.

Resemblance is the major culprit, but
contiguity
and cause and effect are also
sources of error. ”Tho' resemblance be the relation which most
readily produces a mistake
in

ideas,

yet

the

others

of

causation

also concur in the same inf luence"

agrees

that

these

principles

and

(p.

the

and

61).

contiguity may
But, while Hume

mistakes

that

arise

from them are caused by certain
physiological processes, he
does not believe that knowledge of these
processes is as

important as knowing that such mistakes do occur.
In addition to the particular processes involved
in er-

rors, Malebranche continually stresses a more
general reason
for

error.

We

are

constantly misled by sensation and the

ideas of the imagination which arise from sensation
because

we take them to be
natures

of

objects.

a

source of knowledge about the real
Malebranche,
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in

the

Cartesian tradi-

tion,

emphatically

denies

that

sense and imagination
can
ever be the source of
such knowledge.
The sense and imagination depend entirely
on the body and are
provided by God
only for the preservation
of the body.
They are not meant
to provide us with
knowledge of objects, but only
with
limited truths about the
relation of objects to our bodies.
Malebranche's rule for avoiding
error in the senses applies
equally well to the imagination.

s^^ses as to
things are in themselves, but
only
as to the relation they have
to the body
because, in fact, the senses were
given
to us, not to know the truth
of things
in themselves, but only for
the preservation of our body. (I 5, 24)
what

In

he

conclusion of the book on sense and
imagination
Malebranche notes:

All the thoughts the soul has
through the body, or through dependence
upon the body, are all for the sake of
the body ... they are all false or obscure ... they serve only to unite us to
sensible goods and to everything that
can procure them for us; ... this union
involves us in infinite errors and very
great miseries
(ii 3.6 195)
The
IS

source of our knowledge of the real natures of objects
the

pure

understanding,

and

it

is

by

the

ideas

of

the

pure understanding that we correct the errors of the senses
and imagination.

Our natural

judgments

— judgments
34

of

the senses and

in^aginat

ion-are adequate for their
purpose.

preserve the body.

They serve to

But even in this capacity
they are lia-

ble to error and require
regulation by the pure understanding.
in judgments about the
nature of objects the senses
and imagination can give
us no truth whatsoever;
such judgments are "all false and obscure".

According

standing.

to

The

Hume

there

following

is

no

faculty of pure under-

important

passage

is

clearly

directed against any view that assumes
the existence of such
a faculty:

I
shall here take occasion to
propose a second observation concerning
our demonstrative reasonings, which
is
suggested by the same subject of mathematics.
'Tis usual with mathematicians,
to pretend, that those ideas, which
are
their object, are of so refin'd and
spiritual a nature, that they fall not
under the conception of the fancey, but
must be comprehended by a pure and
intellectual view, of which the superior
faculties of the soul are alone capable.
The same notion runs thro' most parts of
philosophy, and is principally made use
of to explain our abstract ideas, and to
show how we can form an idea of a
triangle, for instance, whichv shall
neither be an isosceles nor scalenum,
nor be confin'd to any particular length
and proportion of sides.
'Tis easy to
see, why philosophers are so fond of
this notion of some spiritual and
refin'd perceptions; since by that means
they cover many of their absurdities,
and may refuse to submit to the
decisions of clear ideas, by appealing
to such as are obscure and uncertain.
But to destroy this artifice, we need
but reflect on that principle so oft
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insisted on,

that
all our ideas are
impressions (p. 72)
,

eliminating the faculty of
pure understanding, Hume
IS faced With the task
of accounting for certain
features of
thought traditionally
attributed to that faculty.
As for
the ideas attributed to the
pure understanding, Hume either
denies we have them or argues
that they are really products
of the imagination that are
founded on experience.
But my
primary concern is with another
feature that Hume needs to
account for the regulation of our
judgments.
He could not
follow Malebranche in an appeal to
the pure understanding to
determine what kinds of judgments
provide us with truth or
to account for the means by
which we correct our natural
judgments.
What Hume needs is an empirical method
of regulating and correcting natural judgments.
Such a method must
itself be explicable within the framework
of natural judgments.
General rules provide just such a method.
Custom
Descartes,

Malebranche

and

Locke

all

acknowledge

influence of custom on human thought and action.
that

customs

are

primarily the result of past

the

All agree

repetition.

But, while they agree that customs are primarily the result
of repetition,

they acknowledge exceptions.

Descartes, for

instance, remarks:

[A]

custom can be acquired by
36

a

solitary

]

)

inus when we
Trui°'’whpn‘^

long usage,

unexpectedly mept

so.eth.ng very foul

wifv,

food that „e are
‘hat
th s"lvrnt"
this
event gives us may so
change the
hrain, that we can no
longed Ve°p"
longer
see any such food without
hor-

Malebranche
they see

it,

and

the

Locke

cite

distinguishing

similar examples. [18]
feature of customs

is

As

not

that

they result from past repetition
but that they are arbitrary as opposed to natural, a
distinction I shall discuss
in detail below.
Hume, on the other hand, takes
past repetition as the distinguishing
characteristic of custom.
"We

call

everything custom which proceeds from
past repetition
Without any new reasoning or conclusion"
(p.

Following

Descartes'

mechanical

102).

account,

Malebranche

supposed that customs or habits are
formed when "pathways”
in the body become sufficiently
open or worn to allow easy
passage of animal spirits.
"Little by
little

the

animal

spirits open and smooth these paths by their
continual flow,
so

that

in

time

they find no more resistance" ll 1.5,108).
(

Locke apparently accepted the same explanation:

Custom settles habits of thinking in the
understanding, as well as of determining
in the will, and motions in the body:
all which seems to be but trains of motioins i the animal spirits, which, once
set a going, continue in the same steps
they have been used to; which, by often
treading, are worn into a smooth path
and the motion in it becomes easy, and
as it were natural. (II 33 6 529
19
.
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,

[

[

There is no reason to
suppose that Hume differed
from
his predecessors with
respect to the mechanics
involved in

custom.

This

account

follows naturally from the
Male-

branchian account of the
imagination, an account that Hume
clearly accepted. Furthermore,
in discussing the effects
of
custom in Book II, Hume makes
frequent reference to physiological processes.
He refers to the "difficulty
of spirits
moving in their new direction",
and he explains that "this
difficulty excites the spirits" and
that surprise "puts the
spirits into agitat ion" (p. 423 ).
All

agree that the influence of custom
can be found in
thought, passions, and movement. Locke
and Malebranche take
the skill of a musician as the
paradigm of customary movement
20]
Custom is also a source of connect ion
between
ideas and passions.
in an example later repeated by Malebranch e, Descartes claims:
.

When

dog sees

a

rally disposed

t

a

partridge he is naturun toward it
and
when he hears a gun fired, th is sound
naturally incites him to flight.
But
nevertheless setters are usually so
trained that the sight of a partridge
causes them to stop, and the wound which
they afterwards hear when a shot is
fired over them, causes them to run
toward it [21]
o

,

.

Descartes notes that such conditioning is also possible
in men

"and that even those who have the feeblest souls can
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acquire

very absolute doniinion
over all their passions
if

a

fficient
•

industry is applied

[22]

Left

to

training and guiding

in

accidental circumstances, the
con-

nections established by such
conditioning are apt to produce
various pathological aversions,
fears, and phobias.
But
this capacity for linking
ideas and passions, when
properly
directed, can be used to man's
benefit.
Finally,

tween ideas.

custom can be
I

the

source of connections be-

have already discussed Hume's
and Male-

branche's views on the connection
between ideas of the imagation.
Here I will concentrate on the
important difference between Hume and his
predecessors over the distinction
between "natural" and "customary"
connections
of ideas. [23]

Locke draws the distinctions as follows:
Some of our ideas have a natural correspondence and connection one with another:
it is the office and excellency
of
our reason to trace these, and hold them
together in their peculiar beings.
Besides this there is another connection
of ideas wholly owing to chance and cus t^m.
Ideas that in themselves are not
of kin, come to be so united in some
men's minds, that it is very Hard to
separate them, they always keep in company, and the one no sooner at any time
comes into the understanding, but its
associate appears with it; and if they
are more than two which are thus united,
the whole gang, always inseparable, show
themselves together. {II 33 6 529) [24]
.

According

to

Locke,

separating of ideas.

judgment

consists

A natural
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,

in

the

joining

and

consequence of this view is

Ideas are joined in an
arbitrary manner, the resulting judgment is likewise
arbitrary.
Habits or customs
Of thought consist of
just such arbitrary
judgments.
While Locke distinguishes
between natural and customary
connections between ideas,
Malebranche and Descartes make
a
further distinction.
There are connections between
the nonsensuous ideas of the pure
understanding.
These ideas and
the relations between them
provide us with our real knowledge, including our genuine
knowledge of the physical world.
There are also natural connections
between the ideas of the
imagination.
These connections are essential
for the preservation of our bodies.
They are natural in the sense that
they depend on inborn mechanical
dispositions of our bodies.

According to Malebranche:
There are traces in our brains that
are naturally tied to one another,
and
even to certain emotions of the spirits,
because that is necessary to preservation of life; and their connection cannot be broken, or at least not easily
broken, because it is good that it be
always the same
it consists in a
disposition of the brain fibers that we
have from birth. (II 1.5,106)

Finally,

there

are

customary connections.

These con-

nections are also between ideas of the imagination and
depend

on

body mechanisms.

But

they are either

accidental,

such as the connections established by the identity of times

when objects are experienced,
40

or

they are artificial,

such

'

as the connections
established by education.

Unlike Locke,

Malebranche does not believe
that
ment consists in the joining
and separating of ideas.

branche

'

s

judg-

Male-

view of judgment is one that
is later adopted, in

part, by Hume.

There is no difference on the
part
understanding between a simple
perception, a judgment, and an inerence, other than that the understanding by a simple perception
perceives a
simple thing without any relation
to
anything else whatsoever, that in
judgments It perceives the relations
between
two or more things, and that in
inferences It perceives the relations
among
the relations of things.
Consequently,
operations of the understanding
are nothing but pure perceptions.
(t
^
^
1.2,7)
of

the

[25]

This

judgment on the part of the understanding

is

;

it

"is only the perception of the relation
found between two or

more

things"

(l

1.2,7).

role in judgment.
that

the will

also plays

According to Malebranche,

it

crucial

a

is

the will

assents or withholds assent from the perception of
the

understanding.
ed

yet

in

the

involved

in

in this he and Hume part company.

section

on

judgment

judgment,
is

be lief

Hume
and

held

that

does not

As

the

I

not-

assent

depend on the

will.
What is significant about Malebranche

'

s

theory of judg-

ment is that the particular manner of joining ideas does not

determine whether or not

a

judgment is arbitrary.
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What de-

termines the latter is the
truth of the perception-its
representation of a relation
that actually holds
between ideas
or things.
Natural judgments do
provide us with a measure
of truth-the relation
of objects to our
bodies.
They do
not provide us with truth
about the objects themselves.
customary judgments, on the
other hand, do not provide
us
with truth about the
relation of objects to our
bodies or
about objects themselves.
Such judgments are, therefore,
arbitrary.
Hume

agrees with Malebranche

that

natural

connections

are based on inborn dispositions
necessary for preservation,
but he does not separate
natural connections from customary
ones.

The connecting of ideas by custom
is both natural and
necessary for preservation. According
to Hume, the imagina-

tion has natural dispositions or
"propensities" to join
ideas in certain ways.
One such natural propensity is to
join ideas by custom or repetition.

But

the fact

that

the

joining of ideas by custom is both
natural and necessary to
human nature does not preclude the
possibility that some
particular connection arising from custom will
not be necessary or may actually be destructive. The same
principle ac-

counts for both of the following judgments;
One who concludes somebody to be near
him, when he hears an articulate voice
in the dark, reasons justly and naturally; tho'that conclusion be deriv'd from
nothing but custom, which infixes and
42

,

inlivens

the

idea

of

human creature
conjunction
wUh
tne present impression.
?he"present°Ln^"
But one. who
with'the ap!
Snston^^of""""^
^ spectres in the
dark, may,
Lrhen^
K
perhaps, be
said to reason, and to
reason naturally too;
But then it must be
in the same sense,
that a malady is said
to be natural; as
arising
causes, tho' it be contraryfrom natural
to health
"’^st natural sit
uaf
nation of man. (p. 225 - 26
a

)

Here

Hume

is

clearly

judgment and one that

is

same principle of custom.
ment
it.

is

differentiating

not

just.

Thus,

between

a

just

Yet both depend on the

the "justness" of

a

judg-

not

determined by the principle that
gives rise to
To say that a judgment is
derived from custom is
not to

say

that

it

is

arbitrary.

Like Malebranche,

Hume distin-

guishes between arbitrary judgments
by their ability to provide truth. Yet Hume believes
that natural judgments, judgments based on custom, can provide
truth.
But they can just
as

naturally lead to error.

avoided,

natural

If wrong judgment

judgments must be regulated.

tion is achieved by employing general
rules.

is to be

This regulaThe next chap-

ter is devoted to the examination of
the formation of these

rules

and

a

description of how they serve to regulate and

correct natural judgments.
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NOTES

[1] Port Roya
Logic was the more common
name for The
of Thinking by Antoine
Arnauld.
The view Hume rejects
IS there stated as
follows:

it

presents

itself""to

'

th^l^n^'d

several o;h;;s
A^trine^Ln^nir Th"
ing, trans. James Dlckoff
and Part^ei^i^=r^^
York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964),
p. 29.
.

David Hume,

A

Treatise of Human Nature
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pd

i

i\

d
J
h’ Ni'^
ditch
(Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press
197 R)
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qc ^ f,',
tions to the Treatise are to thrs
edition^' Hereafter ^Je?’
indicated by page numbers
give^L

\°he“’ttxr7^^^^

[3] Hume agrees with Malebranche
here
The similarity
wording suggests that Hume was
directly influenced by
Malebranche s view

in

difference on the part of the understandperception, a judgment, and an
t
inference, other
than that the understanding by a simple perception perceives a simple thing
without any
relation to anything else whatsoever, that
in judgment
relations between two or more things,
and that in inference it perceives the
relations among
the relations of things.
Consequently, all the operations of the understanding are nothing but pure perceptions."
Nicolas Malebranche, The Search After
Tri^, trans. Thomas Lennon and Paul Olscamp (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1980), p,. 7.
K

4-

Norman Kemp Smith,
The Philosophy of David
Critical
Study of Its Orig ins and Central Doctrines
A
(London: Macmillan, 1941; reprint ed.. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), esp. pp. 110-16 and 218-19.
•

For an extensive treatment of this topic see
Livingston's Hume s Phi losophy of Common Life

[5]

Donald

'

(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984), Chapter
[6]

Kemp Smith, p. 349.
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2.

,

,

.

.

Hume makes the same
point in the first Enquiry

[7]

should, pe?hapsrfind

t ^

?icul

;

sentiment, we

Passion of
anger, to a creature who
never had ^nf^ experience
these sentiments.
of
BELIEF ic;
Of this feeling; and
""""
Le is ever
every momen? conscioL of The

“

cj:r4narTTTtsrT%srr.
I
am in full agreement with
John Wright in this
regard.
For a more extensive treatment
of Hume s adoption
of Ma lebranche s
psychophysiological views see Wright's The
Scept ica 1 Rea 1 ism of David Hume
(Minneapolis: Univ. of MinriT
Press, 1983)
[

8

]

•

'

^

Cf.

[9]

Treatise

60.

Nicolas Malebranche,
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Thomas Lennon and Paul OlscaTi^
(Columbus” Ohio State
P- 1®’citations to thi Search are
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tL text
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hv book,
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trans.

,

,

11
Charles J. McCracken, Malebranche
Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1983), p.
[

]

and

28^

British

[12] Rene Descartes, Conversat ions with
Burman, trans.
John Cottingham (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
19 76T“,'p. 27.
[13]

The passage from Hume is as follows:

Let us consider the case of a man, who being
hung out from a high tower in a cage of iron
cannot
forbear trembling, when he surveys the precipie below
him, tho' he knows himself to be perfectly secure
from
falling, by his experience of the solidity of the
iron, which supports him; and tho' the idea of fall
and descent, and harm and death, be deriv'd solely
from custom and experience" (p. 148)
[14]

rather

than

It

may seem odd to attribute error to the senses
judgments based on the senses.
But Male-

to
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invSlvL‘'Ue®''unde?s“

s^'^percept fon

scribes as -compound sensationthat sensations can be considered
[15]

'

S"®
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the “latter^L""'
erroneous.

Malebranche's example is interesting:

The reason we normally see

face in the moon

a

i

q

^

'^ith much attention.
^
So
Iho animal
spirits meeting resistance in the

tL?

1

the direction that

brain, are easily detoured from
the light of the moon impresses
on

^"es to "„hich°\h"‘
natur^(^IT.2 135?.
[16]

a^“rir7‘

^nt^fhose

'a'

attached by

McCracken, p. 279.

Rene Descartes,
The Passions of the Soul, in The
Works of Descartes
trans. Elizabeth"^
Haldane and G.R.T Ross, 2 vols. (Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1911)
1: 356,
[17]

Philosophic al

,

,

[18]

Concerning
ser, 2 vols

^®^®^^^riche
.

John Locke, An Essay
collated by Alexander Fra-

13,65);

(I

Understanding
(New York: Dover,

,

1959), Chap. 33, 1:531.

Like Hume, Locke is cautious about committing
himself to a particular physiological explanation:
"Whether
the natural causes ... be the motions of animal
spirits, I
will not
[23]determine, how probable soever ... it appears
to be
f

so

^

...” (Chap.
[20]
[24]

Cf.

33,

1:530)

Malebranche

(II

1.5,

108); Locke,

(Chap.

33,

•

[21]

Descartes, Passions

[22]

Ibid.

,

p.

356.

For a more extensive treatment of this topic see
John Wright's The Sceptical Realism of David Hume, esp. pp.
151-59 and pp. 221-30.

Compare to Malebranche: "
brain traces are so
well tied to one another that none can be aroused without
all those which were imprinted at the same time being
aroused" (II 1.5,105).
Also, "It is enough that many traces
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;

were produced at the
same time for them all
to rise again
together"(II 1.5,106)

Compare to Hume:

[25]

the three
'^°"t^®Ption, judgment
and reasoning] is, that
t^akino^Vh
they an res^ilve
the^le^verin^o'^tii:
f/rsr“^and are
first,
nothing but Dartinniarconceiving objects.
Whether we

actrof^thT^underlt^ndina
'

,

whether
others

consider

«

the act of mind exceeds
not a simple conception.

97n)
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(p[

chapter

II

the formation and structure
op general rules

Hume's

first

discussion

rules IS found in Book
The

subject

Of

Philosophically

the

1,

of

the

operation

part 3, section

section

is

8

of

general

of the Treatise

probabilities determined

unjustified wavs.

Hume

cites

four

.

in

cases,

calling them "unphllosophlcal
probabilities".
It

IS

important to remember what Hume
means by "probability
His discussion of probability
follows his discussion of belief and is meant as
a continuation of the
same
subject.
Having discussed the nature of
belief and how we
come to form beliefs, Hume turns
to the topic of how we come
.

to

form various degrees of belief.

probable'
less

to describe

Hume uses the term

those judgments which are made with

than complete certainty.

His

interest

the

reader of his meaning.

how and
why we form different degrees of
belief or assurance in our
various judgments.
Hume
At

11,

is

careful

to

inform

is

in

the beginning of his discussion of probability
in section

Hume notes that some philosophers

other points)

(including himself at

have divided all our reasoning into Icnowledge

and probability,

the

former based on the relation of ideas,

the latter including any other forms of reasoning.

course,

entails classifying

all

48

causal

This, of

judgments as proba-

.

.

ble.

But Hume states his
intention of preserving
the "common signification of
words by allowing that
"many srgument s
from causality exceed
probabi 1 i ty
" (p
124)
Thus
at
least for the present
discussion, he will divide
reasonings
into three kinds, depending
on the decree of assurance
attached to them;
.

.

.

.

y knowledge,
ing from the

,

mean the assurance ariscomparison of ideas.
By
proofs, those arguments, which
are
d°riv d from the relation of
cause and effect, and which are entirely
free ^^rom
doubt and uncertainty.
By probability,
that evidence, which is still
attended
with uncertainty. fp. 124)
l

According to Hume,

there are two philosophically sanc-

tioned methods of proportioning
belief:
chances and probability of causes.

probability of

in the case of chances,

such as a roll of a die, belief
is proportioned according to
the "superior number of chances"
(p.
127).
if the die has
four sides marked with the same number
and two sides marked
with a different number, we conclude that
it is more probable that the number marked on four sides
will turn up on any

given roll.

in

according

the

to

the case of causes,

belief is proportioned

frequency with which

observed to follow from

a

given cause.

an

effect

in both

has

been

cases Hume

shows how the degrees of belief are explicable according
to
his theory of belief.

present

purposes.

His explanation is not important for

What

is

important
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is

Hume's claim that

these

two

methods

probabUlty.

constitute

Philosophers

the

"philosophical"

accept

forms

of

these as

legitimate ways
proportion belief; they are
"reasonable foundation of belief and opinion" (p. 143
).
in the previous section
on causality and belief,
Hume's

primary concern has not been
to present
p ical

system.

While

good and bad judgments,

oug^

how we

he

has

made

he has not

a

normative philo-

distinctions

advanced

between

thesis about

a

to make causal

judgments or about how we ought

to proportion

our beliefs.

His primary concern so far
has

been

Ui

causal

how we,

liefs.
the

As

I

f act

make

,

showed in Chapter

psychophysiological

Malebranche.

if

his

judgments

is

form be-

Hume adopts and develops

I,

view of natural

account

and

not

judgments

meant

to

be

held

by

philosophical analysis of how we make
rationally justified judgments, but, rather, a psychophysiological
account of how human beings in fact make judgments,
then his account must be
a

capable of explaining all of our judgments,
not simply those
judgments we consider philosophically
respectable. His dis-

cussion

of

unphilosophical

probabilities

is

an

attempt

to

show that certain forms of judgment that we
take to be illegitimate or unjustified are based on the same
principles as

legitimate probabilities,

that

is,

the

same natural

psychophysiological mechanisms.
Hume does not conclude that we have no grounds for making

a

distinction between

justified
50

and

unjustified

judg-

-nts.
of

the

The distinction is well
founded.

origin

and

nature of our

But

judgments

his account
and

beliefs is
method for distinguishing
between justified and unjustified
judgments must be different
from what
Philosophers have commonly
supposed, of course, Hume is
not
introducing a new point here.
There are two general themes
in Book I of the Tr eatise
.
The first is Hume's account
of
the nature of the understanding.
The second is Hume's insistence that, given a correct
account of the nature of the
understanding, the traditional,
ratlonallstically conceived
philosophical systems leave the
majority of our judgments
either inexplicable or completely
unjustified.
His best
known example is causal judgment.

correct,

As

then

I

the

explained

in

my

first

chapter,

Hume denied

that

there is any faculty of pure
understanding as understood by
Descartes and Malebranche.
what is of particular interest
and importance in his account of
unphi losophical probabilities IS the appearance of a non-rat
ionalistic method for
correcting and justifying certain forms
of judgment.
This
method involves the use of general rules.
While Hume is

only interested in

a

particular kind of error in judgment in

this section and is not specifically addressing
the question
of

justification in general,

l

believe that his account of

general rules provides the rudiments of an empirically
based

system of judgment justification.
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This rudimentary account

-

later

expanded

There are r.portant

to

cover .oral

U.its

and

political

iudg.ents.

to the justification
provided by

general rules, and these
li.rts will be addressed in
Chapter
IIIIn this chapter my main
concern is to work out the
account of general rules
presented by Hume in the discussion
of unphilosophical
probabilities.

According

to

Hume,

there are four types of un-

philosophical probability.
principle

of

judgment

Each

that,

is

based on

while unjustified,

explicable on Hume's account of
belief.

a

certain
is

fully

The four principles

are as follows:

An argument founded on any remembermatter of fact "is more convincing,
according as the fact is recent or
remote” (p. 143).
1.

ed

2.
A recent experiment affects us
more
than one long past.
:
1
the

longer the required inference,
less it affects our judgment.

4.
Rashly formed general rules produce
prejudice which influences our judgment.

Belief,

recall,

can

be

generally

characterized

lively idea related to or associated with
sion"

(p.

belief.

96).

to

an

a

present impres-

Probabilities are weaker or lesser degrees of

Given the mechanics

the majority of our beliefs,

original

a

as

impression the

associated

idea.

less

involved
it

in

the production of

follows that the fainter the

vivacity there is to transfer

The result
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is

weaker belief.

Un-

philosophical probabilities of
the first sort are explained
by the fact that more
remote memories are generally
less
lively than more recent ones
and thus have a lesser degree
of vivacity to transfer to
the associated idea.
The feeling
of belief tends to weaken
over time.
As it weakens it
"weighs" less in our thoughts and
has less influence on our
behavior.
This might explain some people's
seeming inability to learn from their mistakes.
In order to learn from
mistakes, one must be able to assign
equal weight both to
certain remembered facts and to present
facts.

what

judicious

a

judicious

reasoner will do.

reasoner

more remote,

the

and,

some

as

memory of it

But

not

regretted

And this Is

everyone is
action

a

becomes

loses the vivacity needed to

enliven an idea to the degree needed to
influence our present behavior.
The

second principle

is

similar

to

the

first.

While

the first principle depends upon the change in
authority
a

remembered fact,

change

in

second principle depends on the

the

authority of

of

a

remembered argument.

Hume's

example aptly illustrates the point:
A drunkard, who has seen his companion
die of a debauch, is struck with this
instance for some time, and dreads a
like accident for himself:
But as the
memory of it decays away by degrees, his
former security returns, and the danger
seems less certain and real.(p. 144).
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own

.

Again this fact Is explained
by the mechanics of belief,
"a
lively impression produces
more assurance than a faint
one,
because it has more original
force to communicate to the
related idea, which thereby
acquires a greater force and vivacity»(p. 144).

the

The third principle— the
longer the chain of inference,
less we are affected-explains
how "proofs" (judgments

free from uncertainty)
(judgments

degenerate

into "probabi 1 it ies"

"attended with uncertainty").

if

our degree of

assurance is generated by the degree
of vivacity transferred
from the original impression to
the associated idea, then,
Hume believes,
tis evident this vivacity must
decay in

proportion to the distance,
transition"

(p.

144)

.

it

and must

might

be

lose somewhat

noted that

this

in

each

is

only

"evident" assuming a physiology of animal
spirits.
The final form of unphilosophical
probability is rashly

formed general rules.
formed

is

particularly

formed rules

The way these general rules are
important.

While

following

rashly

leads to prejudice and thus to errors in judg-

ment, following judiciously formed general rules
is, according to Hume,

the only way to correct prejudice and all other

unphilosophical

probabilities.

To

understand the dis-

tinction between rashly formed and judiciously formed general

rules and
it

the

important corrective capacity of the lat-

will be necessary to examine Hume's account in some

detail
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[

Hume supplies the following
account of prejudice arissing from rashly formed
general rules:
An

^^ishman cannot have wit^
Frenchman cannot have solidity;

for
reason, tho' the conversation
of
e former in any instance
be visibly
very agreeable, and of the
latter very
;]udicious, we have entertain'd
such a
prejudice against them, that they
must
be dunces or fops in spite
of sense and
reason. (p. 146-47) 1
]

What
count

of

must

be

belief

accounted

formation

for within Hume's

is

"why men

general

form general

ac-

rules,

and allow them to influence their
judgment, even contrary to

present observation and exper ience
swer

IS

on which

that
all

"it

.
.

.

"

(p.

147).

Hume's an-

proceeds from those very same principles,

judgments concerning cause and effect depend.

Our judgments concerning cause and effect
are deriv'd from
habit and experience. .." (p. 147)
General rules arise from
natural processes of the imagination.
Lilce the other three

unphilosophical

probabilities,

rashly formed general

are derived from the same principles

cesses)

as

all

our

causal

judgments

rules

(based on the same pro-

(including

"proofs"),

viz., custom and experience.
An obvious question arises here.

The rash formation of

general rules is an illegitimate method of belief formation.
Yet

the

Hume claims it

legitimate

is

based on the very same principles as

philosophical
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probabilities.

What,

then.

distinguishes the two, allowing
us to view one as
justified,
the other as unjustified?
The answer lies in the
formation
of the rules.

Hu.e-s
causal

account

judgments

of

the

involves

gination based on

a

fundamental
the

method

for

forming

customary transition of

past constant conjunction.

Thus,

the
it

IS

puzzling why he believes that
prejudices of the sort he
describes can be explained by
the same principles as all
causal judgment.
Prejudice is one of the more
notorious examples of beliefs based on very
little experience.
But, in
fact, Hume believes there is
another, less fundamental, but
equally important method of forming
causal judgments.
Hume
calls this an "oblique" or "artificial"
method.
Hume first explains the oblique
manner of causal inference in section 8.
The most fundamental way of producing
the customary transition from
cause to effect is by experience of past constant conjunction.
But, having had experience of causal reasoning in general and
recognizing certain

principles governing such reasoning, we, in

a

sense, acquire

another, higher-order custom of causally relating
objects of
which we have had little or no past experience.
Inasmuch as
this is an important point,

I

quote Hume at length:

Even in common life, we may attain
knowledge of a particular cause merely
by one experiment, provided it be made
with judgment, and after careful removal
of all foreign and superfluous circumstances.
Now as after one experiment of
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upon the appearance
=an
draw an inference
inf
concerning the
correlative; and as a
hablt"c?n
acquir'd merely by
one
It may be thought that
Kofi
estee.’d
the effecr°e custom.
But this difficSltv^wfn vanish, if we
consider, that
suppos'd to have had
onw
^ particular
effect
ffect, yet we have had many
convince us of this principle;millions to
tha? like
9^2
PLac'd in ]^e circu^i^i^nMI^
always produce like ettects
and as
;
this principle has establish'd
itself
by
a sufficient custom,
it bestows an
firmness on any opinion to
which It can be apply 'd.
The connexion
of Ideas is not habitual
after
experiment; but this connexion is one
comprehended under another principle which
IS habitual
(p. 104-105).
"’'''d.

either'^of' th^

®

'

"

^

Here Hume is discussing how we can
attain knowledge of
causes without experiencing past
constant conjunction of the
objects in question.
if we are to avoid error, it is
important that such judgments be made
only after the "removal of
all

of

foreign and superfluous circumstances".
interest

at

present

is

not

how we

But

the point

make correct

judgments after merely one experiment, but,

rather,

form prejudices

answer

after one experiment.

after experiencing one

which does not
higher-order
causal

(or

a

few)

itself establish

a

in

other words,

judgment by causal principles.
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how we
is

that

cases of conjunction,

custom, we rely on

custom established by our

reasoning.

The

causal

we

long

learn

experience
to

a

of

guide our

.

in

makes

the

the

discussion

same

of

the

probability of causes,

Hu.e

point.

Initially our causal beliefs
arise
from experienced constant
conjunctions. But, while this
way
Of forming beliefs is
"first in order ... no one,
who has
the age of maturity, can
any longer be acquainted
with it"(p. 131).
But the time we have become
mature (experienced) reasoners we have
come to recognize certain
general principles involved
in making causal
inferences and
have acquired the higher
order custom of connecting
objects
according to this custom.
The mind, having form'd another
observation concerning the connexion
of causes
and effects, gives new force
to
reasoning from that observation; its
and
by
means of it can build an argument
on one
single experiment, when duly
prepar'd
and examin'd.
what we have found once
to follow from any object, we
will for ever follow from it; conclude
and if
this maxim be not always built upon
as
certain, 'tis not for want of a sufficient number of experiments, but because
we frequently meet with instances
to the

contrary

(p.

131)

The causes of prejudice Hume describes
are not explained merely by the fact that they result
from causal in-

ference made in this "oblique" manner.
this

is

the most

common method of making causal

among experienced reasoners.

process have been of
both

passages

As Hume points out,

cited,

its

he

But

his descriptions of this

legitimate employment.
is

careful
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inferences

to

point

out

Thus,
that

in

care

be

taken to

insure that such inferences
be "niade with
judgment, and after careful
re„,oval of all foreign
and superfluous circumstances",
p.
104).
Prejudices result from
the improper or "rash"
employment of general rules,
ignoring
these important conditions.
The

rash

formation

of

general

rules

is

not simply a
case of hasty generalisation,
as in, "A is B, therefore
all
A are B".
The problem lies in the
failure to attend to the
complexity of the causal circumstances.
Simply adding more
instances of A's that are B's
may not result in a better
judgment.
And, as Hume has noted, when
we do attend
to the

complexity of these circumstances,
one instance may provide
an adequate basis for
generalization.
Experienced reasoners are accustomed
to forming causal
judgments in an oblique manner.
After a certain amount of
experience in the world we assume that,
at

things

have causes.

(According

to

Hume,

least in general,
it

is

only those

who think philosophically or
scientifically who assume that
ev erything has a cause, cf. p. 132).
Suppose we meet someone who IS quite witless.
The imagination causally associates certain other features of the man with
his witlessness.
This is not

a

reflective process; the imagination naturally

associates these features.
extent rule-governed.
the

by

But

the association is to some

The association is not made simply by

experience of repeated past conjunction, but,
the

unreflective

employment
59

of

causal

instead,

principles.

The

problem lies in

failure to distinguish
complexities in the
causal circumstances.
The feature we note about
the man is
is Irish.
But he may also be uneducated,
senile, etc.
we are not careful to
note and separate the essential from the superfluous
circumstances.
a

m,

Our

ability

to

make

such

distinctions depends on our

general experience of causal
reasoning and on our judiciousness as reasoners.
These in turn depend on our
ability to
employ £ro perly formed general
rules.
But, before discussing the nature of properly
formed rules, let me return for a
moment to rashly formed rules.
Hume believes that careful
the complexity of
in

judgment,

the causal

attention must be given to

circumstances to avoid errors

which result from

a

natural propensity of the

imagination.

When the superfluous circumstances surrounding the cause are numerous, and remarkable, and frequently conjoined with
the essential, they have such an influence on the imagination, that even in
the absense of the latter they carry us
on to the conception of the usual effect

Having

(p.

148)

.

causally associated

example,

(A[1]&A[2]),

with

a

certain complex

a

certain effect,

to judge B upon the experience of either A[l]

though A[2]

is

imagination is,

in fact

superfluous.

in turn,

'object',

for

we are

led

B,

or A[2], even

This propensity of the

an instance of a more general pro-
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pensity: •When an object
appears that resembles any
cause in
y considerable circumstances,
the Imagination naturally
carries us to a lively
conception of the usual ef
•
feet
,p.
150).
Having established
.

a

X=(A[1ISA[21),

and Y,

.

.

transition between X, where

upon experiencing A[2),
which resem-

bles X, we judge Y.

Hume has not yet specified
what basic causal principles
guide our 'higher order' iudampni-c=
juagments.
Yet simply examining
the judgments we do in fact
malce and drawing
up a

rules
us

Implicit

with

a

in

such

list

of

judgments would not seem to provide

normative guide for maJtlng causal
judgments.

Hume's discussion of the unphi
losophical probabilities shows
that he believed that many
judgments we ma)te, while fully
explicable according to the general
principles of our underStanding, are illegitimate.
222222222
Throughout his discussion of the unphi
losophical proba-

bilities,

Hume

is

clearly assuming some standards by which

we judge such probabilities illegitimate.

Equally clearly,

such

standards cannot be the kind invoked by
Descartes and
Malebranche.
The standards must be derivable
from and ex-

plicable within Hume's system, and, according to
Hume's
system,

all

of our causal judgments depend on the customary

transition of the imagination.
of how to distinguish

There is an obvious problem

(or why we should distinguish)

legitimate and illegitimate judgments.
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between

Hume states the

problem as follows:

to my system, all
reasonings
arp nothing but the
are
effects
of
customand custom has no Influence,
but by Ini^^gin^tion, a^d giving Ss
a strong.
strong conception of any
obiect
ti^°ncluLd,'tha;
our
iud^en'V^'^'^a'^®'
judgment
and imagination can
never be
custom cannot operate
on^the^V^^"^
a manner / ass \n
to render it opposite
to
the
former. (p. 149)
If, within Hume’s system,

propensities

of

the

all judgments are based on
natural

imagination,

how can he maintain that

our -judgment” corrects the
propensities of the imagination?
Hume believes that we correct
judgments made according
to

the

unphilosophical

probabilities by appeal to what he
calls "general rules by which to
judge of cause and effect",
which are discovered by reflecting
on past judgments.
They
are rules, "by which we ought to
regulate our judgments concerning causes and effects"(p. 145
emp. mine).
,
To solve the problem Hume appeals

ence"

of

section

general
15

judgments.

where

rules.
he

cites

Hume

refers

eight

rules

to a

the

"second influ-

reader ahead to

for guiding

Commenting on these rules Hume says:
Here is all the LOGIC I think proper to employ in my reasoning; and perhaps even this was not very necessary,
but might have been supplied by the natural principles of our understanding.
Our scholastic headpieces and logicians
shew no such superiority above the mere
vulgar in their reason and ability, as
62

causal

to

give US any inclination
to -Lmxiare
imitate
in deliverina
^-Lvering a» long system
of
rules and precepts to
direct our iudqphilosophy.
All the rules of
th?o' nature are
this
easy in their invention
but extremely difficult
in their application
(p. 175) 2

them

i

[

Thus,

we

correct

formed general

rules

]

judgments
(and

made

according

to

rashly

other unphi losophical

probabiliby employing these general
rules by which to judge of
causes and effects.
But Hume does not claim merely
that we
do in fact correct our
judgments according to these rules.
ties)

What,

then,

oug^

to

formed

to

distinguishes the general rules by
which we

regulate

our

ourselves?

judgment

According

from
to

general

rules

rashly

Hume the rules that we

ought

to use in regulating our
judgments are "form'd on the
nature of the understanding and our
experience of its opera-

tions in the judgments we form
concerning objects.
By them
we learn to distinguish accidental
circumstances from efficacious causes" (p. 149).
How are such rules "form'd on
the nature of the understanding"?
Hume's account of the

"opposition" of general rules is helpful here:
When

object appears, that resembles
in any considerable circumstances,
the
imagination naturally
carries us to a lively conception of its
usual effect, tho' the object be different in the most material and most efficacious circumstances from that cause.
Here is the first influence of general
rules.
But when we taJce a review of
this act of mind, and compare it with
an

any cause

the

more general and authentic op63

we find
nature, and de-

of

strucfiv.

reasoning; which is the
rsnoo
rejecting it.
This is the
inf'll
second^ influence
second
of general rulec:
implies the condemnation of
the former
the°o:he;
Irltlnr Tr^
to the disposition
^nH
and character of the
The
vulgar are commonly guidedperson.
by the first
and wise men by the second.
(p. 149)

T'

'

—

i,

'

.

Again, suppose we meet a man
who is witless.
in an "oblique"

ture of

this

manner we causally associate

man

(his

Irishness)

with

a

Reasoning

certain fea-

witlessness.

Upon
meeting another man, we note
this same feature, establishing
a resemblance between him
and the first man. We then expect
the same "effect" and conclude
that he too will be witless,
although he is "different in the
most material and most efficacious circumstances" from the
first man.
This is the
first influence of general rules.
If we examine this judgment, we note that it involves making
a causal judgment
without distinguishing the type of resemblance
involved. We
thereby expect the same effect.
To analyze this mistake in
judgment assumes we have some standards for
determining correct causal judgments.
These standards are implicit in the

"more general and authentic operation of the
understanding".
Thus,

by comparing

the

judgment formed according to rashly

formed general rules to our "authentic" judgments, we
recognize the former as "irregular ... and destructive of all
the
most establish'd principles of reasoning ..." (p. 150
).
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,

According to Hume,

the standards Implicit

in our "general and authentic"
judgments are the eight rules
for judging causes and effects.
These rules are formed by
reflection on our experience
of past judgments.
Some of our past
judgments have been true,
others false.
After a certain
amount of experience „e
are able to discern the
principles

governing true judgments.

Thus,

the rules

for judging
causes and effects are taken
as standards of causal
judgment
because they are the rules
implicit in our past true judgmerits

.

A

[3]

natural

distinguish

question

between

clearly held

a

true

to

raise

and

at

false

this

point

judgments.

correspondence theory of truth

how we

is

while Hume
(cf

.

p.

448)

he took the general ability
to make our experience coherent
as indication of the truth
of judgments.
But Hume’s view on
this issue can only be understood
within the context of his

particular brand of skepticism and

discussion of that
important

for

topic

the present

until

the

l

want

to

postpone

next chapter.

What

the
is

discussion is Hume's belief that

by reflecting on past judgments we are
able to discern certain principles involved in our successful
judgments.
The
degree to which we will be able to discern these
principles

will

depend on our experience and education.

Hume's comments from section
A peasant

7:

can give no better reason for
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Consider

than
to sav
commonly It does not go
rightRn?^
artizan easily perceives,
that Vhe
® force in the sprinq
or
noifi
Influence
Sr the''"'whe^®l
'^"t.al
effect ferhi®'
reason of a grain of
dust,
dust
wh'^
I?
which
puts a stop to the whole
movement.
From the observation of
se^!
instances,
philosophers
fo?m
=1^’'""’'
connection betS^^t
twixt all causes and effects
is equally
tainty
some instances
from
he secret opposition proceeds
of contrary
nrrary
causes, (p. 132)

m

.

Those of the most
least

able

to

discern

successful judgments.
ural
by

limited experience and education
are
the

general

principles

first

in

Thus the "vulgar", following
the nat-

propensities of the imagination,

the

involved

[influence

of

general

"are commonly guided

rules] "(p.

150).

The

philosopher is supposed to have, not
only far more extensive
and diverse experience than the
peasant,
but

education,

to have

access to the

'experience* of

range of other people both past and
present.
the principles
to

establish

also,

through
a

wide

in recognizing

involved in successful judgments, he is
able
general

rules

for

guiding

causal

judgments.

Thus, the "wise" are guided by the second
influence of general rules.

One must

taJce

"vulgar" reasoners.
maJce

judgments

who do not.

care in distinguishing between "wise" and
The difference is not between those who

according

to

natural propensities and those

According to Hume,
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alj.

judgments are made ac-

cording to natural
propensities.
This applies to the judgments Of the ••wise"
reasoner in two respects.
First, the
general rules used by
such reasoners are based
on natural
propensities discovered by
reflection on past judgments.
Y reriection
Thus, these rules are
simply standards developed
from the
natural principles implicit
in our successful
judgments.
They are not standards
based on rational insight
into the
"essence" of objects, or on
innate ideas or any other rationalistic criteria.
•

4.

Second,
ing

if we examine the reasoning
involved in deriv-

these general

tern.

past

rules,

we will

discover

a

familiar pat-

To determine which of the
principles employed in our

judgments ought to regulate our
judgments,

"our reason
must be considered as a kind
of cause, of which truth is the
natural effect ..." (p. 180) .
He take past judgments as objects in our experience and note
that some of the objects
are constantly conjoined with truth.
While this is a somewhat awkward way of speaking, Hume's
point is clear.
General rules are formed by examining
past judgments.
We are

able

to

success

sort
or

these

failure.

principles

involved

judge

all

The
lows

that

objects

inference

This,
in

the

into
in

turn,

successful

judgments of this
involved

in

types

making

:
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according

allows us

judgments.

type will
this

to

be

judgment

to

their

discover
We

then

successful.
is

as

fol-

a

..

Judgments of type (A >B)
have been constantly conjoined with
success in past
experience

Judgments of type
successful

According to

Hutne

such

,

(A

>B)

will always be

inferences are "not founded on

reasoning or on any process
of the understanding"
They
. [4]
are based on the customary
transition of the imaginat ion
natural propensity. Hume
concludes:

—

Mean while the sceptics amy
here have
the pleasure of observing a
new and signal contradiction in our
reason, and of
seeing all philosophy ready to
be subverted by a principle of human
nature,
and again sav'd by a new
direction of
the very same principle.
The following
of general rules is a very unphi
losophical species of probability; and
yet 'tis
only by following them that we can
correct this, and all other unphi
losophical
probabilities. (p. 150)

There is one further aspect of Hume's
basic account of
general rules that deserves emphasis.
This involves the
difference between imagination and judgment.
The general
rules for judging causes and effects were

introduced to

explain how there can be

a

conflict between imagination and

judgment when, according to Hume's system, all
judgments are
derived from the imagination.
it is important to keep in
mind

a

certain ambiguity in the use of the word

tion'.

need

not

To say that

imply

that

a

judgment

it

is

is

based on the imagination

illegitimate.
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'imagina-

As

was

shown

in

:

Chapter

i,

'imagination'

is

a

t echnical

term referring to
the faculty by which
we form and unite ideas.
But we also
^^^^iri^uish between good
qodh and u
j
bad
reasoning and mark this
distinction by attributing
bad reasoning to "mere
imagination and good reasoning
to “judgment".
Here we use ’imagination
to refer to the more
frivolous workings of the

imagination.
i

m

section 11 Hume acknowledges
this ambigu-

ty

In general we may observe,

that

as

P^°bable reasonings
?oundl"/^"
founded
on the vivacity of ideas, !s
it
resembles many of those whimsies
and
prejudices, which are rejected
under the
opprobrious character of being offspring
of the imagination.
By this expression
It appears that the work,
imagination,
IS commonly us'd in two
different
senses; and tho'nothing be more
contrary to true philosophy, than
this inaccuracy, yet in the following reasoning
I
have often been oblig’d to fall
into
It.
When I oppose imagination to the
memory, l mean the faculty, by which
we
orm our fainter ideas.
When I oppose
It to reason, l mean the
same faculty,
excluding only our demonstrative and
probable reasonings. (p. 117-l8n)
To
that

oppose

there

is

judgment

to

imagination

is

not

to

suppose

faculty of judgment entirely distinct from

a

the faculty of imagination, that is, the
faculty by which we

form our fainter ideas.
and understanding
the

imaginat ion.

"the memory, senses,

[judgment]

are ... all of them founded on

265).

The distinction between judg-

.
.

in this sense,

"

(p.
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-nt

and Innaginatlon is
between those judgments
based on the
•""ore extensrve and
constant- operations of the
understanding and those judgments
based on the -.ore capricious
and
uncertain- operations of
the understanding
,p. 149 ,.
But
the fact that the difference
is a matter of degree
does not
""ean that each should
have equal authority ,or no
authority)
in guiding our judgments.

Hume defends

the

distinction in justifying his

criticism of the ancient
philosophers.
These philosophers,
Hume claims, -were guided by
every trivial propensity of the
imagination...
fact

(p.

guided by the

224).

But,

if all of our reasoning is
in

Imagination,

particularly telling criticism.

then this would not seem a

Hume justifies the crltl-

cism as follows:

It may be objected, that the
imagination, according to my own confession,
being the ultimate judge of all
systems
of philosophy, l am unjust in
blaming
the ancient philosophers for making
use
of that faculty, and allowing
themselves
to be entirely guided by it in
their
reasonings.
in order to justify myself,
I
must distinguish in the imagination
betwixt the principles which are permanent, irresistable
and universal; such
as the customary transition from causes
to effect, and from effects to causes;
And the principles, which are changeable, weak and irregular
The former
are the foundation of all our thought
and actions, so that upon their removal
human nature must immediately perish and
go to ruin.
The latter are neither
unavoidable to mankind, nor necessary,
or so much as useful in the conduct of
life
(p. 225)
,

70

.

Hume

is

not

eliminating the distinction
between judg-nt and Imagination. „hat he
is doing is, in effect,
redefining the distinction.
One of Hume's major tasks
was
the debunking of the
traditional views of the nature
of
judgment.
But to deny that such
views are correct is not to
deny that there is such
a thing as judgment,
which can be
distinguished from 'mere'
imagination.
Throughout his works
Hume constantly distinguishes
between conclusions which can
be
justly" drawn and those that
cannot; between "wise" and
"judicious" reasoning and "foolish"
and "vulgar" reasoning.
There are, then, standards
for distinguishing between
good
reasoning or "judgment" and bad
reasoning or "imagination"
and to adhere to these
standards is to make rational
judgments.
Likewise, there are standards for
moral judgments and to adhere to such standards
is to judge morally.
The standards are embodied in
general rules; thus, to guide
our judgments according to general
rules is to make rational
judgments

Clearly

a

lot more needs to be said about the
normative

authority of general rules.

i

have indicated that this

authority is related to our experience of what
sorts of
judgments
tions

of

are

likely to

lead

to

truth.

This

justification and the relationship between Hume's

theory of general rules and his skepticism.
ter

is

raises ques-

devoted to these issues.
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The next chap-

But before turning to that

topic,

want

I

briefly to discuss Tho.as
Hearn's account of

general rules.
of

the

subject

known

This is the only thorough
discussion
to

reading his discussion,
un,

me
i
1

Thonnh
Though

t
I

u
have

profited from

think- It k
=o
tnink
has
certain shortcomings
i

which deserve to be pointed
out.
The central features of
Hearn's account are as follows:
There are two different
types of general rules.
The first
type "describes a propensity
of the imagination to
extend
the scope of judgments
formed in one set of circumstances
to
other resembling but
non-identical circumstances"
[5
The
.

second

type

"function

propensities which result
permitted
these

two

to

operate

certain

natural

erroneous belief or action if

unchecked.

"

[6]

According

Hearn,

types of general rule are very
different.

Those

type involve the propensity of the
imagination

to generalize and are

of

in

correct

to

of the first

Those

to

]

the

second

the source of illegitimate judgments.

type

are

not

the

result

of

mere

propensities of the imagination; they are
"rules of the
understanding"
tive".

and

are

"corrective,

reflective

and

direc-

They are corrective in serving to correct
natural
propensities; they are reflective
in being "consciously
[7]

formulated

and

adopted. "[8]

normative authority:

"we

They are directive

'ought'

in

having

to follow them and failure

to do so is a potential source of error.
"[9]

The formation of the first type of general rule is
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:

[

•explicable

in

ter.s

resemblance... UO,

of

The

the

fa.iliar Hu.ean principles
of
second type of general
rules
rs

formulated

by reflecting on the
nature of our mental activities and operations...
[11] According to Hearn,
..the outcome
of this reflection is
the formation of rules by
use of which
• ••
coJ^iT©ction occurs
occiitq” .[12]
rioi
tt
Hearn's description of the
formation of the "first
j-irst sori-"
sort
of „

general

rules

is

as

follows

Let

us

suppose that C is known to be

necessary for the production of E.
However, when c produces E,
It IS conjoined with D
which is entirely
incidental to the production of
E.
The
effect of the conjunction of
D with C
however, is that the imagination
extends
the principle "C causes E"
to the resembling circumstances "C and D
cause E".
The imagination even can be
led to expect the production of e when
D is
present and C absent.
This effect on
the imagination is what Hume
calls the
first influence of general rules".
13
]

Hearn has surprisingly little to
say about the formation of
the "second sort" of general rule.
He tells us that they
are formed by reflecting on the
nature of our mental
activities, but he does not attempt to show
the structure of
this second type of rule as he does with
the
first type.

believe

the

failure

important point which
What

I

to
I

do

so

leads

him

i

to

overlook an

a

very sketchy

will discuss below.

have been saying here amounts to

account of Hearn's view, but it is adequate for purposes
of
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comparing Hearn's account
of the formation of
general rules
with my own.

The
stated.

similarities

between

our

accounts

are easily
„e agree that general
rules are both the source
of

Illegitimate

judgments.

we

also

agree that, in their
correctrve capacity, general
rules are normative.
Finally,
we agree that normative
general rules are derived
from
reflection on our "mental
activities and operations".
on
the other hand, our
differences stem primarily from
one
fundamental disagreement.
while Hearn claims
there are two

very different types of
general rules,
one type of general rule.

there are

rules

two different

are

the

Hearn's reason for insisting that
types of rule

result

of

imagination, resulting

in

the

rules

other

case

the

claim there is only

I

mere

is

that

in one case

propensities

very misleading.

propensity of the

the

illegitimate judgments, while in

are

the

product

understanding, resulting in legitimate
judgments.
is

of

of

the

But this

What Hearn calls the "generalizing

imagination"

is

simply the imagination's

propensity to join ideas by resemblance
and custom.
According to Hume, these are fundamental
natural principles
of human thought.
Hume was attempting to explain aM
judgments by means of the same fundamental
principles, while
at the same time preserving the distinction

between

legitimate and illegitimate judgments.
distinction

between

legitimate
74

and

Clearly the

Illegitimate

judgments

cannot

depend

on

whether

or

not

they

result

from

propensities of the imagination.
As

showed above, the two
"operations" of general
rules described by Hume
are identical
I

m

in form,

case

the first

person has experienced
objects of type A constantly
conjoined with objects of
type B.
He is then presented with
an object a, which
resembles objects of type
A.
By a
customary transition, he forms
the idea of an object of
type
this idea is enlivened by
the Impression of
a

thus

judges

— or

m

believes— B.

the

second

a.

He

case

the

operations involved are exactly
the same.

A person has
experienced objects of type A (in
this case judgments) constantly conjoined with objects

of

then presented with an object

which

type

a

B

(truth).

He

is

particular judgment)

(a

r6sembles uujecrs
obiects or
nf type

a
A.

By

customary

a

transition he forms the idea of B and
this idea is enlivened
by a.
TO call these two very different
types of rules,
one

based on propensities of the imagination,

the other on the

understanding, is certainly misleading.
Surprisingly,
two

types,

Hearn

after

distinguishing

acknowledges

that

general

"there

is

rules
no

into

sense

in

which these ["reflective"] rules could be other
than empirical

and,

But,

point

as

hence,
I

and

products of probable reason or custom".

noted above,
makes

no

Hearn has

attempt

to
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little to say about

[14]

this

explain how these rules are

the product Of custom.

have

recognized

that,

if he

had worked this out
he might
while we attribute
preiudice
to

the

imagination and general
rules to the judgment,
the only
distinction

is

between the more "capricious
and uncertain"
and the more "extensive
and constant" operations
of the
imagination.
Hume has good reason to
insist that the two examples
of
the operation of general
rules involve only the
"redirecting" of the "very same
principle".
it is important to keep
in mind the task that
Hume is trying to accomplish.
He is

developing
project

is

a

theory of natural judgments.

Part

of his

to

uncover the fundamental
principles operative
in all our judgments.
The section on unphilosophical
probabilities is meant to support
his claim that all judgments
based on the same principles.
The

unphilosophical

probabilities,

although

not

"sanctioned"

by

philosophers,

are in fact "deriv'd from
the same principles" as all other

probabilities.
Hume

IS

particularly

careful

contradiction in his system.

to

resolve

an

apparent

He has claimed that custom is

the foundation of all of our
judgments and that custom is a

propensity of the imagination.

Yet he admits that unphilo-

sophical probabilities are an illegitimate
method of forming
judgments.
Doesn't this presuppose that we have a
faculty
of judgment different from and opposed
to the mere propensities of the imagination?
Hume's reply is
that we do not
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need to suppose any
separate faculty, although
rt Is natural
for us to do so.
The criterion for
determining the legiti-cy Of a judgment is whether
or not that type of
judgment
IS

Ukely

to be true.

„e determine this by
comparing it to
past judgments.
when it resembles the
type of judgments
that have been successful
in our past experience,
we accept
tt as legitimate,
when it is "irregular”
we reject it as
illegitimate.
To correct judgments
based on propensities of
the imagination we use
judgments based on the same
propenslThus Hume offers a unified
theory of natural judgments, which allows for
the correction of judgments
without
appeal to any "pure and
intellectual view, of which the
superior faculties of the soul
are alone capable"
(p.

77
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NOTES

The example appears
to be from Malebranche:

[11

Pattr/u?ar

h?m^,/r7s"7ef^n\a
an

iudae
i;^no
u
ians,
have

the

Z
Englishmen,

'’^o^r

Frenchman to

or
same character

all

Ital^

ne he has already seen,
and he gives in
to some secret liking
or distaste for%h2
man" (Search After Truth
in 2.11, 258).
^

Royal Logi^c

;^^

Passage

suggests

In the part of philosophy

the

Influence

of

the

Port

called, loqic

ITrolT

Claim to offer us a light philosophers
clairto
dissipating the darkness of capable of
Logic IS said to correct all tL mind!
thought and to ®^fcr us errors of
rules so
trustworthy as to lead us infallibly
to
the truth
a set cf rules so necessary

—

that

without them to know the truth
with
complete certainty
is -Lii'PossiDie.
^
impossible.
Such
praises the philosophers bestow on
their own precepts.
But if we
the use philosophers have made consider
of their
own rules either in logic or in
the other
branches of philosophy, we shall have
good
reason to suspect the truth of such
premises” (p. 11-12).
[3]

Hume'

-

viewed
Roya 1 Logic

"Sometimes

theory of general rules can plausibly
be
out of a suggestion made in the Port

men

are

mistaken

i

n

their judgments, but not always; so man
must reason now poorly. now well. and
78

m

,,
, ,,
,

r0asoninQ doot1\7
recognizing his Lror

'

Er^uiry

Concerning Human Understand)

Rules'

ie^’• JonrL^ "-e
405'-406.
[6]

Ibid

.

P.

406.

[7]

Ibid

.

P.

411.

[8]

Ibid.

P-

410.

[9]

Ibid .

P.

411.

[10]

Ibid

.

P.

411.

[11]

Ibid

.

P.

412.

[12]

Ibid.

P.

413.

[13]

Ibid

P-

410.

[14]

Ibid.

P-

413.

.

,

capable of

future

error'Mp. 11).
[4]

s

.

p,

i,

32

.

Hume

'

(October
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chapter III
REASON AND SKEPTICISM

in Chapter

ii,

Of general rules.

provide

a

correcting

i

i

examined the structure and
formation
showed how general rules
were meant to

purely naturalistic method
of regulating and
judgments

and

that

Hume believed

general

rules
normative authority because
they embody the standards
Of rational judgment.
this chapter I want to
examine
Hume's views on the normative
authority of general rules in
more detail.
i
also want to discuss the related
topic of
the connection between
Hume's theory of general rules
and
his skepticism.

have

m

Normative Authority of General Rules

According to Hume, by examining the
"operations of our
understanding, and ... our experience
of its operation in
the judgments we form concerning
objects,” we learn to
separate the "more extensive and constant"
operations from
the "more capricious and uncertain"
operat ions (p
149 ).
.

General rules are formed according to the
extensive and
constant operations and serve to correct judgments
made

according to the capricious and uncertain operations.

Thus,

the steady application of general rules will
ensure that all
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.

our

judgments

„U1

confer,

to

the

extensive

ana

constant

principles
Hume

rational

clearly

believed

that

it

Is

preferable or more
to conform our judgments
to the more extensive and

constant operations of the
understanding.
„e attribute
these operations to the
judgment, while attributing
the
capricious

operations

to

the

imagination.
if „e concede
this point, then it is clear
why we ought to follow
general
rules.
What is not clear is why
we should make such a
concession.
what grounds are there for
maintaining that it
is more rational to
conform our judgments to the
more
extensive operations of the
understanding?
We are able to
distinguish between the different
operations by observing
that certain types of judgments
have often been false, while
other types have often been true.
But Hume's discussion of
causal inference has shown that
there is no justification
for the Inference from past
regularities to future regularities.
Thus, the fact that, in the past,
judgments made
according to the extensive and constant
principles have been
more often true cannot provide any
grounds for Inferring
that such judgments will continue to be
true in the future.
If we cannot show that judgments based
on the extensive

and constant principles of the imagination
will be more
likely to turn out true, then what grounds are
there

for

considering such judgments more rational than those based
on
the capricious and uncertain principles?
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A number of recent

commentators have noted that
Hume persistently
advocates the
adoption of what we would
call -scientific .nethod”
and
ticizes all manner of
"superstitious" reasoning [l]
some
Of the. have ctted
the following passage as
Hu.e’s atte.pt
to justify the distinction:
.

It may here be objected,
that the
imagination, according to my
own
confession, being the ultimate
judge of all
systems of philosonhv
t
losopny
I
am umust
in V.1
blaming the ancient philosophers^
for
making use of that faculty,
and allowing
themselves to be entirely
guided by it
in their reasonings.
order to justiy myself, i must distinguish in
the
imagination betwixt the principles
which
are permanent, irresistable
and universal,
such as the customary transition
from causes to effects, and
from effects
principles which are
angeable, weak, and irregular, such
as
hose I have just now taken notice
of.
The former are the foundation
of all our
thoughts and actions, so that upon
their
removal human nature must immediately
perish and go to ruin.
The latter
neither unavoidable to mankind, nor are
necessary, or so much as useful in the
conduct of life; but on the contrary
are
observ'd only to take place in weak
minds, and being opposite to the
other
principles of custom and reasoning, may
easily be subverted by a due contrast
and opposition. (p. 225
-L

,

m

,

)

The

traditional method of justifying

show that

it

method.

method is

A

is

formed

in

a

judgment

accordance with

justified by showing that

likely to result in true judgments.

a

is

to

justified
it

is

more

But, given Hume's views

on causal inference, he cannot maintain that
judgments based
82

established principles
Therefore,

he

cannot

are

appeal

support his claim that

to

It

more
the

likely

to

be

true.

traditional gronnds to

more rational to guide our
judgments according to
established principles such
as
Is

cus-

tom.

The question,

then.

Is

whether Hume can provide any

Other grounds for this
claim.
It

is certainly questionable
whether the fact that some

principles

are

"permanent,

Irreslstable,

Others "weak and irregular”
j-i-i-eguiar
ran
can,
reason

for

irrational.

considering
Passmore,

the

in
m

and

universal".

itself, provide any
^

i

former rational

jt

and

the

latter

for Instance, clearly maintains
that

this approach is inadequate:

"Unphilosophical probability" depends
on
trick of the mind; but so does
philosophical probability.
why, then, does
the philosopher regard them so
differently? .... In neither case, on
Hume's
view, is there any objective
implication; in both cases we are led
to
certain conclusion as a result of aa
merely psychological operation....
Is there, then, no difference
between these two cases?
One difference,
Hume again suggests, is that to rely
upon unphilosophical probability would
be to commit ourselves to an 'irregular'
kind of reasoning, which is 'capricious
and uncertain' in contrast with the 'extensive and constant' principles of
philosophical reasoning (T, 149)
But
why should we prefer regularity to irregularity? To this the only answer can
be, Hume replies, that the 'disposition
and character of
the person' (T, 150)
will determine his preference. [2]
a

.
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Passmore goes on to point
out that this resort
to
individual psychological
preference is worthless in
the
attempt to justify the
distinction between rational
and

irrational

judgments.

pineal reasoning
able".

"The

logical

be justified

—

problem

-

how can em-

vanishes
vaiiitsiies as unanswernn;,n

[3]

think Passmore is too hasty
here.
while it is true
that this sort Of appeal
to individual psychology
could not
support the distinction between
rational and irrational
judgment, it is not necessarily
true, as his discussion in
the section seems to suggest,
that no appeal to psychology
could provide grounds for the
distinction.
Hume does not
claim that the reason (ground)
for the distinction is the
disposition of the individual.
He claims that people are
inclined toward one form or the
other according to their
disposition. This is a different claim
altogether. One can
admit that whether people choose
their winter coats on the
basis of warmth or style is often
determined by their
disposition without concluding that the
only grounds for
prefering one 'principle' to the other
is individual disposition.
The same is true of the principles of
reasoning.
I

Hume could argue in the following manner:

psychological

fact

about

human beings

that

It

is

a

they prefer

orderly and coherent judgments to disorderly and
incoherent
judgments.
Following the regular and established principles
results in orderly and coherent judgments, following
weak

84

irregular principles
results in disorderly and
incoherent judgments.
People who reason according
to weak and
gular principles are
irrational because they are
thwarting their own aims.
They are like people who
prefer warmth
to style yet, on a
sudden impulse, end up
buying a flimsy
Stylish coat.

Numerous

passages

believed that

in

the
tne

"love ot
of order
ord^.i-”

Treatise
is

•

indicate

u
inherent

that

Hume

•

in human

nature.

To note just a few such
passages;

Objects have a certain coherence
even as
they appear to our senses;
but this
coherence is much greater and
more uniform, if we suppose the
objects to have
a continu d existence;
and as the mind

observing

^

an
niformity among objects, it
naturally
continues, till it renders the
uniformity as compleat as possible.
(p. 198)

The mind has a natural propensity
to join relations, especially
resembling
ones, and finds a kind of
fitness and
uniformity in such an union. (p. 509)

The same love of order and
uniformity,
which arranges the books in the library,
and the chairs in the parlour,
contributes to the formation of society
(n
504)

Although

this

for maintaining

line

that

it

of reasoning would provide grounds
is

more rational

to

follow estab-

lished principles than it is to follow irregular
principles,
it

appears to conflict with certain other of Hume's
claims.

If

the established principles produce orderly
judgments and
85

he

irregular

judgments

do

not,

and

It

is

a

psychological

fact

that human beings prefer
order,
explain the fact that many
(if not

then how can Hume

most)

of manlcind reason

according to the irregular
principles?

Hume notes that
"superstition arises naturally
and easily from the popular
opinions of mankind
and that for this reason
it is
more likely to rule the
popular Imagination, (p. 271
He
)

also Claims that the "wise”
are generally guided by the
established principles, the vulgar
by the irregular princi-

ples.

By the vulgar Hume meant the
Ignorant and uneducated
in other words, the majority
of mankind.
The implication
is that the majority of
mankind

—

guide

their judgments
according to weak and irregular
principles.
This is difficult to reconcile with the
claim that human beings prefer
orderly judgments.
The evidence appears to indicate
just
the opposite.
think that Hume can answer this sort
of criticism by
distinguishing between different levels of
judgment of belief.
Custom is the permanent, irresistable and
universal
principle underlying all of he most fundamental
beliefs of
common life.
Hume is not referring to our most cherished
religious or ideological convictions.
He is referring to
I

much more basic beliefs— the types of belief
that underlie

even our most trivial thoughts and actions.
to

When we get up

answer the door we reveal the belief that the knock was
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produced by someone, that
our bodies will .ove as
we desire,
that the floor will
support us, that the door
Is where we
remember it being, and
countless other basic beliefs.
These
sorts Of belief are the
product of custom and are
common to
all mankind.
Without them our experience
would be disconnected and incoherent.
Hume makes this point gulte
clearly
in the first Enquiry
:

*’*

great guide of
principle alone
experience useful to
us^^^
us, and makes us expect,
for the future,
train of events with those
Withou^ the influence of custom,
we would be
entirely ignorant of every matter
of
tact, beyond what is immediately
present
to the memory and senses.
We should
never know how to adjust means
to ends,
or to employ our natural
powers in the
production of any effect.
There would
be an end at once of all action,
as well
as the chief part of speculation.
[4]
human life.

Thus,

at

this

it

basic

is that

level

of

belief,

everyone

forms

judgments according to the established
principle of custom.
But, at a somewhat more complex level,
other natural propensities that are "neither unavoidable
..., nor necessary, or
so much as useful in the conduct of
life” begin to influence

judgments.

Hume

has

three different,

yet

related,

criti-

cisms of the irregular principles discernable
in the operation of these propensities:
1.

lar

Judgments made according to irreguprinciples are "often contrary to
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each other" and lead
us to "absurdities
and obscurities". (p.
267)

2

Judgments

made according to
lar principles are
the most establish' d "disruptive
principles
.

soning".(p. 150)

Ld
bv

3

According

irreguof all
of rea-

principles "being op°iher principles of custom
subverted
dne
due contrast and opposition”,
(p.

to

Hume, we cannot know that
beliefs formed
according to custom are more
likely to be true. Neither can
we know that they are more
likely to be false.
But we do
know that principles that lead
to judgments that are "often
contrary to each other", and lead
to "absurdities and
obscurities" cannot lead to truth.
Hume often refers to the
absurdities and contradictions that
result from the "trivial

propensities of the fancy".
ties

provide

propensities,

a

good

"an

The unphilosophlcal probabili-

example.

Because

experiment,

that

is

of

certain natural

fresh

in

the

memory

affects us more than one that is in some
measure obliterated. .."

(p.

143 ).

When the evidence that smoking is dan-

gerous to my health is fresh in my memory,
smoking is unsafe.
judge that

I

judge that

When the same evidence is more remote,

smoking is safe.

Guiding my judgment by such

I

a

principle leads me to form contrary judgments from exactly
the same evidence.

Not

only do we know that principles that result in
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contrary judgments cannot
employing
truth.

mutually

According

lead

inconsistent
to

Hu.e,

to

„e also kno« that

principles

„e all

but accept the basic
beliefs of

troth,

accept

co™on

life.

cannot

lead

and cannot
At this

we all employ the egular
and established principles.

Who

^

form beliefs

according

to

to

help
level

Those

weak and

irregular
principles are following
principles that conflict with
established principles. The
drunkard who lets time weaken
his
belief that he, like his
friend, is in danger of dying
of a
debauch, employs mutually
incompatible principles.
When he
expects his liquor to pour when
he tips his bottle, to feel
a warm glow when he
drinks and the ground to support
him
where he lies, he is reasoning
according to the established
principle of custom.
When he allows his belief in his
danger to weaken over time he is
“reasoning" according
to an

irregular principle that
tructive of all

the most

is

“opposite"

to custom and

“des-

established principles of reason-

ing".

Given that we cannot give up the
established principles, the only consistent course is
to give up the weak and
irregular principles.

According to Hume, at the level of basic
beliefs we are
unable to suspend judgment.
"Nature, by an absolute and
uncontroulable necessity has determin'd us to judge
as well

as

to

breath

and

feel..."(p.

183).

forming beliefs according to custom.
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Neither can we avoid

forbear viewinq

^

stronger and fuller

liaht
iignt,
upon account of thf^ir
connexion with the present
Drf^Qontimpression.
ourselves frL thinking
inras
as long
lo^n'’a
as we are awake, or
seeing
eyes towards them in broad
sunshine.
•

(p.

Given the

facts

that

,1,

judgments formed according to

irregular principles will
inevitably conflict with
judgments
.ade according to established
principles then we can avoid
"seeing surrounding bodies,
when we turn our eyes towards
them in broad sunshine”,
it follows that judgments
formed
according to irregular principles
will often be unstable.
"Being opposite to the other
principles of custom and
reasoning, [they] may easily be
subverted by a due contrast
and opposit ion" (p. 225 ).
Not
are

all

unstable,

the principle

beliefs

that

however.
that

most

result

m

fact,

from irregular principles

indoctrination,

it

is

resembles custom in its operation,

often produces remarkably stable beliefs.
tom,

which

cannot be consistently employed.

But, unlike cus-

No amount of

indoctrination will allow us to sustain the
belief that
placing our hand on
off

cliffs

is

a

hot stove will not burn, that walking

harmless,

or

that

we can breathe water.

A

belief produced by an irregular principle can
remain stable
only when it does not conflict (or at least not
obviously
conflict) with a belief based on custom.
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Thus,

While Hu^e admits that we
cannot justify custom
by Showing that U ts
more UKely to lead to

true judgments,
he does not conclude
that there are no grounds
for supposing

more rational to form
judgments according to custom
than
to form judgments
according to Irregular
principles.
It

t^tnatlon

is

allow'd to
enJer
PbHo/ophy, and hypotheses
embrac'd
specious and
aoreeLie"’®'"®^^
agreeable,
we can never have any
steadv
sentiments, which
will^suit^'
^
common practice and expethese
rpmnv^Ad, we might hope hypotheses once
remov
to establish a
system or set of opinions, which
if not
that, perhaps, is too much
?o
be hop d for) might at least
be satisfactory to the human mind, and
might
stand the test of the most
critical
examination. (p. 272)
We

now have

normative

a

clear answer

authority of general

to

the question about

rules.

Following

the

properly

formed general rules will ensure the
consistent application
of the fundamental principles
inherent in our reasoning.

These principles are the foundation
of our thoughts and
actions and

it

is

that we can achieve

only be following these principles alone
a

consistent system of orderly, coherent

and stable judgments.

Although they cannot be justified in

— by showing
judgments — they can

the traditional manner

that

result

be shown to be rational-

in

true

following them will

ly preferable to irregular principles.
It

is

interesting

to

note an
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important

and

marJced

contrast between Hu.e
and

Ms

rationalist predecessors.
Descartes and Malebranche
considered natural judgments
the
source of endless error
and illusion.
According to them,
the principles of
scientific thinking are
discoverable only
at the abstract level
of thought discoverable
in the operation Of the intellect, a
level seldom achieved by
the
vulgar.
contrast, Hume maintained that
the principles of
scientific thinking are Inherent
in our most basic natural
judgments.
According to him, when answering

m

the door, pre-

paring

a

meal,

or

taking

walk,

a

the most

vulgar peasants
employ exactly the same principles
of reasoning as the most
sophisticated philosophers.
Our scholastic headpieces and
shew no such superiority above logicians
the
vulgar in their reason and ability,mere
as
to give us any inclination
to imitate
them in delivering a long system
of
rules and precepts to direct our
judgment, in philosophy. (p. 175)

Although
reasoning
the

Hume

are

maintains

inherent

in

the

most vulgar reasoner,

credit,

that

the

that

he

the

principles

fundamental

many such

good

beliefs of even

does not conclude,

to his

so-called "common sense" views of the

vulgar have some sort of prima facie validity.
that

of

beliefs are simply false.

But

He

this

argues
is

not

inconsistent with the view that the principles of
scientific
thinking

are

inherent

in

the

basic beliefs of

the

vulgar.

The difference between the reasonings of the vulgar and
the
92

[

reasonings

of

the

true

philosopher

is

in

methodology,
scientific method requires
the consistent application
of the
permanent, irresistable,
and universal" principles
inherent
in the judgments of
common life.

philosopher-the

scientific

The decisions of the true

thinker-"are nothing

but

reflections of common life,
methodized and corrected”
.

the

5]

The Skeptical Limits of
General Rules

Hume

develops

his

views

on

the

relationship

between
reason, general rules and skepticism
in two sections fo Book
I
of the T reatise
Part 4, section 1, "of scepticism
with
regard to reason", and Part
4, section 7, "Conclusion of
this book
In the first of these sections
Hume attempts to
show how, by consistently adhering
to the prescriptions of
reason, we will be led inevitably to
skepticism about reason
:

.

Itself.

In

the

latter section Hume offers what Robert

Fogelin has aptly called his "skeptical
conclusion" to these
doubts [6]
.

For convenience,

cism”

will divide the section "Of scepti-

into three parts.

two-stage
"all

I

skeptical

In the

argument

first part Hume advances

purporting

to

show

knowledge degenerates into probability" and,

by following our reason,

all

nothing”.

part

in

the

second
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probability
of

the

is

section,

(1)
(2)

a

that
that,

"reduc'd to
Hume

links

this
that

argument
our

to

failure

his
to

theory

of

belief,

first

by

claiming

follow reason

in forming our beliefs
supports his theory that
"belief is more properly
an act of
the sensitive, than of
the cogitative part of
our natures",

and,

second,

by offering

a

psychophyslologlcal explanation
Of Why we are unable to
follow reason,
the third

m

part of
the section, Hume turns
his attention from the
psychological
to the philosophical
conclusions to be drawn from the
argument in the first part.
He concludes that, by refusing
to be influenced by the
principles that our reason explicitly condemns, we will
inevitably undermine the authority
of
reason.

There are two features of Hume's
argument in the first
part of the section that link it
directly to the subject of
general rules.
First, in illustrating how knowledge
reduces
to probability, Hume shows how
demonstrative reasoning comes
under the influence of general rules.
Second, he sows how

reason subverts

itself by extending the application of

general rules beyond their natural

scope.

The first stage

Hume describes as follows:
In

rules

[7]

all demonstrative sciences the
are certain and infallible; but

when we apply them, our fallible and
uncertain faculties are very apt to de-

from them, and
must, therefore, in
a new judgment as a
our first judgment
enlarge our view to

fall into error.

We

every reasoning form
check of controul on
or belief; and must
comprehend a kind of
94

^y,

.

1

,

onf as

Kind of caus6,

of which

bv

°‘her causes
and bv th» ?n^^°^stancy
of
our mental
powers^ mav
f
may frequently
be prevented
rv
this means all knowledge
degenerates
into probability, and
this probabilltv
IS greater or less,
accordLg
to on?
experience of the veracity or
deceitfulunderstanding, and according
to^^the^
to
the simplicity or
intricacy
^ of the
question. (p. 180)
f

However -infallible" the rules
of demonstration may be,
experience teaches us that we
make mistakes in our demonstrative reasoning.
-There is no Algebraist or
Mathematician so expert in his science,
as to place entire confidence
in any truth immediately
upon his discovery of it..."(p.
IBO); not because he has any
doubts about the truths of
mathematics, but because he
recognizes the possibility
of

errors in his judgments.

Our experience of errors in demon-

strative judgments does not lead us
to doubt the principles
of mathematics but, rather, our
ability to correctly apply
such principles in our judgments.
A simple example illustrates Hume's point.
Suppose I want to write a check for
$135.00.
I consult my check register
and note a balance of
$136.08.
Knowing that I have often miscalculated
and

wanting to overdraw my account,
arrive

at

the

same

balance

my

I

recheck my figures.

confidence

increases;

arrive at a different balance my confidence
decreases.
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not

If
if

i

i

recalculated my balance
because i am in doubt
about
original judgment, not
because I have any doubts
about
mathematics.
i
ac not believe that,
say, 7.5 does not
always equal 12.
What I do believe is
that I do not always
judge that 7.5=12.
Thus, my belief that my
balance is
5135.08 is tempered by
considering the nature of my
judgment.
This tempering of belief is
the result of a general
rule Of judgment: "We must
. . .
every reasoning form a new
ludgment, as a check or controul
on our first
I

m

judgment or

belief...
senses:

(p.

it

is

180).

It

is a general rule of
judgment

rule formed by judgment and

a

in two

rule applica-

a

ble to judgments.
A

possible objection

to

Hume's claim that

(if

„e

are

reasonable)

controul
what
such

we

we ought to "form a new
judgment as a check or
on our first judgment" is
that in the majority of

consider

thing.

perfectly

believe

I

reasonable

(judge)

that

judgments
I

am

we

sitting

do

in

no

this

chair, drinking coffee, hearing someone
upstairs, and so on.
In making these judgments I do not
consider the history of

my

judgments about

such

matters

and

adjust

my

current

beliefs to reflect the proportion of past
cases where I have
been mistaken.
It is only in exceptional cases that I
engage in such an examination of past
judgments. While this

objection
directing

is,

l

believe,

attention

to

the

ill-founded,

it

is

subtilty of Hume's
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useful
view.

in

His

dOGS not
or

TGail

r*o

i

explicitly consider

judgments.

what

is

hat in each judgment
we consciously
our failures and
successes in past

4-V-ir»4-

important

is

that

upon analysing our
Dudgments we discover that
our degree of belief is
regulated
by a general rule.
Once we recognise he rule
we can apply
it With more consistency
than is apt to occur naturally.
consider my check register
example.
while in certain
Circumstances I might consciously
reflect on my -history
of

Check register judgments,

Whatever

balance

confidence.
My

low

i

degree

I

for the most part

initially

arrive

at,

I

simply accept

but

with

limited
do not have much conviction
in my judgment.
of belief is reflected in
other judgments.

Which depend on this one, and
in my actions.
i
am wary of
writing checks for the full amount
of my balance and recheck
my figures before doing so.
i am not surprised
when my bank
statement shows a different balance
from my register and,
unless I have just checked my balance
against the bank
statement, I certainly would not place
a wager on my balance
being $136.08.
It

IS perfectly conceivable that all
this could be true

whether or not
judgments.

I

had ever consciously reflected on my past

The modification of belief is the natural
effect

of certain occurrences

ments)

.

Our

in

my past experience

judgments are as much

a

part

experience as the objects of these judgments.

of

(bad judg-

our past

As the result

of our past success and failure in judging, we
begin to have
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different

degrees

effect

of

.y

of

confidence

past

in

our

present

Judgments.

failures

at mathematical
judgments
Will, then, he reflected
in my lower degree
of confidence in
present judgment.
The extent to which
present judgments
will reflect the influence
of general rules
rnioc hdepends on the
experience and intelligence
of the judger:
A man of solid sense
and long experience
er
er^assuranc^'-^''^""""”^
assurance in his opinions, ^
than

one
ignorant,... our sentiments have different
degrees of authority, even with ourselves,
in proportion to the degrees of
our reason and
experience,
(p.

In

Chapter

Ilf

i

82

)

explained Hume's view of how
our
judgments about objects are
regulated by general
I

rules
formed according to our past
experience of objects.
These
Dudgments are, in turn, regulated
by general rules formed
according to our past experience
in making judgments.
in
this section Hume is extending
the scope of general rules by
Viewing demonstrative judgments
as objects of experience,
thus incorporating them into his
standard pattern of causal
inference.
Whether the subject matter of the
judgments is
causal relations or mathematics,
the judgments themselves
show various degrees of regularity
in their "conjunction"
with truth.
We will expect a judgment
to

believe
been

it,

true

in

to

the

our

extent

past

that

that

experience.
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sort

be

of

true,

i.e.,

judgment

has

The more experience we

have had and,

no doubt,

the more our past

experience of

our present judgments.
to general

rules

indicates

the

the better our natural
capacities,

is,

judgments

Is

reflected

In

The modification of
belief according
then, a natural causal
process.
Hume

causal

structure of

this

process

In

the

following passage:

question prorevolving
ovlr thP Tm,;
memory
and
senses
carrying my thoughts from
fhom to
/ such nh’ior't-e
them
commonly
con-inSn'rq
condom
d with them, l feel
a stronqer
conception on the one
sidp"’°^f-\
than on the other. This strong
conception forms my first decision.
i
suppose, that afterwards I
examine my
judgment itself, and observing
perience, that 'tis sometimes from exjust and
sometimes erroneous, l consider
it as
regulated by contrary principles
or
causes, of which some lead to
truth, and
some to error; and in ballancing
contrary causes, l diminish by athese
new
probability the assurance of my first
decision. (p. 184-85)
The

effect

"natural

IS

not

effect"

of

judgment

is

produced with

complete

regularity.

confronted with what Hume elsewhere
calls

m

our past experience.
causes,
in

past

he

claims that

the

experience is to "give us
(p.

132)

a

But

We

this
are

"contrariety" in

section on probability of

the natural

belief for he future ..."

truth.

.

effect of
a

a

contrariety

kind of hesitating

The modification of our

present judgment is the "hesitating belief"
produced by the
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.

contrariety in our experience
of past judgments.
It is Significant
that the natural

causal

confined to the

initial

judgment

about

the

process

object

and

is

the

second judgment about the
initial judgment.
We do not
naturally go on to form a
third judgment to correct
the
second

judgment.

According

to

Hume,

after the first and
second judgments "the action
of the mind becomes forc’d
and
unnatural... -,p. 185,.
But our reason does not
let us stop
with the second decision.
Seeking truth and recognizing
that following general
rules is a means of correcting
judgment, reason demands that
we extend the rule beyond
its
natural scope. After the first
two judgments:
We are oblig'd by our reason
to add
new doubt deriv'd from the
possibility
Of error in the estimation
we make of
the
and fidelity of our faculties.
This IS a doubt which immediately
occurs
to us, and of which, if we
woul'd closey pursue our reason, we cannot avoid
giving a decision, (p. 182)
a

According to Hume, rational judgment
requires the adoption of a certain methodology— the
consistent application of
the "permanent, irresistable and
universal" principles in-

herent

in

the

judgments of common life.

We ensure the

consistent application of these principles
only be conforming our judgment to general rules.
To apply
these rules in

a

haphazard fashion would,

rational

methodology.

it

appears, be inconsistent with

Reason,
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therefore,

requires

us

to

spply

the

general

rules

aii
_n

hn

^
judgments.

The

result

of

reflecting on the errors
in our past judgments
is to reduce
our initial confidence
in our present judgment.
»„hen i
reflect on the natural
fallibility of .y judgment,
have

i

less

confidence

in

my opinions,

the object concerning
which
If

into

we were

I

than when

reason"

(p.

only consider

I

183).

to

follow the demands of
reason and weigh
judgment an estimation of
the veracity

every

of

our

past judgments we would
get the following results:
Our
initial judgment is made with
a degree of confidence
determined by the nature of the
object judged.
Applying the
general rule, we consider
past errors in judgments
and our

confidence

in

the

original

consideration of past

judgment

errors

is

is

diminished.

itself a

judgment

This

and,

in

order to meet the demands of
reason, we must again apply the

general

rule diminishing our confidence

in

this

second

judgment.

Inasmuch as our confidence in the
initial judgment depends on our confidence
in the second judgment, by
lowering our confidence in the second
judgment we diminish
still further our conviction in the
initial judgment.
Our
original conviction in the Initial
judgment will continue to

diminish with each successive judgment.
"Let our first
belief be never so strong, it must Infallibly

perish by

passing thro'

diminishes
final

so

many many new examinations, of which each

somewhat

result

of

of

its

force

and

following reason is
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vigour"
"a

(p.

183)

The

total extinction of

belief and evidence”

inasmuch
numerous

and

as

183 ).

(p.

this

diverse

argument has been the subject
of

criticisms,

examine it more closely.

will

be worthwhile

to

Hume presents it as follows:

original uncertainty

m

inherent

U

the subject, a new uncerfrom the weakness of that
farni?
judges, and having adtogether, we are oblia'd^hJ^®^®
the possibility of error
in
the truth and
faculties.
This is a
donhJ
^"’"'ediately occurs to us,
and of which, if we wou'd
closely pursue

our reason, we cannot avoid
giving
ecision.
But

this

a

decision, tho' it
shou d be favourable to our
judgment, being founded only on precedina
a probability, must weaken still further
our
itself be weaken d by a fourth doubt of the
same kind,
and so on iji infinitum ; till
at last
there remains nothing of the
original
probability, however great we may suppose it to have been, and however
small
the diminution by every new
uncertainty, (p.

182)

For clarity,

argument

basic

and

form

conviction.

then

seems
[8]

will first present the basic form of
the

l

examine
to

l

be

90%

judgment

reliable.
"A”

to

this:

step
i

in

judge

more
"A"

detail.

with,

say,

The
90%

then assess my ability to make judgments

of type A and judge ”B"
say,

each

— that

This

my judgments of type "A” are,

reduces

my

initial

90x90 or 81% conviction.
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l

conviction in
then assess my

ability to

n,ake

Dudgments of
this

he

reduces

does

not

have In mind

judgments of type "B" and
judge "C”-that my
type B are only 90%
reliable. Hume claims
that
my conviction In '.A"
still further.
Although
describe just how this
occurs, he appears to
the following process:

When we first

make

judgment

particular degree of conviction
ction.
be
"C”)

90%)

.

we

But

B"
n
(I

we make
u
have

when we examine judgment

recognize

with some

it

supposed this to

"B"

(make

judgment

that

judgments of type B are only
about
90% reliable and this reduces
our conviction In judgment
”B"
to 90x90 or 81%.
inasmuch as our conviction In
"A" depends
upon our conviction In "B” we
must now reassess our conviction in "A" from 90x90 to
90x81 or 73%.
This same process
occurs when we examine judgment
"C" (make judgment ”D").
Noting that judgments of type
c are only 90% reliable we
reduce our Initial conviction In
"C" to 90x90
or 81%.

judgment "B" depends upon judgment
"C".

So we must reassess

our initial conviction in judgment
in "B"

73%.

our conviction in "A"

(90%)

(90%)

to 90x81 or

must be reassessed in

light of our corrected degree of
conviction in "B"

our

With

conviction
each

new

in

"A"

judgment

is

But

(73%)

and

further reduced to 90x73 or 66%.

the

original

conviction

in

"A"

is

further reduced until there is what Hume calls
"a total
extinction of belief and evidence".

Reviewing the argument, we first note that, having
already shown how our conviction in demonstrative
judgments
103

IS

reduced,

Hume begins with

a

Which,

"probable" judgment— one
in

given the nature of the
object, we judge with
less
than complete certainty.
inasmuch as a judgment of
matter
IS, in Hume s sense,
a probable judgment,
suppose
that my initial judgment
is "that is red" and
that i judge
this with 90% conviction.
According to Hume, if i am
reasonable, then I should
also take into account the
reliability of my judgment in such
matters or, more specifically,
I
ought to proportion my degree
of conviction in this
judgment according to my past
experience of the veracity of
n>y color judgments.
Here, I think, Hume is clearly
correct,
for, if I deny that my
performance in judging

colors is

relevant
present

in

determining my degree of conviction
in my

judgment,

then

there

is no reason why

remain fully convinced that
object

as

judgments

red
in

even if
the

i

past.

I

that

IS

if

red"

i

under

rightly, be considered

have always been mistaken in such
But

to

any reasonable person this
I

remained confident

such
a

should not

have correctly judged an

would be taken as good evidence
that
identify red.

I

lack the ability to
in my

circumstances

judgment

would,

I

that

quite

fool.

Even if we concede Hume's point here

objection might still be raised.

a

very plausible

We are supposing that my

initial conviction in my judgment is 90% and
that judgments
of

this

sort

are

90%

reliable.

104

Shouldn't we

say

that

my

.

actual

degree of conviction

ments

Of

reduction

this
is

sort

(90%

required?

only point out that

it

,90%,

is

reliable)

To answer

appropriate for Judgand

that

no further

this objection one need

merely skips the first step
of Hume's

argument by assuming that
the reliability of our
judgments
of objects has already
been weighed into the initial
judgment.
This is merely to make
implicit a step that Hume
makes explicit.
But whether the application
of the rule is
explicit or Implicit makes no
difference to Hume's argument.
If we suppose that my
initial judgment is made with
90%
conviction in part because my
past judgments
of

this

sort

have been 90% reliable, then my
degree of belief depends on
a judgment about the
reliability of my judgments of this
sort just as surely as it would
if i had made two separate
judgments.
But if my initial conviction
rests in part on
the assumption that judgments of
this sort are 90% reliable,
then it is still legitimate to
question my conviction in the
argument

Assessing
quires

a

my

past

judgment about

performance
a

this

sort

are

90%

"that

is

red".

At

l

reliable

conviction to reflect this fact.
that

color

judgments

matter of fact, which

by consulting my past experience.

of

in

determine

find that my judgments

and
I

I

re-

am,

adjust
then,

my

original

90x90 certain

this point Hume claims that we are

"oblig'd by our reason to add

a

new doubt deriv'd from the

possibility of error in the estimation we make of the truth
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and fidelity of our
faculties"

demands
ludgment

the

^
that

take

I

the

I

this,

for

principle

reason

the reliability of my
This is simply to employ

employed in my previous
judgment

Hume appears

reason demands

adopt

into account
judgments.

same principle

Furthermore,

In other words,

in

to

be

the

my

correct

in

circumstances

his
that

claim that
led me

judgments

about objects
exactly the same in my judgments
about my judgments.
When I judge that "that
is red"
i

indication of my good

sense

that

I

take

consider

it

into account

to

are

an
the

reliability of my judgment in
such matters and determine my
conviction in the judgment
accordingly. But what basis do I
have for simply accepting
such matters without taking
into
account my ability to make
judgments about my judgments?
Isn't this to accept a judgment
as reliable without appeal
to any empirical evidence which
might support or contradict
this fact?
This is just the sort of thing
that was deemed
unreasonable in my judgments about objects,
so why should it
be considered any more reasonable
in my judgments about
judgments?
In

fact,

that people's
to

error

as

if

we

examine

the

judgments about
their

human foibles,

we

judgments
might

not

evidence,

it

seems

clear

their judgments are as prone
about
be

objects.

Given certain

inclined to notice this

ourselves, but we certainly do not fail to notice
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it

in

in

.

.

others

see

people believe that they
have very good judg-nt When,
fact, the evidence
points to Just the opposite
conclusion.
There are people who
consider themselves good
judges Of character when
they are not, people
who consider
themselves good Judges of
art when they are not,
people who
consider themselves good
logicians when they are not,

m

and so

There are also people who
err in just the opposite
way;
those Who consider themselves
to have poor Judgment
when, in
fact, the evidence points
to just the opposite
conclusion.
From these general considerations
regarding the reliability
of people's Judgments
about their judgments it
certainly
seems that reason does demand
that we consider the reliability of our judgment about
our judgments in order to determine the proper degree of
conviction we should have in such
judgments
If

I

apply

appears that

I

this

to

the

case

in

question,

then

it

am obliged by reason to evaluate
the relia-

bility of my judgment about my color
judgment.
This is a
matter of fact that must be decided
according to experience.
But here I might point out the
following problem to Hume:
I
have never made any judgments about
the reliability of my
judgments about color judgment,

which

I

can appeal.

Therefore,

so
I

there

is

no evidence to

have no way of continuing

my evaluations and the regress must come
to a stop.

Hume would

have

evidence

support

to

a

ready reply
the

to

this.

reliability of
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a

if

i

certain

i

think

have no
type

of

judgment,

then

I

have

no

basis for any conviction
in that
type Of judgment.
To acknowledge that
I have no evidence
to
support my conviction is
to acknowledge that my
conviction

unwarranted.

I

i

cannot reasonably assign

a

very high

conviction to an unwarranted
judgment; therefore,
Should reduce my conviction
in the
judgment

I

make about

ability to make color
judgments and, according to
Hume,
this will lead to further
reduction in my conviction in
my
previous judgments.
n>y

might

also appeal to the more
general consideration
about the reliability of
judgments about judgments mentioned
above.
Considerations such as these incline
me to think
that i^atever the degree of
reliability of my judgment about
my color judgment, it is
not likely to be any greater
than
that of my other types of
judgments.
But if i reduce my
conviction in this judgment in any
way this should,
I

in turn.

reduce my conviction in my initial
judgment.
The same considerations are going
to apply to this last

judgment, requiring me to make another
judgment about
judgment

under

virtually

identical

a

circumstances.

Thus I
will have no better grounds for conviction
in its reliability than I had in the reliability of
the previous judgment.
This should reduce my initial conviction
still further and

so

on

for

each

new judgment.

So

it

appears

that,

by

following the perfectly rational method of proportioning
my
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onviction to the evidence,

will completely undermine
my
Inasmuch as the argument
is perfectly genappear that the consistent
application

itial belief.
eral,

it

would

i

of

rational method would
undermine all belief.
I have presented
Hume's argument in some
detail because
I believe that,
through their misinterpretations
of the
argument, many commentators
have underestimated its
importance.
A discussion Of the
various misinterpretations
and

criticisms would constitute
point;
want

therefore,

to

I

concentrate

major digression at

a

deal with them in the Appendix.
on

the

argument's

view of rational methodology.

relation

this

Here

to

I

Hume's

This requires an examination

of the second and third part
of the section.

Having argued that reason,
"utterly

subvert

the argument

all

to his

belief

"closely pursued", will

and opinion",

theory of belief.

Hume

next

links

The fact that we

continue to believe, and think and
reason as usual", even
though we are unable to discover any
error in his argument.
proves that "belief is some sensation
or peculiar manner of
conception, which 'tis impossible for mere
ideas and reflection to destroy"(p. 184).
if we are free to form our
beliefs according to our reflections, then
we cannot explain
why we maintain our beliefs when our
reflections dictate
that we abandon them.
On the other hand, if belief
is

effect

of

impression

experience— a
then

the

lively

failure

of
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idea

"mere

related
ideas”

to
to

a

the

present

influence

beliefs is explicable.
Hu.e recognised that
even if we accept this
theory of
belief there is another
factor that .ust be
explained.
„hy
should we be any „,ore
likely to retain any
degree of
conviction in our judgments
given Hume's theory of
belief
than we would on the rival
thoery of belief?

Probabilities, which by
perpetually diminish
tne
th^ original
orioTnai evidence, are
founded on
principles, whether of
thouah^^
thought or sensation, as the
primarv
Dudgment, it may seem unavoidable,
that
in either case they must
equally subvert
it....(p.

thei^

184

)

Following reason in the form
of general rules developed
from
our past experience effects
our initial beliefs.
if Hume is
correct in his explanation of
the principles by which such
beliefs are effected, why shouldn't
these principles continue to effect our beliefs in
our higher order judgments,
reducing us to total skepticism?
Hume explains this by
appeal to psychophysiological mechanisms:

sion:

After the first and second decias

the action of the mind becomes
and unnatural, and the ideas
faint and obscure; tho' the principles
of judgment, and the bal lancing of opposite causes be the same as at the very
beginning; yet their influence on the
imagination, and the vigour they add to,
or diminish from the thought, is by no
means equal. Where the mind reaches not
Its objects with easiness and facility,
the same principles have not the same

forc'd
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^

feJ

I

natural

conception
Imagination
holds any pro-

the

sensation,

which

tention^ is^ on"‘tl,e^1r
“e^^^h^he ToltSl;
ts uneasy; and the
spirits
be inn®
their na^tural
course aVe®“:''
m^nirby^rheTamrirws'" 1"/'’®'^
the same degree,
1°
a/":henMi®e®y®‘f
their usual channel.
(p. 185)

^

Thus Hume Claims that his
thoery explains both why
the
principles of reason cannot
produce belief beyond a certain
P int and why the mere ideas of
reason cannot Influence our
beliefs.
In

the

final

part

of

the

section Hume

turns his
attention from the psychological
to the philosophical conclusions to be drawn from the
argument of the first part.
According to Hume, if we follow
our reason we will destroy
all

belief and conviction.

Including the beliefs that fol-

lowing our reason leads to truth.
ing

to

reason

reason must
itself.

Thus, consistently adher-

inevitably lead to skepticism about

What Hume has

in mind

appears to be this:

We can reason only insofar as we
maintain certain beliefs.
If we reject one belief it is
only on the basis of some
other belief. [9]
if all beliefs are destroyed, then we
no
longer have any beliefs with which to
reason.
Furthermore,
in eliminating all beliefs, we also
eliminate the belief
that following reason is in any way
preferable to following
the mere suggestions of

the

Imagination.
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But without this

.

belief reason
lowing
all

loses all

reason would

belief,

claim to authority.

ultimately

lead

to

the

Thus,

if

fol-

destruction of

then following reason would
ultimately

lead

to

the destruction of reason
itself.

The response of the dogmatic
defender of reason to
skeptical arguments is that
such arguments are self-defeating.
Any argument against reason
must derive all its force
from the authority of reason.
The skeptic must presuppose
the very authority he denies:
“If the sceptical reasonings
be strong, say they, ’tis
proof, that reason
must have some

force and authority;
to

invalidate all

186).

Hume

easily

dismissed.

denies

if weak,

they can never be sufficient

the conclusions of our understanding"
(p.

that

the

skeptical

Skeptical

arguments

position can be so
may

destroy

selves, but not without first destroying
reason:

Reason first appears in possession of
the throne, prescribing laws, and imposing maxims, with an absolute sway and
authority.
Her enemy, therefore, is ob1 ig d
to take shelter under her protection, and by making use of rational
arguments to prove the fallaciousness
and imbecility of reason, produces, in a
manner, a patent under her hand and
seal.
This patent has at first an authority, proportion'd to the present and
immediate authority of reason, from
which it is deriv'd.
But as it is suppos'd to be contradictory to reason, it
gradually diminishes the force of that
governing power, and its own at the same
time; till at last they both vanish away
into nothing, by a regular and just
diminution. (p. 186-87)
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them-

The Claim

that

skeptical arguments are
self-destructive is
true, but this does not
help the dogmatist’s
position.
The
Skeptical arguments are the
arguments of reason; thus
the
dogmatist must concede that
reason is self-destructive.
Hume concludes:

‘*’®t®fore, that nature
b^aks
breaks the
tL force
f
of all sceptical arguents in time, and keeps them
from havany considerable influence
g
understanding. Were we to trust on the
entirely to their self-destruction,
that can
never take place, ’till they
have first
subverted all conviction, and
have totally destroy'd human reason.
(p. 187)
Hume evaluates
in Part

4,

section

1

the
,

conclusion reached in this section

"Conclusion of this book".

be faced with the following
dilemma:

trivial

standing

suggestions of the fancy,
But,

.

We seem to

We can "reject all the

and

adhere to the under-

as Hume has already shown,

this move would

be disasterous.

I
have already shewn, that the understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its most general principles,
entirely subverts itself, and leaves not
the lowest degree of evidence in any
proposition, either in philosophy or
common life.(pp. 267-68)

Such

a

result

is

avoided

only

by

the

operation

of

a

"seemingly trivial propensity of the fancy, by which we
enter

with

difficulty

into

remote
113

views

of

things ..."

(p.

268

)

.

On the other hand,

if

these considerations

lead us to

yield to the propensities of
the imagination and reject
all
refin'd or elaborate reasonings",
the consequences would be
equally disasterous.

to every trivial suggestion
of the fancy; beside
that these suggestions are often contrary to
each other;
hey lead us into such errors,
absurdities, and obscurities, that
we must at
asham'd of our credulity.
Nothing IS more dangerous to reason
than

imagination, and
nothing has been the occasion of
more
mistakes among phi losophers (p. 267)
.

By allowing

ourselves

to

be

guided by mere

imagination we

would "cut off entirely all science
and philosophy" and
leave ourselves prey to all manner
of superstition.
ly,

we

would

be

guilty of

the

"express

Final-

contradiction"

of

accepting an argument produced by reason in
order to condemn
all

arguments produced by reason.

it

would appear that our

only choice is between "a false reason and none
at all"(p.
268), yet neither position is rationally defensible.

Hume suggests

a

compromise.

authority to reason, following

We should grant a limited

only when

it

connection with some natural propensity.
lively,
be

and mixes

assented to.

itself with

title to operate upon us"(p. 270).
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it

works in

"Where reason

some propensity,

Where it does not,

it

it

is

ought to

can never have nay

Hume's claim here is not

simply that

reason,

in

fact,

fails

to

influence us beyond

this point.

His claim is that reason
has no "title" (right)
to influence us beyond
this point.
it has no right to
influence us because, when
carried further, it undermines
its own authority.

Reason, thus limited, is
simply the following of general rules within their
natural scope.
The general rule tells
that "we ought always to
correct the first judgment,
deriv'd from the nature of the
object, by another judgment,
deriv'd from the nature of the
understanding"
(p.

181 82 ).

The first and second judgment
are the natural effects of our
experience.
But, when we try to extend
the scope of the
rule beyond its natural scope, our
reason "subverts itself"
and, thus subverted, has no
authority to either condemn or
condone our judgments.
The limitations of the authority of

general

rules

turns

out

to

be

the

limitations

of

the

authority of reason.
The fact that Hume partially equates
following general

rules with following reason has some interesting
and important consequences.

the

a

adhere

priori
to

the

principles

to

of

established

Although we can know
lead

To follow reason is either to adhere to

a

demonstrative
principles

of

reasoning, or
the

to

imagination.

priori that demonstrative principles

truth, we cannot know

a

priori the extent to which

we are capable of properly employing such principles in our
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This can only be known
by our experience, and
our experience proves
that we .ake „,istakes
In the e^ploy-nt of such principles. Thus,
our demonstrative judgments
are subject to the
control of our non-demonstrative
judgin the sense that our
belief that our demonstrative
judgments are true ultimately
depends on our past experience
success or failure in employing
demonstrative principles
in our judgments.

Hume has, in effect, stood
the Cartesian view of reason
on Its head.
Instead of making our

empirical judgments

subject

to

the

regulation

judgments, Hume makes our

a

and

control of our

a

priori

priori judgments subject to the

regulation and control of our empirical
or, more specifically
our causal judgments.
f

Causal

judgments

are,

of

course,

founded

But what is important to note is
that this is
for Hume s skepticism here.
Hume's argument

on

custom.

the basis

presupposes

that rational judgment consists in
following general rules—

adhering to those principles that
experience has shown lead
to true judgments.
Hume's skepticism arises from two factors.

reason,

First,

by consistently employing these principles
of

we will

the belief that

ble

to

Second,

ultimately undermine all belief,

including

following our reason is rationally prefera-

following

the

this result

"trivial
is

suggestions

only prevented by

of
a

the

fancy".

principle of

judgment that reason explicitly condemns because experience
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.

has

shown

that

it

leads

to

false

judgments.

Thus

Hume's

concern is not that
reason depends on custom-the
extensive
and constant operations
of the imagination.
To adhere to
such principles
constitutes being reasonable.
This is
Hume's naturalistrc
conception of reason. Hume's
concern is
.that reason, correctly
understood, is ultimately
selfdestructive and that it is
only prevented from this
fate by
"that singular and seemingly
trivial propensity of the
fancy,

by which we enter with
difficulty into remote views
Of things. . (p. 268)
.

This result is particularly
relevant in considering the
relationship between Hume's
skepticism and his naturalism.

Beginning with Kemp Smith there
has been an increasing
number of commentators who
challenge the traditional view of
Hume's philosophy as primarily
negative and skeptical. Kemp
Smith viewed Hume's philosophy
as consisting of two complimentary elements:
A sceptical discipline to open
[men's]
eyes to the deceptiveness of the
mistaken endeavours, both moral and
speculative, into which his specifically
human powers are ever tending to
betray
him, and a positive naturalistic
philosophy to mark out the path upon
which
he can confidently travel without
any
such attempted violation of human
nature
[10]

In this two-fold task of philosophy,

as

an ally,

but

in due subordination,
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"scepticism serves

not as an equal". [11]

Thus,

on

Ke.p smith's interpretation,
the positive task of
presenting a naturalistic
interpretation of the nature
and

function Of reason takes
precedence over the negative,

skeptical task of defining
the limitation of reason.
This tendency to emphasize
the naturalistic element
in
Hume has even led at least
one commentator to deny
that
Hume s philosophy is in
any way skeptical:

pretense

at

skepticism

was

a

Hume's
literary

^-^^tise With Which to
his opponents and to prepare
the
reader for a more favorable
reception
of
his own theory of the
passions.... By
the time Hume wrote the
first Enquiry,
he went out of his way
to
explicit in showing that skepticismmo? e
was
a
literary device employed to
serve
other purposes. [12]

^

But

the

school

more
is

not

common

tendency of

the

"Hume

as

to deny that Hume's philosophy
is

naturalistin

any way

skeptical but to follow Kemp Smith
in the claim that many of
the skeptical arguments in the
Treatise are aimed at discrediting what Hume took to be an incorrect
account of the
nature of reason.
Thus Stroud claims that Hume's skeptical
arguments were meant to "show that reason,
as traditionally
understood, has no role in human life".
in this vein
[14]
one might argue that "skepticism" about
causal inference is
the result of an incorrect view of what
constitutes the

operation of reason,

a

view of reason that Hume himself
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.

rejects
I

confess

that

am

I

pointed out in Chapter

Treati^ was
ing,

I,

sympathetic to this view.

As

I

one of Hume's primary
aims in the

to discover the true
nature of the understand-

and this

required an extensive critique
of the Cartesian view.
I
also believe that there
is a good deal of
evidence to suggest that, in
many arguments traditionally
interpreted as skeptical attacks
on reason, Hume was actually

engaged in

a

process of redefining what
constitutes

reason, reasoning, and being
reasonable.

[9]

But the point

I

want to make does not depend
on accepting this view.
What I
want to argue Is that, even if
this view is correct, it does
not entail the conclusion that
Hume was not or was not
primarily
a skeptic.

—

—

This sort of conclusion seems to
be the result of the
following type of reasoning:
If we accept a certain (false)
view of the nature of reason, we are
led to highly skeptical
conclusions such as the conclusion that
causal inference is
irrational.
On the other hand, if we replace this
false

account of reason with
these

by

a

correct, naturalistic account,

sorts of skeptical conclusions do not
follow.

adopting

avoided.

of

the

correct

course,

on

view of reason,
the

naturalistic

Thus,

skepticism

is

interpretation,

reason is much more limited in scope, but this limitation
is

primarily psychological.
the

Hume's

"moderate

recognition of the psychological
119

skepticism"

is

limits of reason.

properly understood.
Hume's argument

In

"Of scepticism with

regard to reason" belies this sort
of conclusion.
The conception of
reason in this section is
entirely naturalistic. Reason,
in
the form of general rules,
is viewed as the
"general and
more establish'd properties
of the imagination". Its
principles derived from experience
and founded on custom.
But

Hume's skeptical conclusion
about reason thus understood
is
not merely a claim about
our psychological limitations.
Psychological factors explain why
we do not, in fact, follow
our reason beyond a certain
point.
But Hume's claim is
that, if we were to follow
our reason beyond these psychological limitations, we would
discover the limitations of
the legitimate authority of
reason.
At a certain point
reason becomes self-destructive and
undermines its authority
to condemn or condone our beliefs.
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chapter

IV

GENERAL RULES AND THE PASSIONS

As

I

pointed out in Chapter

I,

gaining an accurate

P cture of Hume s views requires
understanding certain peculiarities in his method of

presentation.

As one commentator
aptly described it, reading
the Treatise is like reading
a
good detective story. 1
As the 'plof unfolds, new
facts
are revealed, forcing the
reader to reassess earlier situations and incidents in light
of the new information.
This
feature of Hume's style is
particularly evident in the
relationship between Book I and
Book II of the Treatise .
Although his Book I examples of
judgments sometimes reveal
the interaction between passions
and judgments, Hume's exposition of his theory of judgment
gives the reader little
reason to suppose that there is any
major connection between
the two.
But in Book II, it becomes clear
that Book I
presents an abstract and artificial view
of judgment. However useful it may be to consider judgment
apart
]

from the

passions,

in

actual

practice

they are

inseparable.

[2]

in

fact, Hume goes so far as to claim that every
impression and
idea is attended with some degree of passion
or emotion.

believe it may safely be establish'd
a general maxim, that no object is
presented to the senses, nor image
formed in the fancy, but what is accompany 'd with some emotion or movement of
I

for
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.

spirits proportion'd to it....(p.
373

)

Beginning with the work of
Kemp Smith there has been
an
increasing awareness of
the importance of the
passions in
Hume's philosophy.
Kemp Smith directed
attention to the

relation between Hume's
theory of the passions and
his
epistemology.

Pall Ardal

emphasized the important role
of
the passions in Hume's
moral philosophy. Whether
or not one

agrees with their particular
interpretations,
point must be conceded: according
to Hume,

their general

the passions are

intimately related to judgment.

how

in

this chapter

it

allows

us

I

shall examine this relation and
show

to

regulate and control our passions
according to general rules.
i
shall begin with a brief
review of Hume's theory of the
passions.
According to Hume,

impressions may be divided into two

categories: original impressions or
impressions of sensation
and secondary impressions or
impressions of reflection.
Original impressions he describes as those
that "without any
antecedent perception arise in the soul,
from the constitution of the body, from
the animal spirits, or from the
application of objects to the external organs"
(p.

275).

The

passions are impressions of reflection or secondary
impressions
Hume makes two further distinctions among the passions,
^i^st

,

a

passion may be either calm or violent.
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The calm-

.

ness or violence of a
passion is si.ply its degree
of felt
intensity.
Because any individual
passion t,ay vary

xn in-

tensity

according

classification

of

to

the

particular

Violent is impossible.

-de

according

circumstances,

to

passions

as

a

determinate

either

calm or

But a rule of thumb division
can be

how

passion

a

is

typically experienced.

The senses of beauty and
deformity are typically experienced
as low in intensity
and thus may be classed
as calm
passions, while love and hatred
are generally experienced as

high

in

intensity and

thus

Although he admits that
specious",

Hume

adopts

may be classed

the distinction is
as

it

useful

a

greater order" into his account
The

second distinction

passions.
evil,
such

Direct

passions

is

passions

fear,

despair

and

arise

from pleasure

and

qualities".

pride, humility,

"vulgar and

way of

introducing

276)

(p.

immediately from good or

276).

security.

pain but

Examples

violent.

between direct and indirect

include desire,

hope,

other

(p.

"arise

from pleasure or pain"

direct

as

of

ambition, vanity,

Hume's examples of
aversion,

Indirect

only

in

indirect
love,

grief,

joy,

passions also

combination with
passions

include

hatred, envy, mal-

ice and generosity.

The

ward.

operation of

An

object

which

the

direct

passions

straightfor-

produces pleasure directly arouses

such passions as aversion and grief.
are more complicated.

is

The indirect passions

Their production involves what Hume
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double relation of impressions
and ideas" (p. 286).
The clearest way to
explain Hume's meaning is by
an example.
Following Hume, i shall
concentrate on the indirect
passion
of pride.
a

Suppose

I

am proud of some particular
house.

My pride
has both a cause and what
Hume calls an object.
The cause
of my pride is the house
and the object of my pride
is my
self.
When by pride is aroused
"the first idea, that is

presented to the mind,

is

that

of the cause or productive

principle.

This excites the passion connected
with it; and
that passion, when excited,
turns our view to another idea,
which is that of self"(p. 278).
The cause of the pride can
be further divided into subject
and quality.
it

is

not the

house per se that arouses my
pride but some particular
pleasing quality of the house.
The same subject might
produce contrary passions.
One quality, for
instance the

beauty of the house's exterior, may
arouse pride, while
another quality, say its taclcy furnishings,
may produce
humility.

Besides

a

pleasing quality in the subject there

is one further requirement

subject

for the production of pride.

must bear some relation to myself.

i

beautiful house that has no relation to me, but

The

may admire
I

a

cannot be

proud of it.
The

"double relation" consists in the relation between

two ideas, the idea of the subject and the idea of the self.
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.

and the relation between
two impressions, the
impres-sion of
pleasure and the impression
of pride,
Hume explains the
process as follows:
The quality [beauty]
which operates on
,
he passion [pride]
produces separately
an impression [pleasure]
resembling it;
[house], to which the qual^
1.
y adheres, is related to self,
the
object of the passion
(p. 289)
,

Thus,

the double relation of
impressions and ideas consists
in the following four
relations:

e

The idea of the beautiful house
and
idea of the self.
The house belongs
^

to me.

2. The idea of the beautiful
house and
the impression of pleasure.
The idea of
the house produces pleasure.

The impression of pleasure and the
impression of pride.
The impression of
pleasure resembles the impression of
pride
3.

4. The impression of pride and the
idea
of self.
The impression of pride has
self as its object "by an original and
natural instinct" (p. 286).

More generally,
to

me

produces

whenever an idea of an object related

pleasure,

it

will

produce pride,

which

resembles the impression of pleasure and is naturally
related

to

the

idea of self.

Humility follows the same model.

When an idea of an object related to me produces displeasure
or

pain,

it

will produce humility,
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which resembles the

.

impression of pain and
Is naturally related
to the Idea of

self.

All

the

indirect

passions

take

some

self as their

Object.

Pride, humility, ambition,
and vanity take
bject the self of the
person experiencing the
hatred, envy, pity, malice
and generosity are
toward some other self.
But, in either case, the

involved depend on

a

as their

passion.
directed
passions

double relation of impressions
and

ideas

The above account is admittedly
a simplified version
of
Hume’s theory but it will be
adequate for understanding the
role Of general rules in Hume's
theory of the passions.
Although general rules enter
into Hume's account in a
number of ways, their primary
role is in the regulation and
control of the passions.
This regulatory function is evident in the following passage:
The

passions are often vary'd by very
inconsiderable principles; and these do
not always play with perfect
regularity,
especially on the first trial.
But as
custom and practice have brought to
light all these principles, and have
settled the just value of every thing;
this must certainly contribute to the
easy production of the passions, and
guide us, by means of general establish d maxims, in the proportions we
ought to observe in preferring one object to another. (p. 294
)

This passage

is

curious,

for

it

supposes

a

point

appears to be at odds with what Hume claims elsewhere.
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that

More

specifically,

degrees

of

passron.

it

implies

passions
„e

and

-ought-

that

there are proper or
correct

improper

or

incorrect

degrees

of

to

proportion our passions properly.
But this seems tantamount
to saying that passions
can be
correct or incorrect and
thus reasonable or
unreasonable,
and Hume denies corn
both tnese claims.
=
the section

m

influencing
can

never

therefore,

motives
direct

reason

of

the

can

the will-,

will

Hume argues that

(provide

never oppose

"Of the

a
a

motivation

to

reason
act),

passion.

Reason is
concerned with the discovery of
truth: demonstrative reason
with truth concerning the
relation of ideas, probable reason
with the truth concerning
matters of fact and
existence.

The -proper province” of
demonstrative reason is -the world
of ideas, and as the will
always places us in that of
realities, demonstration and volition
seem, upon that account, to be totally remov'd from
each other” (p. 413).

Probable reason informs us of causes
and effects.
knowledge of causes and effects will not

But

move us to act

unless we have some desire or aversion
to them.
'Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity
arises toward any object; And these emotions extend themselves to the causes
and effects of that object, as they are
point'd out to us by reason and experience.
It can never in the least concern
us to know, that such objects are
causes, and such other effects, if both
the causes and effects be indifferent to
us.
Where the objects themselves do not
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.

their connexion can
never
give them any influence;
and 'tis plain
ery of this connexion,
it cannot be
t>y
Its means that the
objects
are able
to affect us. (p. 414
)

Having argued that reason
cannot provide

action, Hume goes on to
claim that

a

„,otive

for

passion, in and of

a

Itself,

cannot be unreasonable.

truth.

"Nothing can be contrary to
truth and reason except

Reason is the discovery of

What has reference to it...",p.
"original existence ...

415).

Fear,

A passion

is

an

and contains not any
representative

quality, which renders
..."(P.

415).

it

a

copy of any other existence

for instance,

impression or feeling.

is

a

particular sort of

This feeling does not represent
any

qualities or relations of objects
or ideas any more than
pain or a tic)cle.
it cannot
be

true or false,

a

correct or

incorrect, thus it cannot be contrary
to reason or unreasonable

Note that Hume is not denying that
reason has a role in
directing the passions.
Our passions are aroused from the
"prospect of pain or pleasure".
Reason discovers the quali-

ties

of

objects

that

produce

pain

discovers the means for attaining
passion

can

insofar

as

ion" (p.

416).

the

be
it

passions,

or

pleasure

(or avoiding)

and

it

objects.

A

considered unreasonable or reasonable only
is

"accompany 'd with

some

judgment

or

opin-

Given the role of reason in the production of
it

follows

that
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a

passion can be viewed as

unreasonable in either of two
ways:

when it is ..founded on
the supposition of the
existence of objects, which
really do
not exist
or ..»hen in exerting
any passion in action,
we
chuse .eans insufficient
for the design.d end,
and deceive
ourselves in our judgment
of causes and effects.,
(p.

in

effect,

considered
judgment.

Hume

is

unreasonable
..«,ere

a

saying

only when

passion

is

that
it

is

a

passion
based

416

)

can

.

be

on

a

false

neither founded on

a

false

supposition, nor chuses means
insufficient for the end, the
understanding can neither justify
nor condemn it..(p, 416).
This claim has drawn quite
a bit of (deserved)
criticism and
for that reason I want to
examine it in some detail.
But,
before doing so, i want to
point out a few important facts
concerning the relationship between
judgments and passions.
As 1 noted above, Hume claims
that passions can be
considered reasonable or unreasonable
only insofar as they
are based on a judgment.
One should note that in actual
fact, barring highly unusual
circumstances, almost all the
passions will be accompanied by a
judgment. [3]
it follows
that most actual passions can be
evaluated in terms of
reasonableness.
Passions do not exist in a void.
They are
the effects

of certain objects

tain qualities of objects.
us

(the passion

it

more specifically,

cer-

The effect that an object has on

produces)

conception of the object;

or,

in

will depend on our view or
other words,

131

the passion will

depend on our oeiief.
belief

It

^ i-i
follows
that insofar 9s

depends on any sort
of belief
tion of reasonableness.

f

if
It

c
IS
-i

o
ksub:)ect

a

passion

to an evalua-

once the importance of
the role of judgments
or beliefs
in the production of
the passions is recognised,
the role of
ludgment in regulating and
guiding the passions is
clariGenerally, a passion will
require a judgment about
the existence or probable
existence of an object.
Passions
will also depend on the
ability to distinguish

various
qualities of the object and
the causes and effects of
such
qualities.
If a passion is to be
reasonable, the various
judgrnants involvsd in amncinn
arousing the passion must be
reasonable.
An example from Book I
provides an excellent
illus-

tration of the complex Interplay
between judgment and passion, while, at the same
time, providing a paradigm of
an
"unreasonable” passion.

Consider the case of a man, who
being hung out from a high tower
in a
cage of iron cannot forbear
trembling,
when he surveys the precipice below
him,
tho
he knows himself to be perfectly
secure from falling, by his experience
of the solidity of the iron, which
supports him; and tho' the ideas of fall
and descent, and harm and death,
be
deriv'd solely from custom and experience.
The same custom goes beyond the
instances, from which it is deriv'd
and to which it perfectly corresponds;
and influences his ideas of such objects
as are in some respects resembling,
but
fall not precisely under the same rule.
The circumstances of depth and descent
strike so strongly upon him, that their
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influence cannot be deqf

•

u

/?

circumstances of support
Ind
solidxty, Which ought
to giveXm pe?away wlt^V/s’ ob”
ect';\"nV’%‘xc°?te"s "a

gr°jtu-rra^r;u

and inlivens the idea;
which lively idea
on the passion, and
i^its^T
augments it force and viollnnl
lence;
and both his fancy and
affe?"
mutually supporting each
oth^r
^ very
qreat'infT^®
g
influence upon him, (pp. 148-49)

The

unreasonableness

of

the

passion can be traced

the unreasonableness of
the judgment,

ness of

the

judgment can,

instances,

from

which

and the unreasonable-

in this case,

"rashly formed" general rule.
it

be attributed to a

Such a rule "goes beyond the

is

deriv'd,

and

perfectly corresponds; and influences
obiects

as

are

in

some

to

respects

precisely under the same rule"

(p.

to

It

ideas of such

...

resembling,

US).

which

but

fall

not

The man's experi-

ence has taught him to causally
associate height with "fall
and descent", and fall and descent
with "harm and death".
But, while his present experience

resembles

situation in these respects,
in

an essential

way.

it

dangerous

a

differs from such situations

The properties of the

iron which

surrounds him make him "perfectly secure".
Under different

rected

his

rash

judgment

formed general rules.
is

circumstances

prevented by the

But,

by

a

the man might

judgment

based

in this example,

intervention of
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a

on

have cor-

properly

such correction

new factor

— the

arousal of
Of danger

a

violent, ainect passion.

arouses fear.

The onipinal ,u.,.ent

The violence of this
passion

in-

fects the imagination,
strengthening the belief that
aroused
the passion.
This strengthened belief
increases his fear.
”His imagination runs
away with its object,
and excites a
passron proportion'd to It.
That passion returns bach
upon
the imagination and
Inlivens the idea; which
lively idea has
influence on the passion,
and in turn augments its
force and violence ..."
(p. 148 ).

According to Hume, judgments
made according to the rash
tion of general rules can
only be corrected by a
"second influence- of general
rules.
But, as the example
Illustrates, such correction can
be thwarted by the Intervention of a passion, which
serves to reinforce the initial
belief.
No doubt Hume's awareness of
such "passionate
be-

liefs"

was

in

pessimism about
able.

some measure responsible for his
occasional
the

ability of human beings

to

be

reason-

The

difficulty of correcting beliefs
reinforced by
passions is obvious. To modify or
eliminate the
belief, the

passions must be lessened.

But,

to lessen the passion,

the

belief must be modified or eliminated.
Similar examples include cases of
religious fanaticism
or deep-rooted prejudices,
Such

both major concerns of Hume.

prejudices are simply beliefs reinforced by such
pas-

sions as fear and hatred.

These sorts of beliefs cannot be
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corrected merely by pointing
ont contrary facts
or reviewing
the original judgment
any .ore than the
terror-stricken

-n's belief

that

he

is

in

danger can be corrected
by
pointing out the properties
of iron.
The best defense
against

these erroneous passionate
beliefs is to avoid the
initial incorrect judgments,
and this is best achieved
by
cultivating sound judgment.
Sound judgment consists
in proportioning one's belipf<3
4-u^
4-r^
j
efs to
the evidence
provided by experience or, what amounts
to the samp
pit
me thing, following
properly
formed general rules.
To what extent does the
above example accord with
what
Hume says about the
relationship between reason and
passions?
Clearly, the man's fear,
considered in and of itself, IS neither reasonable
nor unreasonable any more
than
feeling of pain or a tickle
would be reasonable or
unreasonable.
it is only in relation to
his beliefs about
his situation that his fear
can be called

unreasonable.

More specifically, we can judge
his fear unreasonable only
by assessing how his beliefs
were formed.
I

with

a

claims

emphasize

this

point

because

it

plainly

claim of Hume's mentioned earlier.
that

unreasonable;

there

are

two ways

first, when it

is

in

which

conflicts

Recall that Hume
a

passion can be

"founded on the supposition

of the existence of objects, which really
do not exist", and
second, "when in exerting any passion in
action, we choose

means

insufficient

for

the

design'd
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end

and

deceive

our-

selves

in

our

other words,
false

of causes and effects"
(p.

passion is unreasonable
when

belief or judgment.

that
It

a

judgment

the man's belief

is

But,

in

it

416 ).

m

is based on a

the example,

it

is

not

false that makes it
unreasonable;

is

that the belief is
unwarranted by the evidence.
The
man believes that hp> ic ^
^
IS in a dangerous
situation but has no
good reason to believe
this.
-i

If

the example

is

modified,

it

becomes clear that the

unreasonableness of his belief
does not stem from the
fact
that it is false.
Suppose that the man in the
cage

has had

enough experience to be aware
of the danger of falling
from
heights, but no experience
of the properties of iron
or any
Similar material.
Such a man would falsely believe
himself
to be in great danger,
but, unlike the man in Hume’s
example, this man's belief and
subsequent fear would not be
unreasonable.
Furthermore, just as a false belief
or judgment may be reasonable, so
too a true belief may be
unreasonable.
The man might correctly believe
that

he

is

perfectly safe,

not

perties of iron

(which we are supposing he has no
knowledge

of)

because he correctly assesses the pro-

but because a palm reader told him
he would live a long

and healthy life.

Hume is certainly wrong in claiming that
to be contrary
to reason or unreasonable is equivalent
to being false and,

conversely, to be in accordance with reason
or reasonable is
equivalent to being true.
What is curious here
is
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not that

mistaken,
odds With

the

but

View of
view that

that

such

sound

a

claim

is

completely at

judgment developed

in

Book

l.

a

reasonable judgment is
equivalent
to a true judgment is
thoroughly Cartesian.
On a Cartesian
View Of the understanding,
reason is Infallible.
The souroe
of error lies in the
will's assenting to judgments
that are

not

recognized by the Intellect
as certain.

employed— guided
n0V0iT

l0ad us

by

to

reason— our

©ttot
0
rror.[fat
4]

view of the understanding

if u
Humo
t-p

(and,

why should he here present

a

clearly Cartesian?

is,

There

faculty

When correctly

of

judgment

will

ronoctod the Cartosian

for that matter,

the will),

view of reasonableness that is
I

believe,

a

very plausible

explanation for this and other
anomalies in Hume's remarks
about reason . [51
These anomalies stem from Hume's
development of a theory of the
understanding that entails a view of
reason that is substantially different
from traditional
views.
The problem Hume faced was how to
develop his views
about the nature of sound judgment
within a tradition where
the nature of reason was defined
according to a view of the
und0rst anding that h0 rajactad.
Tha

sound

conflict

judgmant

batwaan

consists

in

tha

claim

mada

proportioning

Book

in

ona

'

s

I,

that

baliafs

to

tha avidanca, and tha claim mada in Book II,
that raasonabla

judgmants

(thus, prasumably,

sound judgmants) ara trua judg-

mants is simply ona axampla of Huma
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'

s

difficulty.

Thara ara

others.

For instance,

a

and,

similar conflict occurs
in Book

I

interestingly enough, the
conflicting statements
appear
on the very same page.
a footnote clarifying
his view of
the "acts Of the
understanding", Hume asserts

m

popular View,
ing

more than two

third

to

^ine).

serve

^^

that "„e may

as

ideas,
a

(against

and without

medium betwixt

the

having recourse to

them"(p.

97n,

a

emphasis

Hume's example is that
"we infer

a cause immediately
from its effect" and he
claims that "this Inference
is not
only a true seecies of re
asoning , but the strongest
of all
others.... "(p. 97n, emphasis
mine).
the text of the same
page Hume tells us that
"reason can never satisfy

m

us

that

the existence of any one
object does ever imply that of
another; so that when we pass
from the impression of one to
the Idea or belief of
another, we are not determin'd
by
reason, but by custom or a
principle of association"
(p.

Thus,

97 ).

on one and the same page Hume
tells us both that,

in

causal

inference, we "exert our reason"
and that, in causal
inference, we are "not determin'd by
reason".
think these conflicts can be explained
in the followmanner:
As Hume's footnote makes clear,
there was a
I

ing

then common, traditional view of the
nature and operation of
the understanding.
Hume rejected this view in the sense
that he offered a different explanation
of the operations

involved in the "acts of the understanding".

immediate

problem

of

how he

could
138

This poses an

intelligibly

state

his

]

position.

There

What he .ight call

are

two

the

possibilities.

He

could

retain

-co^on signification of words",

in

other words, the common
meaning of "reason" that
was tied to
traditional view of the
nature of the understanding.
if
he did so, then he
must deny that certain
operations of
thought, commonly supposed
to be operations of
the underding or reason, are
really the workings of
reason at
all.
He must, for Instance,
deny that causal inference
is
"determin'd by reason" or,
as he puts it in the
Enguirv
that causal inference is
"founded on reasoning, or on
any
process of the understanding"
[6
.

.

On

tions

the

of

other hand,

thought

he

might

maintain that

commonly supposed

to

be

the

acts

operaof

the

understanding and determined by
reason really are so.
But,
given his account of the nature
of the understanding, to do
this requires that he assign
a different signification
to
words, that is, it requires
redefining "reason" and "understanding".

In

that

inference

In

causal

fact,

this way Hume could quite
legitimately state
is

a

for the most part,

"true

species of reasoning"

.

[7]

Hume follows the first course;

he maintains the common meaning of
"reason" and denies that

certain acts of thought are really the
products of reason. [8]
One might note that this way of presenting
his
position has considerably more shock value
and is, thereby,
more cohducive to his skeptical position.
But
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I

do not see

y

ing.

reason to suppose that
Hume ever explicitly
recognized
options and consciously
chose to retain the
common meanin

fact,

the existence of the
conflicting statements
in his sesms to indicafo -ino'i- -u
xxiaicate just the
opposite.
«y discussion of the
conflicts In Hume's comments
on
reason is meant to
emphasize an
4

important point.
Hume
claims that a passion
is reasonable or
unreasonable to the
extent that the judgment
,s, involved in arousing
the passion
are reasonable or
unreasonable. But, while he
claims that a
judgment is reasonable when
it is true and unreasonable
when
It IS false, this
is true only when
reason is understood
along Cartesian lines.
fact, according to Hume's
own
account of judgment, a judgment
is sound-what we would
call

m

"reasonable"-when
unreasonable when

it

it

is

warranted by the evidence and

is unwarranted by the
evidence.

m

the

example cited, Hume evaluates
the passion according to his
own theory, that is, according
to whether the judgment
involved is warranted or unwarranted.
have argued that general rules
serve to regulate and
control the passions by regulating
and controlling the
judgments necessary for their production.
So far l have
concentrated on one type of judgment
judgment about the
existence of objects (or qualities of
objects). [9]
But
I

—

there is often another type of judgment
involved in the
arousal

of a passion.

m

the existence of objects,

addition to judgments concerning
the production of a passion often
140

requires

a

value judgment.

aspect Of Hume’s view

value,

which

judgments.

win

Includes

Although

1

proper treatment of this

A

require

a

aesthetic,

review of hts theory of

moral

of

the

political

am still concerned with
the question

Of how general rules
regulate the passions,

discussion

and

bearing

Hume’s

answer to this question
warrants

141

a

value

I

thlnjt that

theory has

separate chapter.

on

the
the

,

,

NOTES

Pall Ardal, ^Convention
and Value," in
ed
d. G.P.
G.P. Morice (Edinburgh David Hume,
Univ. Press, 1977
rWnHJigi;
PP. 51 - 67
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^

bicentenary Papers
)

[

2

]

from Book III:

.

^'^’^'’°''^®dges

"Human

nature

as much in the following
comment

being

alWte®
all
its actions,

compos'd

of two
requisite in

the affection and

certain, that the
former, without the
latter, incapacitate
me^ for society: And
men
it may be allow'd
Separately the effects,
tLt
=
®dlt
from separate operations of
theo ®
,'^°'”P°P®'’t
parts of the mind.
Thf same ° liberty
many be permitted to
moral, which is allow'd to
natural philosophers; and 'tis very usual
with the
consider any motion as compounded and consisting of two
parts separate from each other, tho' at
the same
time they acknowledge it to be
in itself
uncompounded and inseparable" (p. 493).
blind^mn?'^^'’^'
direof?
e

3

qualifications here, both need explahighly unusual
considerations.
psssions ©r*© impr©ssions
Alhhnnnh -KHoir'
different from thi ^au^es ofsenL^ons
(^rfme
sensations Tn th't
heir"Ls:ncl»"c°'’"’'/'’"^
particular
phenomenal
fells
particular passions are produced by
ranc^fo is merely a
certain
tain causes
contingent fact based on the
human beings.
There is no a priori
why pain should not arouse desire and
pleasure arouse
aversion.
(There are, of course, obvious evolutionary
"reasons" why this should not be so).
G^^^^ting this, it is easy to imagine a
situation in
which a passion could be aroused without a
judgment.
Direct
stimulation of the brain could cause a passion.
An
electrode in the right spot can arouse rage, fear,
desire, etc.
Hume would admit that an unusual movement of
animal spirits
[

]

nation
The
circumstance^' ^
AccordinrtrHnme
Hum©
^

=n

^
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could arouse

a

passion.

needed"\rcrs"
casually introduces

passions", is

previously described number of
passions
These unusual
a

"n^Qcf
i^n

^ ^

rather
differ from

k

respects,
passions
not
%
but "from a natural
pleasure,
impulse or ine^
desire of punishment to
include
"the
our enemier^and
° 'of happiness to our
friends; hunger, lust
439).
appetites" (p!
»«iile
is pLu" ble
the happiness of our
<i®aire for
friends *and°^h^
requires a judament
enemies
it is noi
^
lust requires ' a judgment
that
stance's, involve one.
^
“p®*
1"'
Hunger o^n th^ °
does not require a judgment.
P^ttainly

U

f41

"Whatever i understand,
from God that I have the because it is
power of underI
doubtless understand rightf
1
impossible for anything to
tlkf^

ause me to be deceived.
From what
source
therefore, do my errors arfse?
Solely from the fact that,
because the
further than the intellect,
di not contain my
I do
will within the same
boundaries; rather, i even extend
it to
things I do not understand.
Because
my
will IS indifferent to these
latter
things. It easily turns away
from the
true and the good; in this
way l am
deceived and commit sin" (Rene
Descartes, Meditations
trans. Donald
Hackett, 1979, pp.

L

,

J

/

oo

•

[5]
A number of commentators
have remarked on the
ambiguity in Hume's use of the term
'reason
Fate Norton,
for example, lists seven
"principle" senses in which Hume
ambiguity is not at all
surLisfna^^'"''TV
to survey current usage fo the
term, one would most likely discover
at least as manv
senses.
The sense
'

V

of the term 'reason' was, and still
is
This sort of ambiguity, although
confusing
confLinq at
a\" times, is not particularly
significant.
But it
appears to have two different and
^nnf
conflicting views of the nature of reason.
f-^^^uiry
[7]

Concerning Human Understanding,

p.

21.

A simple analogy might serve to clarify
the point.
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Suppose a society where
^
tics and the meaning of
considered luna'lunatir'^the effects of the moo^
/"?urtLriucL^r"°^ enterprising
scientist conducts experiments
^
^
has no effect on people's
^°°n
behavior
There are two ways the
scientist might explain his
common meaning of ^'lunatic'
retain the
and^^dp^*
there
lunatics
no
on the other hpnd
h
continue to call
certain people lunatics but in
i

^

.

'lunatic' simply to
refer to people who exhibit
to the ca^se of the beha^^^^^^
might substitute some
other cause, for examnip *•
effects of t^heJicarimbai;ncr°'’l®>.
‘he
equally legiti.i:rVor
tist to retain the common
usage and deny there erp theTcien^isf
inn = <.usage
and agree theL are lunatics
ff ^
he®
''aciHate
between these two cour^er'he But°’' ,i
"
certain amount of confuLon.'
,

'

‘hat causal Inference is
'
‘hink there is
S?her e™dfnce"®thai"\°'^
''5'^
retained
the
standard
sense of
'reason'
T.ia
"proportioned
to
threrid;nce'^' aTe® h
«® «°uld call rational or
reasonable
iudgments
We o
,
people who generally form their judoments
Ln?rin
thie manner rational or
in this
reasonable people
HumP
judgment"
or
"solid®siLe"“and^ people
ntTT’'®who
h°^ make such
judgments
"wise"
or
"judicious reeo"'^
of restricting
•.
tne
thfdescriotfve
descriptive h®“
terms
rational' or 'reasonable' to whp+- io
demonstratively certain accords with the view
that, for the
most part, Hume uses 'reason' in its
traditional se^se

not

1

[9]
I
am following Hume in using "object"
in a very
loose sense that covers individu al
objects, event s
and
states of affairs.
,
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CHAPTER

V

GENERAL RULES AND OBJECTIVE
VALUE

In

passions

the

and

last

chapter

showed

i

discussed Hume’s

how the

passions

can

theory of

the

be

regulated by
conforming our judgments to
general rules.
i
also argued
that the relationship between
the passions and judgment
allows us to evaluate the
reasonableness of a passion.
this chapter I want to extend
the discussion to include
value judgments.
The connection between the
passions and
value judgments serves as the
foundation to Hume’s aesthetic, moral, and political
theories.
Thus, an examination

m

of

the

role

of

general

rules

in

value

judgments will

reveal
their significance to these areas
of Hume’s philosophy.

"

Just Value ” of Objects

Hume explicitly links general rules
to value judgments
in the following passage from the
Treatise:
The influence of general rules and
maxims on the passions very much contributes to facilitate the effects of all
the principles which we shall explain in
the progress of this treatise.
For 'tis
evident, that if a person full-grown,
and of the same nature with ourselves,
were on a sudden transported into our
world, he wou'd be very much embarass'd
with every object, and wou'd not readily
find what degree of love or hatred.
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he'ough^ "jr aVtrVbute

P^^^tice have brought to
light
principles, and have settled

?h

all

thi

th?s „ust
certalnL''^'”^ °t
Producnon
t!o^ of the passions,‘°
and guide us
hv
means of general establish'd
maxims' in
.°“9ht to observe in
^
°‘>3ect to another, (p.
293-94)

TO discover

the

role of general

rules

in

guiding

the

value judgments underlying
the passions, it will be
neoessary to clarify what Hume
means by "just value".
Fundamentally,

produce pleasure

the value of

or

interpreting this.

By

pain.

"pov^

is

its power to

Some care must

be

m

discussing the powers

has always a reference to its
exercise

,

either actual

and that we consider a person endow'd
with any

ability when we find from past experience,
that
or

at

in

that we ascribe to persons, Hume
explains that

or probable,

ble,

taken

"power" Hume does not mean to refer

to any hidden force or
principle.

or abilities

an object

least

possible he may exert

it"(p.

'tis proba-

313).

Hume

concludes that "power consists in the
possibility of probability of any action, as discover'd by
experience and the
practice of the world"
of

an object

to

(p.

313)

.

[1]

Analogously,

the power

produce pleasure or pain is simply the

probability or possibility that the object will produce
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or pain

as discovered by
experience”

.

[2]

While Hume's view concerning
the value of an object
is
fairly simple, his view
on what determines the
value of
an Object is substantially
more complex.
it may seem that
there is no reason for
any complexity in this
regard.
Granting that the value of
an object is its ability
to cause
pleasure or pain, we can
distinguish between actual and
apparent value.
We can be mistaken about
whether an object
really does produce pleasure
and thus act according
to what

is

merely its apparent value and
not

Hume's

reference

to

"just

its

"just” value.

value” can be taken simply as

a

recognition of this distinction.
Hume

certainly does

recognizes

the

this respect.

importance

acknowledge
of

this

exercising

But his notion of what

is

distinction

sound

judgment

and
in

involved in deter-

mining just value requires another,
equally important, distinction.
Determining the just value of an object
requires
distinguishing between subjective and
objective value. This
claim may appear quite out of place in
Hume's account, which
is often taken to be a form of
subjectivism.
Whether an
object is pleasant or painful would
appear to be a matter
for the individual to decide,

qualities
jects.

of

objects

Inasmuch as

but

the

for pain and pleasure are not

effects

of

qualities

of

ob-

there are considerable differences be-

tween individuals with respect to what is considered
painful
or pleasant,

there seems no room for objective criteria.
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.

Hucne

quite explicitly denies
this conclusion, maintaining that a person can
he mistaken in judging
an object
valuable even when that
object does, in fact, give
him
Pleasure.
Understanding this claim will
require a more
detailed picture of Hume's
theory of value.
To obtain
this

Picture

I

want

to

depart

from

the methodology

i
have been
Observing, which has been
to rely exclusively on
the text of
the Tr_eatise
and examine Hume's essay
"of the Standard of
Taste".
inasmuch as my expressed aim
is to explain the role
of general rules in the
Tr eatise
the introduction of views
expressed in another, much later
work, requires some justification.
I
shall attempt to provide this
justification by
answering the two major objections
to this change in procedure
,

,

The

years

first

between

objection
the

is

that,

given

nearly twenty

publication of the Treatise and

publication of the "Standard of Taste",

ble

the

it

is

the

not implausi-

to

suppose that Hume either developed new
views or
changed his earlier views.
While this is certainly not
implausible,
ed

in

the

explicitly

I

believe that it is false.

The views express-

"Standard of Taste" can all be found, either
stated

or

implicitly assumed,

in

the

Treatise

.

The problem with working entirely from the
Treat Ise is that

Hume's value theory is not presented in
manner.

a

neat and orderly

Instead it must be pieced together from the various
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cements scattered throughout
Boohs
ing

the

theory

found

in

ampl© ©videnpp

Treatise

the

o-f

the

ii and

m.

"standard of Taste",
same views

expressed

i

shall
in

the

.

The second objection
is that the "Standard
of Taste" is
an essay on aesthetic
judgment and that one cannot
si.ply
assume that the principles
involved can be generalised
to

cover value judgments in
general.
cannot

simply be assumed but,

it

is

true that this

fortunately, Hume eliminates

the

need for any such supposition
by making clear that
"fixing the epithets of praise
or blame"

depends on the same

fundamental principles whether
the praise and blame be
aesthetic or moral.

practice

of

using

This is particularly evident
in Hume's

examples

from

aesthetics

to

illustrate

points in his moral theory and
vice versa.
In "Of

the Standard of Taste" Hume
argues against what
he believes to be a common
misconception about the nature of

aesthetic judgments.

Hume characterizes this Incorrect
view

as follows:

All sentiment is right; because
sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond
itself, and is always real, wherever
a
man is conscious of it.
But all determinations of the understanding are not
right; because they have reference to
something beyond themselves, to wit,
real matters of fact
A thousand
different sentiments, excited by the
same object, are all right; because no
sentiment represents what is really in
the object....
Beauty is no quality in
149

things

themselves: it exists merely
in
contemplates them; and
each "'ml'na
mind perceives a different
beauty.
[3]

While

the

view

that

beauty

is

in

the

eye

of

the

beholder has gained such
currency that

it passes for
matter of simple common
sense, Hume argues that,
in fact,

a
it

conflicts with another common
sense view.

Someone who
Claims the works of Ogilby
to be just as good as
the works
of Milton “would be thought
to defend no less an extravagance, than if he had maintained
... a pool as extensive as
the ocean". [4]
Someone might well prefer Ogilby
to Milton,
but this would be taken not
as a mere difference
in

taste

but as a lack of taste.
To

acknowledge

aesthetic judgment

that
is

to

a

person

admit

that

can

be

general

been universally found
ages"

.

observations,

to

please

in

This standard is

countries

and

all

[5]

speaking, beauty is not

a

Although, strictly

quality of objects, there are

properties of objects which, as

a

matter of contingent fact,

arouse the sense of beauty in human beings.

not

an

concerning what has

all

What Hume has in mind here is this:

to

in

there is some standard

of taste other than individual
sentiment.

discoverable by

incorrect

the primary/secondary quality distinction.

thought

to

be

a

He likens this

Sweetness is

quality in any object, but the effect

that certain qualities in an object produce in us.
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The

existence of the independent
objective quality in the
object
and its causal relationship
to our sensation allows
us to
make the objective judgment
that a certain object is
sweet.
This objective judgment
can be distinguished

from the sub-

jective judgment that an
object tastes sweet or seems
sweet
to a particular individual.
The same is true of the
sentiment of beauty.

the

structure of human organisms,

[6]

Given

certain qualities of

objects will produce certain
effects on human beings.

certain that beauty and
deformity, more than sweet and
bitter
are not qualities in objects,
but belong
entirely to the sentiment, internal
or
external, it must be allowed, that
there
are certain qualities in
objects,
are fitted by nature to produce which
these
particular feelings. [7]
The

relationship between

(or

passion)

But

as

calls

long

the

will be

a

it

as

produces
the

nature")

a

is

given quality and he sentiment
causal

and,

psychophysiological

thus,

contingent.

makeup

(what

Hume

of human beings remains the same
there

basis for objective value judgments.

Amidst all the variety and caprice of
taste, there are certain general principles of approbation or blame, whose influence a careful eye may trace in all
operations of the mind. Some particular
forms or qualities, from the original
structure of the internal fabric are
calculated to please, and other to displease; and if they fail of their effect
in any particular instance, it is from
151

some apparent
the organ. [8]

defect or imperfection
in

Hu.e does not deny that
variations among value

there can be considerable

judgments, not only between
individ-

uals,

but

number of

even between cultures
and ages.
factors

common cause

of

that

might

produce such variation.

difference

a

There are

a

one

value judgment is the
failure to distinguish
subjective from objective
judgments.
This sort of failure can be
identified by attending to the
language of the evaluator.
The beetle phobic who claims
that Kafka's Metamorphosis,
is an inferior work is using
the
language of objective valuation
to express subjective distaste.
The mother who calls her
daughter's novels brilliant
to express her personal
enjoyment likewise misuses
in

language.

There are, Hume says, "certain
terms in every language which
import blame, and others praise;
and all men who use the
same tongue must agree in their
application
of them". [9]

call
like,

a

work inferior
and

equating

is

the

not

equivalent

two reveals

a

to

To

expressing dis-

basic

lack of under-

standing of the nature of evaluative
language.
There are other factors that can prevent the
discovery
of the just value of objects.

Such factors include the lack

of "serenity of mind", a "due attention to
the object",

"all

the caprices of mode and fashion,

ignorance and envy". [10]
for making correct

all

and

the mistakes of

Hume discusses five requirements

value judgments:
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(1)

delicacy of taste.

(2)

and

practice,
(5)

By

(3)

comparison,

(4)

elimination of prejudice

good sense.

delicacy

of

taste

Hume

means

a

keen

power

of

discernment.

The passions and sentiments
depend on our
judgments concerning the
qualities of objects. Many
differences in passions arise
from differences in ability
to
discern and distinguish
such qualities.
Developing one's
power of discernment requires
practice.
When objects of any kind are
first
nted to the eye or imagination, prethe
sentiment which attends them is
obscure
and confused; and the mind
is, in
measure, incapable of pronouncing great
concerning their merits or defects
But
allow him to acquire experience
in those
objects, his feeling becomes more
and nice; he not only perceivesexact
the
beauties and defects of each part,
but
marks the distinguishing species
of each
quality, and assigns it suitable
praise
^
or blame. [11]
The

third

comparison.

requirement

for

correct

value

judgment

is

"a man who has no opportunity of
comparing the

different kinds of beauty,

is

indeed totally unqualified to

pronounce an opinion with regard to any
objects

By

comparison alone we fix the epithets of praise
and blame and
learn how to assign the due degree of each.”
[12]

It

is only

by comparison that we can differentiate
between various
degrees of value. A mass-produced plastic figurine

may have

some qualities

"fitted

to please"

153

and,

thus,

have some

measure of beauty.

But,

when compared to

a

Micbelanpelo,
Pleasing qualities are
recognised as few and crude
and
we adjust our judgment
accordingly.
Its

Freedom from prejudice is a
matter of framing a proper
evaluative viewpoint.
This involves two aspects:
all relevant factors must be considered,
and all irrelevant factors
must be ruled out.
A Humean "impartial observer"
is not
necessarily an observer who
ignores his own sentiments, but
an observer who forms his
judgments based on his own sentiment only after prejudice has
been eliminated.
We may observe, that every work
of art
in order to produce its due
effect on
the mind, must be surveyed in
a certain
point of view, and cannot be fully
relished by persons whose situation,
real
or imaginary, is not conformable
to that
which is required by the performance.
An orator addresses himself to a
particular audience, and must have a regard
to their particular genius,
interests,
passions, and prejudices; otherwise he
hopes in vain to govern their resolu-

tions,

and

influence

their

affec-

tions....
A critic of a different age
or nation, who should peruse this
discourse, must have all these circumstances in his eye, in order to form a
true judgment of the oration. [13]
The

ment

,

is

final
the

requirement,
most

"good

sense"

or

"sound

judg-

general of the five requirements.

Hume

is

clearly referring to what we would call

It

includes

tinction",

"clearness
and

of

conception",

"exactness

"vivacity of apprehension"
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"intelligence".

.

[14

]

of

dis-

Apart

from

[

checking prejudice, sound
judgment Is required for
analyzing
work of art.
"Mutual relations and
correspondence of
parts" must be understood
and compared in order to
judge the
"consistency and uniformity of
the whole".
When a work is
designed to achieve some end
or purpose, sound judgment
is
required to judge "how far
means employed are adapted to
their respective purposes
15
]

HOW do general rules enter
into the determinations of
the just value of objects?
The first and most obvious way
IS in discerning those
qualities "fitted to please".
As
Hume points out, it is only by
experience, or custom and
practice, that we come to discover
what qualities please and
displease, and thus, the "proportions
we ought to observe in
preferring one object to another"
(p. 294).

Experience

teaches us the value of money— its ability
to obtain objects
which produce pleasure.
According to this experience we

develop general rules by which "we form

a

notion of the

different ranks of men, suitable to the power
of riches they
are possest of...", and regulate our
passions accordingly, (p.

293)

wealth,

We

respect

(or,

more likely, envy)

those with

take pride in our own wealth, or are humbled by
our

own poverty,

all

in

accordance with general rules involving

the power of money to produce pleasure.

The general rules originate from our experience of the

value of money.
money

"fails

of

When,
its

through some intervening cause,

usual

effect",
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the

the

attending passions

Should also cease.
to

influence

But, because general rules
often contln-

us

beyond the original circumstances
that
rise to them, our passions
may continue to follow

9

the

general rule even when the
circumstances no longer warrant
the passion.
We rank men according to
their riches, but
circumstances can counter the
usual effects of such riches.
Continuing to follow the general
rule, we do not change our
view "upon account of any
peculiarities of health and temper
of the persons, which may
deprive them of all enjoyment in
their possessions" (p. 293).
Hume points out that "this may
be accounted for from the
same principles, that explain'd
the influence of general rules
on the understanding.
Custom
readily carries us beyond the just
bounds in our passions as
well as in our reasonings" (p. 293).
We can, of course, correct such
judgments and, thereby,
correct" the corresponding passions by
another, higher
order application of general rules.
Surveying past judg-

ments

of

this

discriminate

sort,

we

will

recognize that

failure to

"efficacious" from "nonef f icacious" causes, or

failure to take

into account

mistaken judgments.
the attending passion.

contrary causes,

When the judgment

is

leads

corrected,

so

to
is

A rich man who is unable to reap the

rewards of his riches is to be pitied, not envied.

Another role of general rules
point

of

view necessary

for

an
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is

in developing

objective

value

the

judgment.

'

Passions are aroused and
influenced by a variety of
factors
including the evaluator's
particular relations to objects,
his prejudices, and his
psychological or physiological idio-

syncrasies.

our passions tend to vary
according to an
object's relative proximity in
space and time.
The passions
depend upon judgments and
judgments depend on
the imagination, which is naturally
influenced aaccording to he proximity of an object.

Here then we are to consider two
kinds
of objects, the contiguous and
remote;
of which the former, by means
of their
relation to ourselves, approach an impression in force and vivacity, the latter by reason of the interruption in
our
manner of conceiving them, appear in
a
weaker and more imperfect light.
This
is their effect on the imagination.
if
my reasoning be just, they must have
a
proportionate effect on the will and
passions.
Contiguous objects must have
an influence much superior to the
distant and remote. (p. 428
)

Because

the

passions

depend

on

judgment

and

judgment

depends on the imagination, the passions will be
subject to
the

influence of the "unphilosophical probabilities".

Such

passions will be inappropriate or unreasonable because they
are aroused by a view of objects based on faulty judgments.

Besides, that we ourselves often change
our situation in this particular, we
every day meet with persons, who are in
a
different situation from ourselves,
and who cou'd never converse with us on
any reasonable terms, were we to remain
constantly in that situation and point
157

s

of view,

which is peculiar to us.
intercourse o sentiments, therefore, The
in
society and conversation, makes
us form
some general inalterable
standard, by
which we may approve or
disapprove of
characters and manners. (p. 603)
These "general and inalterable
standards" are formed according to our experience of
those qualities that have been
"universally found to please in
all countr ies
and

ages"

in

all

[16]

.

Moral Sent iment

Given

the

role

of

general

objective evaluative viewpoint,

rules

developing

in

one aspect

of

their

tance to Hume's moral theory should be
clear.
Hume,

an

objective viewpoint

is

a

an

impor-

According to

necessary condition for

the arousal of a truly moral sentiment.

Insofar as general

rules help us distinguish objective from
nonobjective view-

points,

they

will

also

nonmoral sentiments.

icant

help

function.

moral sentiments.

to

distinguish

moral

from

But, while this is certainly a signif-

function of general

crucial

us

General

rules,

it

is

not

rules can help us

their most
regulate our

But their major significance is in regu-

lating our moral judgments.
It

is

influence

making

a

of

impossible
general

to

rules

appreciate
in

the

Hume's moral

extent

of

the

theory without

clear distinction between moral sentiments and
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.

moral judgments,

m

fact,

think it is impossible to
fully

I

understand Hume's moral theory
without being clear on this
distinction.
i
„in support both these claims and, at
the
same time, attempt to explalin
the relationship between
judgment and sentiment by examining
the shortcomings

of an

account

the two.

that

falls

to make an adequate distinction
between

The account

Hearn's article

I

have in mind is found in Thomas

"General Rules and Moral Sentiments
in

Hume's Treatise "

Hearn points out

that,

according to Hume,

"our senti-

ments are subject to influences which,
if uncorrected, would
render morality and moral discourse
impossible" [17]
He
.

lists what he calls four "general rules"
for correcting
moral sentiments.
(1) Our sentiments must reflect a point
of view which abstracts from accidental
relations in space and time between the
observer and the object of evaluation.
(2) The moral sentiments must be founded
upon a general and impartial conception
of their object.
(3) They must reflect
an entirely adequate conception of the
object.
They must have the motives
(4)
and character of agents as their ultimate object. [18]

Hearn does

not

ment and sentiment;

discuss the relationship between judgthus he has no account of just how this

correction of the sentiments
explained

how

sentiments

is

are

achieved.

corrected,
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I

and

have
it

already

should

be

clear

from

rules

my

description

that

what

Hearn

calls

"general

are not

really rules at all, but,
rather, necessary
conditions for objective moral
judgments.
it would be more
accurate to say that we satisfy
these conditions by forming
our judgments according to
general rules.
The

first

and

second conditions will

be

met when we
eliminate subjective elements
from our judgments.
This is
achieved by eliminating prejudice
and disregarding personal
Idiosyncrasies.
The third condition will be met
when we
discern the qualities of objects that
are "fitted" to please
or displease, which Involves
distinguishing real from apparent qualities.
Hearn's fourth condition is a distinguishing
feature of moral evaluation. Moral
value is distinguishable
from non-moral value by its object.
"The pain or pleasure,
which arises from the general survey or
view of any action

or quality of
614

)

the

mind

,

constitutes

it

vice or virtue"

(p.

.

having

introduced the "rules" for correcting moral

sentiments, Hearn attempts to specify the connection
between
reason,
tion,

he

the calm passions,

believes,

can be

and general

found

in

the

rules.

The connec-

following

from the Treatise:
But however the general principles of
our blame or praise may be corrected by
those other principles, 'tis certain
they are not altogether efficacious, nor
do our passions often correspond entirely to the present theory.
"Tis seldom
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passages

men

heartily love what lies
tance from them, and what noat a disway redounds to their particular
benefit; as
tis no

less rare to meet with
persons
pardon another any opposition
to
their^^
their interest, however
justifiable that
opposition may be by the general
rules
contented with
sLina^^^^?\
ying, that reason requires
such an
impartial conduct, but that 'tis
seldom
we can bring ourselves to
it, and that
our passions do not readily
follow the
eterminations of our judgment.
language will be easily understood,This
if
we consider what we formerly
said concerning that reason
which is able to
oppose our passion; and which we
have
found to be nothing but a general
calm
determination of the passions, founded
on some distant view or reflection,
(p.
*

,

583

)

Here Hume describes how the natural

passions

are

Although

these

tendencies of our

corrected by other principles
rules

do

not

always

— general

correct

our

rules.

passions,

Hearn notes that "they are said to be the
determinations of
our judgment and reason". [19]
He concludes:

The

sense of reason involved here is
then related to the calm passions. What
I principally want
to note is that Hume
makes it abundantly plain here that a
calm passion is a corrected passion, one
that has been tested by these general
rules. [20]
In explaining our tendency to confuse the calm passions

with

the

similarity

"determinations of reason",
in

the

passions produce

way

they

"feel".

Hume stresses the

Both

reason and calm

little or no sensible emotion.
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"When any

.

]

passions are calm,

...

they

are

and cause no disorder in
the soul,

very readily

taken

for

the

determinations

of
and are suppos'd to proceed
from the same faculty.
that, which judges of truth and
falsehood" (p. 4i7)

reason,

With

.

Hearn argues that the calm passions
are corrected passions;
they are precisely ... those
states we achieve by following
reflective procedures" [21]
He concludes that "the relationship between reason and the calm
passions is closer than
Hume sometimes seems to suggest ”.[
22
.

I

agree with Hearn in his emphasis on the
importance of

general

rules

passions.

But

"reasonable"

I

think his attempt to link general rules to

passions

rected passions
senses.

determining the reasonableness of the

in

First,

is
it

by
a

is

equating

mistake.
a

calm passions with
it

is

a

mistake

mistake in interpretation;

identifies the actual place of general rules
the

passions.

Second,

it

is

a

cor-

in

two
mis-

it

correcting

in

mistake in method.

Appeal-

ing to Hume's notion of the calm passions sheds little
light

on the relationship between the passions and general rules.
As

I

will

show below,

it

actually tends to obscure the

relationship
A number of problems arise from Hearn's failure to make

any

For

clear

distinction

instance,

claims:

(1)

rules,

and

between

consider

the

passions

and

judgments

consequences of

two

of

.

[23]

his

A calm passion is a passion corrected by general
(2)

Only

a

passion
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can

correct

a

passion.

Together

these

imply

general

,3)

rules

are also passions.

Surely hearn does not want to
make such

claim.

a

To

say

that the

rule' that "moral sentiments
must be founded upon
a general and impartial
conception of their object" is a
passion makes no sense whatsoever.

Furthermore,

passion.

I

it

clear

is

know what

how

means

it

passion

a

say

to

can

that

oppose

anger

overcome fear, or that disgust can
oppose curiosity.
IS

not

at

all

clear how

a

passion can correct

a

can

But it

passion.

a

Talk of correction only makes sense
by making some reference
to judgment.
Hume is quite clear on this point.
Finally, Hearn's interpretation entails
that

can only be corrected by employing
This seems to involve
of

this

because,

means to say that
it

not

is

as
a

a
I

it

know how else to view

saying

that

we

can correct

judgment.

It

is

it)
a

,

then

judgment

difficult

I

am not

sure

unclear what

is

passion can correct

viewed as analogous to judgment

passion

corrected passion.

a

troublesome regress.
noted above,

a

passion.

a

(and,
it

I

But

confess,

is

I

see

if

do

analogous to

only by employing
to

it

a

how we could

ever get any process of correction going under such circum-

stances

.

These sort of difficulties would have been avoided by

a

more detailed examination of the relation between moral
sentiments

and

moral

judgments.
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What

Hume

is

claiming

in

the passage cited is that
our sentin,ents do not always
agree
With our moral judgments.
Numerous commentators have noted
that, according to Hume,
a moral judgment must be
made from
a certain "general" or
objective point of view.
This is
certainly true, but it is important
to be clear on just what
Hume means by judging from such
a viewpoint.
I think a more

accurate way of describing Hume’s
view is to say that,

judge

morally

is

to

(objective) viewpoint.

we were

free

from

^

judge

one occupied

subjective

influences without,

may

prevent

us

from

in

fact,

This is exactly what

happens when we judge someone we loath
virtuous.
sentiment

moral

The point is that we can judge as if

being free from subjective influences.

sonal

a

to

actually

person objectively, yet we recognize that

a

Our per-

viewing

moral

the

judgment

requires an objective viewpoint and we make the
sort of
judgment that we know would result from such

a

viewpoint.

A moral sentiment is aroused when we actually
achieve a

moral viewpoint.

jective

When our view is completely free of sub-

influences,

the

sentiment we

feel

will

be

a

truly

only

under

moral

sentiment.

ideal

conditions and Hume's frequent reminders that people

Thus

moral

sentiments

arise

rarely manage to match their sentiments to their judgments
indicates his recognition of this fact.

this

If

moral

Having

interpretation

judgments
a

are

not

is

correct,

then particular

always based on moral

genuinely objective view of
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a

sentiments.

person's character is

.

not

a

necessary condition for making

that

is

what

necessary for moral

an

judgment

objective view

^

a

judgment

involves

„,oral

is

and

judgment.

that

that

All

we

recognize

we

form

if this were the view we
actually have.

our

This is

achieved by forming our judgments
according to general
rules

Hume's comments

leading

up

to

the quoted passages

strongly support this Interpretation.

He first notes that,

if we were to judge characters
-only as they appear from our

peculiar point of view",

would be impossible for us "to

it

converse together on any reasonable terms"
avoid

this

view;

and always,

whatever

by

may

fixing

be

on

"some

present

place ourselves in them,

situation"

(p.

581-82).

compares this to our manner of judging beauty.

ment

may vary

viewed.
judge

But

effect

when we

according

were near.
it

according

to

to

We

steady and general point of

in our thoughts,

our

581).

(p.

the

Hume

Our senti-

distance of the object

judge a distant

the effect we Icnow

object beautiful, we
it

would have if it

We judge it beautiful "because we Icnow what

will

have

in

such

position,

a

reflection we correct its momentary appearance"

Clearly Hume does not want

to

suggest

and
(p.

by

that

582).

that

maJcing

an aesthetic judgment requires actually viewing objects from

close by.

close by.

We need only judge them as if we viewed them from

The same is true of
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a

moral viewpoint.

Our

actual

view of

a

person may not be

free

of

subjective

factors, but we judge as if it were
free of them.
In general, all sentiments of
blame
or praise are variable according
to our
situation of nearness or remoteness,
with ^regard to the person blam'd
or
prais'd, and according to the
present
disposition of our mind.
But these
variations we regard not in our general

decisions,

but still apply the terms
expressive of our liking or dislike,
in
the same manner, as if we remain'd
in
one point of view.
Experience soon
teaches us this method of correcting our
language, where the sentiments are more
stubborn and inalterable. (p. 582
)

General

rules

can

actually change our passions by

correcting our judgments about
passions.

But,

more

the objects

importantly,

general

that

arouse our

rules

allow the

possibility of making genuine moral judgments when we do
not
or cannot correct our passions.
Even when I cannot help
viewing someone as my enemy and feeling dislike,

I

know what

my sentiment would be towards someone with the same
character who

is

not

my enemy,

and

this

enables me

to

judge

an

enemy as if my view were objective.
Keeping this distinction between passions and judgments
in

mind,

I

shall now return to examine Hearn's view of the

calm passions.

While Hearn claims

are corrected passions

— passions

that

the

calm passions

"founded on reflection"

— he

does not want to claim that this is the only characterizing

feature

of

calm passions.

He
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merely holds that

"at

least

one

sense

which passions are calm is
when they are

in

corrected by rules".

Hearn can thus agree with Ardal

[24]

that a calm passion is one which
"on most occasions involves

low emotional
intensity is

intensity"

,

yet

[25]

argue

that

this

natural result of correcting a passion.

a

low
This

interpretation also lends credence to
Hearn's view that
"calm passions precisely are those
states we achieve by
following reflective procedures" and
are,
able in the ordinary way of talking"

This

IS

simplistic.

calm

a

It

passions

passions

as

thereby,

"reason-

[26]

.

very tidy picture,

but

it

far too

is

entirely overlooks the fact that, among the

often

mistaken

benevolence

and

and kindness to children'

(p.

for

reason,

resentment,
417).

the

lists

love

such

of

life,

Such calm passions cer-

tainly are not corrected passions.
passions are corrected passions.

Hume

Thus,

not

calm

all

Furthermore, while it may

be

true

in

intensity and thus experienced as calm, this is equally

that a passion that has been corrected will be low

true of violent passions.
correcting my judgment.

might

l

might correct my anger by

As the result of such correction,

reduce my anger to the point of calmness.

corrected violent passion
passion that

is

is

still

a

violent passion

generally high in intensity)

correction results in experiencing

it

But

as calm.

I

a

(a

even when the
So,

not all

corrected passions are calm passions.
If

not

all

calm

passions
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are

corrected passions,

and

not

all

corrected passions are cal.
passions,

is there
anything left to Hearn-s claim
that a calm passion is a
corrected passion? Given the
various other claims that

Hearn makes, the only recourse
that

I

can think of would be

for him to argue along the
following lines:

Admittedly, any

passion may be corrected by review
and reflection.
review

and

reflection

sentiments,
calm

and

are

necessary

conditions

this explains why the moral

passions.

A

"distant view".

moral

sentiment

is

for

But
moral

sentiments are

aroused only upon

a

Such a view requires the correction of our

natural sentiments by reflection.

Moral sentiments are just

"those states we achieve by following reflective
procedures

.

This is not true of the violent passions.

[27]

flection may be used to correct or modify

a

Re-

violent passion,

but reflection is not a necessary condition
for its arousal.
If

talk of
that

this

an

this more
the

the

position Hearn has

calm passions

moral

merely

is

obscures

the

mind,

in

point,

which

sentiments are corrected passions.
incidental

by-product

of

that

the

the arousal of moral

a

merely

Calmness

Its mistake

objective viewpoint

But

even

lies

necessary

is

in

for

sentiments can be achieved only by

reflection and correction.
viewpoint is

is

correction.

limited claim is incorrect.

assumption

then his

According to Hume, an objective

necessary condition for the arousal of moral

sentiments, but there is nothing in Hume's theory that says
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such

a

Viewpoint

can be

achieved only by

a

process of

correction.
Hume

held

that

all

(or,

at

least,

most)

people )tnow

from experience the sentiments
aroused in them when observing "qualities of mind"
objectively.
i
know the approval I
have felt when observing
benevolence that neither hinders
nor serves my own interests.
My viewpoint in such circumstances was naturally objective,
it required no particular
reflection or correction. Yet my approval
was moral approval

all

the same.

of human beings,

Will

experience

Hume believed that, given the similarity

anyone in relevantly similar circumstances
the

qualities of mind.

same

sentiment

upon observing

similar

Our experience of this causal relation-

ship allows us to form general rules.

These general rules

guide our judgments, allowing us to adjust
our judgments to
varying circumstances.
When, for instance,

benevolent

person,

my

I

have some personal quarrel with

sentiment

is

likely

those observers who have no such quarrel.
my quarrel acts as a contrary cause,

judgment

by

following

general

rules.

I

to

differ

a

from

Recognizing that

am able to adjust my

My

experience

of

a

naturally objective viewpoint serves as the basis for forming

general

rules

that

guide my judgments when

I

am

influ-

enced by nonobjective factors.

Hearn and
element

in

I

agree that general rules are an essential

Hume's moral

theory.
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But we disagree on their

function.

Hearn claims that moral sentiments
are calm passions and that calm passions
are passions corrected by
general rules.
Thus, a moral sentiment is simply
a passion
corrected by general rules. Such
passions can
be said to be

reasonable because they are the
result of reflective procedures.
I
argue that following general rules
allows us to
make the sort of objective value

judgments necessary or

genuinely moral judgments .
IS

not

that

sentiments,

The importance of general rules

they correct passions,
but

that

they allow us

thereby producing moral
to make moral

judgments

even in the absence of moral sentiments.

The Rules of Justice
An account

of general

rules

in

the Treatise would not

be complete without some mention of the rules of
justice.

full treatment of this subject would require

analysis of Hume's theory of justice,
itself.

I

shall

a

a

thorough

large topic

confine myself to the modest

A

in

task of

outlining those aspects of Hume's theory which are most
essential for understanding the operations of general rules.
I

shall

then examine certain parallels between the role of

general rules in Hume's theory of justice and their role in
his theory of judgment.
A

virtue,

that produces

according
a

to

Hume,

is

any

quality of mind

certain sort of pleasure, vice
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a

quality of

mind

that

produces

a

certain sort of pain.

The qualities

that produce moral pleasure are
those that are agreeable or
useful to the person possessing
the qualities or to others.

Hume

makes

distinction between two types of virtue:

a

natural and artificial.

a virtue is natural when

(1)

people

are naturally inclined to be
motivated by it (naturally
possess it) and (2) people are naturally
inclined to approve
of It.
The paradigm natural virtue is benevolence.
People
have a natural tendency towards
benevolence, albeit in
varying degrees.
Hume denies that we have any such passion
as

"the

is

not

love of mankind,

incompatible

endowed with

a

merely as such"(p.

with

the

claim

that

481),

but this

are

naturally

we

more limited benevolence, which is strongest

towards our friends

and

acquaintances and more limited

towards "strangers and indifferent persons"

(p.

488). Benevo-

lence also elicits our natural approval.

Artificial virtues depend on the "invention or contrivance"

of

man.

(they have

are

no

People do not naturally posses such virtues
natural or original motivation to them)

people naturally inclined to approve of them.

artificial virtues become virtues only

to

the

sorts

point,

The

Justice

is

a

There is no original motivation

of behavior we call

'just'

,

nor

natural tendency to approve of such behavior.

his

nor

within some order of

convention, which provides their motivation.

paradigm artificial virtue.

,

is

there any

To illustrate

Hume considers an example of just behavior:
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rsturning borrowed money.
What

money?

motivation might

The

someone have to return borrowed

most obvious answer would be

and obligation” (p.

479).

But,

sense of duty

“a

Hume claims,

the regard for

the virtue of an action could never
be the original motlvation for that action:

We can never have a regard to the
virtue
of an action, unless the action be
ante-

cedently virtuous.
No action can be
virtuous, but so far as it proceeds from
a virtuous motive.
A virtuous motive
must precede the regard to the virtue;
and 'tis impossible, that the virtuous
motive and the regard to the virtue can

be the same. (p.
It

is

"sophistry"

a

virtuous

is
is

a

a

virtuous

say

that

motive

what

makes

and what

a

considers

public interest,

motive

in

This

is

provide an original motiva-

three

alternatives:

and the interest of the lender.

our

interest

to

a

motiva-

self-interest,

self-interest could not be the motivation, for

generally be

a

circle". [28]

sense of duty cannot

Hume

action

makes

tion to return the money, what could provide such

tion?

an

regard for the virtue of the action.

"reasoning in
If

to

480)

it

Obviously
would not

return the money.

interest could not supply the motivation either.

Public

Hume cites

three specific and one general objection to this possibility.

First,

particular acts of justice do not necessarily
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promote public interest.

provide

motivation

a

Second, public interest would
not

to

secret

acts

of

honesty,

yet

such

secret acts are nonetheless
virtuous.
Third, in actual
fact, people rarely consider
public interest when they
just

remote

and

mankind

(p.

IS

that

love

of

or

honest

too

sublime

481).

"there

actions.

affect

the

"too

generality of

no

such

merely

as

passion
such,

in

human minds,

independent

of

qualities, or services, or of relation to
ourself"

The

is

Hume's final and more general objection

is

mankind,

to

Such a motivation

only possibility

lender or benevolence.

left

is

the

as

the

personal
(p.

481).

interest of the

Hume has two objections.

First,

if

the lender is an enemy, towards whom we
feel no benevolence,

there would be

no

clearly people

are

circumstances.

motivation to return the money,
motivated

do

so

even under

He may be "a profligate debauchee,

wou'd rather receive harm than benefit

possessions"

Hume

s

such

Second, it may not be in the lender's inter-

est to return the money.

and

to

yet

(p.

from

large

482).

conclusion

is

that

it

would

seem

"we

have

naturally no real or universal motive for observing the laws
of equity,

vance

(p.

but
483)

the very equity and merit of that obser-

.

But,

as

he

has

already shown,

regard for

the

virtue of an action cannot be an original motivation.

The

only solution

is

to

"allow,

that

the

sense of justice

and injustice is not deriv'd from nature, but arises artifi173

Cially,
tions
of

tho'

necessarily from education,

483).

(p.

conventional

just

It

only when considered within

is

rules

and

practices that

actions can be discovered.

arises,

will

it

and human conven-

be necessary

a

system

motivation for

a

To see how the motivation

to examine Hume's explanation

Of the origins of justice.
[29]

The origins of society cannot be
attributed to people's

recognition of its benefits, for people
would have no means
of discovering such benefits without
experience.
But,

without

the

society

is

its

benefits,

the

formation of

ensured by the "natural appetite betwixt the
Once a rudimentary society is established, its

sexes".
members

recognition of

even

will

increases

the

recognize
power,

the

benefits

ability

and

that

accrue:

security of

its

society
members.

Experience will also make clear that certain "outward
circumstances" and man's "natural temper" hinder the preservation of society.

The scarcity of goods and instability of

their possession combined with man's natural
and biased affections

self-interest

inevitably lead to conflicts.

Man's

natural temper cannot be changed, but it can be redirected.
There is no passion ... capable of controlling the interested affection, but
the very affection itself, by an alteration of its direction. Now this alteration must necessarily take place upon
the least reflection; since 'tis evident, that the passion is much better
satisfy'd by its restraint than by its
liberty.
(p. 492)
.

.

.
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Recognizing
their

that

friends

their

and

own

loved

interests

ones

are

and

better

the

interest

satisfied

of

within

society than without it, people
are led to check their
natural temper.

Given man's natural acquisitiveness,
biased affections
and the scarcity of goods, the
major impediment to maintaining society will be the instability
of possessions.
if
society is to be preserved this situation
must be remedied.
The remedy is supplied by artifice.

When men, from their early education in
society, have become sensible of the
infinite advantages that result from it
... and when they have observ'd that
the
principal disturbance in society arises
from those goods, which we call external, and from their looseness and easy
transition from one person to another,
they must seek a remedy, by putting
these goods, as far as possible, on the
same footing with the fix'd and constant
advantages of the mind and body. (p. 489)
The

which

remedy

consists

Hume describes

as

in
"a

establishing

a

general

convention enter'd

rule,

into by

all

members of society to bestow stability on the possession of
those

external

goods,

and

leave

everyone

in

the

peaceable

enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry" (p.

489).

This convention for stabilizing possessions

creates property, which is "nothing but those goods, whose

constant possession is establish'd by the laws of soci-
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ety”(p.

491).

Justice consists, at least in
part, in abid-

ing by such laws. [30]

Hume stresses that the agreement
to abide by the rules
of justice IS not based on a
promise.
"it is only a general
sense of common interest, which
inclines them to regulate
their conduct by certain rules"
(p. 490).
Promises arise in
same manner as the rules for
stabilizing property.
Both
are the product of a convention,
which "arises gradually,
and acquires force by slow
progression, and by our repeated
experiences of the inconveniences of
transgressing it"(p.
490)

.

noted above,

As

just.

I

another's

may have

there are no natural motivations to be

motivation to refrain from taking

a

possessions

under

certain circumstances

— for

in-

stance, when it would be dangerous to myself or when

I

have

some particular affection for the other person.

I

have

But

no natural motive for restraining myself in all
circum-

stances.

Within

motive

supplied.

is

a

conventional order of society such

The original motive for observing the

rules of justice is simply enlightened self-interest.
best

my

satisfy my own interest within society;

interest

to

abide

preserving society.
"natural

serve

the

by

the

if

foster our own best

it

can

I

thus

is

conventions developed

in

for

This is what Hume refers to as the

obligation to justice"
rules,

a

we want

to

interests.
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(p.

498).

We

ought

preserve society,
The

'ought'

to

and

obthus

here is purely

.

.

prudential
But,

according

to

Hume,

natural

the original motivation to
justice.

and conventions

obligation

is

merely

Once society has grown

have become firmly established,

people are

no

longer motivated by natural
obligation, or regard to
self-interest, but by moral obligation,
or regard to virtue.

Within a conventional order an act of
injustice will be seen
as “prejudicial to human society,
and pernicious to everyone
that approaches the person guilty
of lt”(p. 499).
This
arouses our displeasure, and "as every
thing, which gives
uneasiness in human actions, upon the general
survey,

call d Vice",
is

injustice elicits our moral disapproval.

only within

will

always

a

conventional

appear

useful

or

order that

agreeable

a

just

from

an

is

it

character
objective

viewpoint, and it is these qualities that give rise to
moral
approval
The general rule for stabilizing possessions is worked
out

over

time by our

experience of its advantages and the

disadvantages of transgressing

it.

But

the rule

much too general to guide us in particular cases.
Tho' the establishment of the rule, concerning the stability of possession, be
not only useful, but even absolutely
necessary to human society, it can never
serve to any purpose, while it remains
in such general terms.
Some method must
be shown, by which we may distinguish
what particular goods are to be assign'd
to each particular person, while the
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itself is

rest of mankind are excluded
from
possession and enjoyment (p. 501 - thei]
502
.

We
the

must

rule.

determine

Ideally,

possess'd of what
his use..."(p.

some

most

502).

particular

would seem best

it

is

)

means

for

applying

"every one were

if

suitable to him,

and proper

for

Thus, we might be tempted to
believe

that the best way to stabilize
possessions is according to a
principle of utility, assigning to
each person those goods

which

would

be

most

useful

or

advantageous

person himself or to society.
scheme

may

appear

in

theory,

either

to

the

However agreeable such
it

is

not

acceptable

a

in

practice.

Besides, that this relation of fitness
may be common to several at once, 'tis
liable to so many controversies, and men
are so partial and passionate in judging
of these controversies, that such a rule
wou'd be absolutely incompatible with
the peace of human society. (p. 502)

Following such a rule would introduce an endless source
of controversy and disagreement.

Consider

a

simple example.

Is an apple orchard more useful or advantageous to an
expert

fruit

grower or to an

impoverished family?

disabled and unable to till the soil or to
whose

food

sources

are

more

limited

than

— To
a

someone

vegetarian

others?

A

rule

requiring that such decisions be made for every case would
be

the

a

source of perpetual dispute,

and would thus undermine

original purpose for introducing
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a

rule that would

stabilize possessions.
Rather than pursuing such
theoretical solutions to the
problem, Hume examines actual
practice. [31]
He discovers
five rules by which people
actually assign property.
These
rules are succinctly summed up
in the following account of
David Miller:

(1) Possession: A person shall
have the
right to whatever objects he
currently
holds in his possession.

(2)
Occupation: A person shall have a
right to whatever objects he possesses
first, i.e. prior to other persons.
(3) Prescription: A person shall have
a
right to whatever objects he has held
over an extensive period of time.

(4)

Accession:

A person shall have a
whatever is 'intimately' connected with objects he already owns
(e.g. the fruits of his trees, the offspring of his cattle)

right

to

.

(5)
Succession: A person shall have a
right to objects owned by his close
relatives upon their death. [32]

The application of the first rule, present possession,
is

limited to the initial formation of society.

Once soci-

ety is established the observance of it would not only cease
to stabilize possessions,

it

would actively promote destabi-

lization.

These five rules, though more determinate than the rule

that property must be stable,
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are still not determinate

enough to settle all
controversies.
are

Ukely

Two types of problems

to arise.

First, there will be questions
such as
"What should be counted as
first possession?" and "How
long
must an object be possessed
before it

becomes rightful

property?"

Second,

will conflict.

there is the possibility that
the rules

Both problems are resolved by
an even more

determinate set of general rules—
municiple laws.
Hume claims that the origin of
the rules

for assigning

property is not reason,
tion has

but

the

imagination.

The imagina-

"natural propensity to join relations,
especially
resembling ones..."(p. 509).
We ascribe property relations
a

according

to

the

"natural union betwixt the ideas of

person and that of an ob j ect
union

is

the

result

of

our

.
.

.

"

{

p

.

510).

observation of

This natural
a

natural

tion, primarily contiguity and cause and
effect.
for instance,

is

a

rela-

Accession,

based on both the contiguity between person

and object and cause and effect between objects.
If

the

ty?

the rules for assigning property are the product
of

imagination, what

They are not

is

their claim to legitimate authori-

based on reason,

but

only on

"the

frivolous properties of our thought and concept ion"
Thus, they appear to be entirely arbitrary.
that

reason

cannot

signing property.
are

not

supply

the

.

504).

Hume's reply is

any workable principles

for

as-

The type of principles supplied by reason

simply impractical;

reintroduce

(p

more

sort

of

they are self-defeating.

destabilizing
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influences

that

They
the

rule for stabilizing property
is designed to eliminate.
The imagination can and
does supply workable principles.
This, according to Hume, is
a simple matter of
fact.
His five rules are taken
from actual practice.
Hume explains this fact by appealing
to "known properties of
human
nature"— our natural propensity to
join relations.
Because
the rules are the product of a
natural propensity, they will
Immediately occur to everyone as the
"most natural expedient
and people will "easily acquiese
in this expedient" and

"naturally agree in preferring lt"(p.

503-504).

if we re-

ject

these naturally formed rules because
they are not the
product of reason, we are left with no
way of stabilizing

possessions and this undermines our effort
to maintain
society.
In discussing the influencing motives
of the will, Hume

claims

passion

that

we

are

action,

in

design’d end..."(p.

rules,

he

argues

unreasonable when
we

chuse means

416).

that

"in

exerting

insufficient for the

his

discussion of the above

reason is

incapable of providing

in

principles that achieve our desired end

— stabilizing

sions.

is

The paradoxical conclusion

unreasonable

to

any

employ our reason.

To

that

it

posses-

would be

achieve our end we

must grant authority to custom.

There are

a

number of striking parallels between Hume's

argument here and his Book

I

argument concerning the role of
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custom

in

judgment

showing the

.

Both arguments are concerned
with

[33)

limits of reason.

m

Book

I
Hume argues that
reason does not and cannot
support causal inferences. Causal Inference is based on the
imagination. er custom. Reason
loses its title to grant or
deny authority to custom because
reason, when consistently pursued,
is self-destructive.
f

if

we allow that only judgments
based on reason have legitimate

authority, then we must conclude
that no judgments have
legitimate

authority.

But

claim to lead to truth.
all

judgments,

reason

ples

for

its

title

then it clearly thwarts

reason does

not

property distribution.

it

its

and cannot

These

provide princi-

rules

are based

too

reason

title

to

it

undermines all judgment.

imagination, or custom in the form of convention.
its

its

own aim;

the

loses

by

if following reason would undermine

cannot lead to true judgment if

Similarly,

gains

grant

or

on

Here

deny authority to

these conventions because rational principles are selfdefeating.

Attempts to assign property according to ratio-

nal principles undermines the purpose of the rules,
which is
to maintain "peace and order" in society.
In both cases the

tendency

to

undermine

limits of reason are revealed by its
its

own

end.

This

tendency can be

arrested only by granting authority to custom.

entirely consistent
tom,
if

in

If we were

following reason and rejecting cus-

we would undermine all judgment and belief.

we were

to

follow only rational principles
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Likewise,
in

property

distribution and reject convention
or custom-derived rules,
we would undermine the social
order.
To achieve the aim of
reason we must limit reason and
acknowledge custom.
Another
the

important

between

Hume's

account

of

general rules of judgment and the
general rules of

justice

IS

natural

propensities

his

parallel

that

in both

discussion of

sophical

cases general rules can be seen as

correcting

judgments,

probabilities

propensities of the

are

natural

propensities.

Hume notes

the

result

imagination.

that
of

the

unphilo-

certain

We correct

m

natural

judgments

formed according to unphi losophical
probabilities by following general

of the

rules.

But these general rules are the product

same propensities of the imagination as the
unphilo-

sophical probabilities.

Thus we correct our judgments by a

"new direction of the very same principle"

(p.

150 ).

There are also certain natural propensities of the
passions.

"in the original frame of our mind, our strongest

attention is confin'd to ourselves; our next is extended to
our relations

and acquaintances;

and

'tis

only the weakest

which reaches to strangers and indifferent persons"

(p.

488 ).

Our self-interest and biased affection lead us astray in our

behavior just as our natural propensities of the imagination
lead us astray in our judgment.

The self-interested passion

can only be corrected by redirecting the same passion.
'Tis

certain,

that

no
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affection of the

"

human

mind

the

has

of

liL

both

sufficient

force

to counter-ballanc4
There is no pas-

gam....

therefore, capable of controlling
the interested affection,
but the very
alteration of
Its direction. (p. 492)
i

This
rules.

alteration

direction

-Tis by establishing

possession,
93)

of

that

this

is

achieved

by

general

the rule for the stability of

passion restrains

itself ..."

(p.

492-

.

Although Hume claims that the
redirecting of selfinterest

must necessarily take place upon the
least reflec-

tion” (p.

492)

and that

"nature provides

judgment or understanding,

modious in the affections"
not

for what
484),

(p.

is
it

a

remedy in the

irregular and incomis clear that he does

consider the formation of the general rules of
justice

as a conscious reflective process.

The rules are the result

of "a progress of the sentiments" that is "natural
and even

necessary
of

(p.

500).

self-interest

is

Given time and experience, the passion
self-correcting.

Thus

the

rule

that

property must remain stable "arises gradually, and acquires
force by

a

slow progression, and our repeated experience of

the inconveniences of transgressing it"(p. 490).

The

manner.
judgments,

general
we

do

rules
not

weighing

judgment

of

arise

in

a

similar

reflect on the history of our past
successes

and

develop rules to avoid failures.

184

failures

and

consciously

The modification of belief

—

.

and correction of certain
natural propensities is the
natural effect of certain
occurrences in our past experience
false judgments.
General rules arise gradually
and unre-

flectively

as

we

experience

the

judgments
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"inconveniences”

of

false

NOTES

Hume points out that, while it follnwc
=
®
cannot,
philosophically
speaxing,
speakinq
be said to have such a power,
[1]

"'tis

it

n^r^bv°"

operate
opera^ upon them by means of the idea and
suDoositinn of
power, independent of its actual
exercise" (p. 311-12).
pleasure and
Pleasure and pain are
[5]
""" secondary impressions or
imp?esslonnrre??ection!''°""

pain [4]
are
Li'ain/i

^

themselves

passions.

[6]

David Hume, "Of the Standard of Taste,"
ed. John W.
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merr i 1 1
1965), p. 6.
[3]

Lenz

,

Ibid., p. 7.
Ibid.

the calm
Treatise.
[7]

What Hume here calls the "sentiment of beauty"
is
passion called the "sense of beauty" in the

"Standard of Taste", p. 11.

[8] Ibid., p. 9.
The scope of this passage clearly includes more than aesthetic judgments.
In the Treatise, Hume
maizes the same point about both the passions and
the moral
sentiments.
Discussing the passions, Hume claims:

"We may

greater question,
that produce the
passions, be as natural as the object,
to which it is directed, and whether all
the vast variety proceeds from caprice
or from the constitution of the mind.
This doubt we shall soon remove, if we
cast our eye upon human nature, and
consider that in all nations and all
ages, the same objects still give rise
to pride and humility. .." (pp. 280-81).

whether

...

the

maJce

it

a

causes

Discussing moral sentiments, Hume claims:
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.

"When you pronounce any action or
charvicious, you mean nothing,
but that from the constitution
of your
have a feeling or sentiment
f r om the contemplation
of
1
^

evaluLVi
evaluation
as

distinction between subjective

expression of individual preference and
objective evaluation baaed on certain objective
quaUt?es in
a

theory; it serves as a
claim that a moral judgment must be made
from
„
view".
Hume's awareness of the imporcorrect use of evaluative language is evident
in
tne following passage from the Treatise;

basis

"In general, all sentiments of praise or

blame are variable, according to our
situation of nearness or remoteness,
with regard to the person blam'd or
prais'd,

and

according to the present
of our mind.
But these
variations we regard not in our general
decisions, but still apply the terms
expressive our liking or dislike, in the
same manner, as if we remain'd in one
point of view.
Experience soon teaches
us this method of correcting our sentiments, or at least, of correcting our
language, where the sentiments are more
[10] stubborn
and inalterable.... Such cor[11] rections are common with regard to all
the senses; and indeed
twere impossible
we cou'd ever make use of language, or
communicate our sentiments to one
another, did we not correct the momentary appearances of things, and overlook
our present situation" (p. 582).
[12]
Ibid. , pp. 8-9

disposition

'

Ibid., p. 13.
Hume is here making essentially the
same point made in a previously quoted passage from the
Treatise (pp. 293-94)
A person "full-grown and of the same
nature as ourselves" but totally inexperienced would not
know the proper degree of passion he "ought to assign" to
any object.
It is only by custom and experience that we
.

learn to "settle the just value of every thing".

Ibid.,
repeatedly in the

The same view is expressed
p. 14.
Treatise.
Cf.
pp. 291,303,323,372,389,
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390,593.
[13]

Ibid.,

svaluativ©
602-603.

p.

15

.

For similar passages regarding
the
see Treatise
p.
472 and pp.

viewpoint

[14]

Ibid., p. 16.

[15]

Ibid.

[16]

Ibid., p. 7.

,

and

in Hume'l
Hume s Treatise,” Review of Metaphysics Moral Sentiments
30 (1976)
p. 60.
,

[18]

Ibid., p. 61.

[19]

Ibid., p. 62.

[20]

Ibid.

[21]

Ibid., p. 63.

[22]

Ibid.

[23]
This failing is the source of a fundamental
problem in Hearn's main thesis.
Hearn tries to argue that
Hume's moral sentiments are attitudes as opposed
to
emotions.
Hearn characterizes an attitude as "highly
rational, in the sense that it presupposes a certain
conception of an object.
One can only have attitudes where
certain beliefs concerning the objects ... are involved"
(p.
63)
Emotions, on the other hand, "can be experienced in
the context of few or no beliefs" (p. 63).
Attitudes are
within our control", whereas "emotions are relatively
beyond our control" (p. 68).
Even a cursory examination of
Hume's view of the relationship between passions and judgment reveals that this sort of distinction between emotions
and attitudes would be unacceptable to Hume.
Even the
direct violent passions such as anger or fear depend on a
certain conception of objects and require a context of
belief.
Such 'emotions' are within our control to the extent that our belief is within our control.
One might argue
that, on Hume's view, belief is not within our control, but
this will then present an equal problem for Hearn's account
of an attitude.
.

[24]

Hearn, p. 62.

Pall S. Ardal, ^ssion and Value in Hume's
[25]
Treatise (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1966), p. 94.
188

[26]

Hearn, p. 63.

[27]

Ibid.

[28] Although he argues that a
regard for the virtue of
an action cannot be the original
motive
for that action,
Hume acknowledges that a sense of duty
can become a motive:

ask.

^

What reason or motive have I to
money ? it will, peThi^sT b^
that my regard to justice, and
abhorance of villainy and knavery, are
sufficient reasons ... if i have the
least grain of honesty, or sense of duty
and obligation.
And this answer, no
doubt, is just and satisfactory to man
in his civilized state, and when train'd
up according to a certain discipline and
education.
But in his rude and more
natural condition, if you are pleas'd to
call such a condition natural, this answer wou'd be rejected as perfectly unintelligible" (p. 479-480).
I

[29] Presumably, in explaining the origins of justice,
Hume means to offer a causal hypothesis. He is arguing from
effects our actual rules and practices to causes.

—

[30] Hume s notion of justice clearly encompasses much
more than the mere observance of property rights.
Justice,
according to Hume, is the observance of the conventional
rules and practices for the preservation of society.
This
explains why he includes sections on allegiance to government, the laws of nations, and even chastity and modesty in
his discussion of justice and injustice.

In the second Enquiry, Hume examines and
[31]
criticizes two other theoretical solutions: distribution
according to individual merit and equal distribution.
He
argues that both solutions are self-defeating.
His
objection to individual merit is the same as his objection
to utility:
"So

great

the uncertainty of merit,
its natural obscurity, and
from the self-conceit of each individual, that no determinate rule of conduct
would ever result from it; and the total
dissolution of society must be the imme-

both

is

from
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.

Enquir y Concerninq
tl^ Principles
Morals ed. L.A. Selbyigge, third edition, reyised
with notes

^

pLss!'?975?,‘^p“? 53.'°^^°‘^‘^= Clarendon
h"r‘evin“‘^e°e;

—

prTcr\«^r '.-a^^

Pl--ble

Historians, and even common sense, may
inform us, that however specious
these
Ideas of perfect equality may seem,
they
are really, at bottom, impracticable;
and were they not so, would be
extremely

pernicious to human society.

Render

possessions ever so equal, men's different degrees of art, care, and industry
will immediately break that equality.
you check these virtues, you reduce society to the most extreme indigence; and instead of preventing want
and beggary in a few, render it unavoidable to the whole community.
The most
rigorous inquisition too is requisite to
watch every inequality ... and the most
severe jurisdiction, to punish and redress it .... So much authority must
soon degenerate into tyranny and be exerted with great par t ia 1 i t ies
p
"
^
.

.

.

(

194)

Political Thought
[33]

Miller, Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's
(Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 'Sl~.

Hume's Book

I

argument is discussed in Chapter III.
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CHAPTER

VI

CONCLUSION

In

the

preceding

chapters

have

I

tried

to

present

a

thorough account of the role of
general rules in Hu.e
philosophy as presented in the
Treatise
This task has
•

.

often

required

examining

certain

arguments in great detail.
essary,

of

Hume's

doctrines

and

Such detailed analysis was nec-

not

only for understanding how general
rules function, but, also, for appreciating
their Importance to major
areas of Hume's philosophy.
As necessary
as

analysis

may

combined with

be,
a

it

is,

think,

I

more general view.

a

detailed

most profitable when

Thus, in this chapter,

I

shall review the major conclusions of the
previous chapters
in

light

of

their relevance to certain general features of

Hume's thought.
One important aspect of Hume's philosophy is
his natu-

ralism,

and

the

considerations

in

Chapters

I

and ll reveal

the crucial role of general rules in this regard.

as

Inasmuch

there are substantial differences among commentators

concerning the nature of Hume's naturalism,
to be clear on my use of the term.

loose

Hume

but
s

limited

thought:

"experimental

sense
(1)

meant

his

reasoning"

to

expressed
in
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his

I

it

is

important

use "naturalism" in a

include

two

features

of

intention of employing

examination

of

human

•nature,

and

his

(2)

view that

all

mental phenomena can be

explained in terms of
psychophysiological principles.
Hume explains his use of
experimental method in
introduction to the Treatise:

the

seems to me evident, that the
essence
mind being equally unknown to
us with
bodies, it must be
equally impossible to form any
notion of
Its powers and qualities
otherwise than
from careful and exact experiments,
and
the observation of those particular
effects, which result from its
different
circumstances and situations.
And tho'
we must endeavor to render all
our
principles as universal as possible, by
tracing up our experiments to the utmost, and explaining all effects from
the simplest and fewest causes, 'tis
certain we cannot go beyond experience?
and any hypothesis, that pretends to
discover the ultimate original qualities
of human nature, ought at first to be
rejected as presumptuous and chimerical,
(p. xvii)
It

What we know of the nature of the understanding
we know from

observation and experience" alone, and any hypothesis that
appeals to mysterious or supernatural agencies and powers
or
to

refin d

and

spiritual"

faculties

must

be

rejected

as

"presumptuous and chimerical".

The
^®l^ted

second element of Hume's naturalism is closely
to

the

first.

As

I

pointed out

in

Chapter

I,

in

eliminating what he considered the suspect faculty of pure
intellect,

Hume

understanding

on

was

free

purely

to

base

natural
192

all

the

physical

workings of the
processes.

Al-

.

though the physiological
aspects of the workings of the
mind
clearly of little Interest
to Hume, his frequent
references and allusions to
them indicate his concern that
his psychological principles
be fully explicable at the
physiological level.
Hume's ideal, although, perhaps,
not
always realised, was to eliminate
as much mystery as possible from the workings of the
understanding.
if, after
rendering all our principles as
universal as possible by
"tracing up our experiments to the
utmost”, we can find "no
reason for our most general and most
refined principles,
besides our experience of their reality",
we must not be

tempted to offer "chimerical" explanations.

Instead we must

sit down contented” and be "satisfied
with our Ignorance",

consoling ourselves with the recognition that "this
impossibility of explaining ultimate principles
is a
defect com-

mon to... all the sciences ..."

(p.

xviii)

Although the Malebranchian theory of natural judgments

provided Hume with the means of eliminating what he considered chimerical explanations of the operations of the under-

standing,

it

needed supplementing if

it

was to account for

the observable fact that we are able to regulate and correct

our natural

judgments.
to

the

judgments and distinguish between good and bad

Malebranche

accounted for these facts by appeal

faculty of pure intellect, which does not depend on

any psychophysiological processes.
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This sort of appeal was

not

possible

needed

that

an

was

within

account

Hume's

of

the

naturalistic

correction

of

framework,
natural

Hume

judgments

fully explicable within the theory
of natural

judgments.

He

achieved

this

by

developing

his

theory of

general rules.
General rules are the natural result
of our experience
of successes and failures in past
judgments.
Their formation IS explained by exactly the
same principles used to
explain all our judgments customs and
experience.
By em-

—

ploying them we learn to distinguish the
"extensive and
constant" principles of the imagination form
the "capricious
and

uncertain"

principles,

and

to

guide our

judgments

ac-

cording to the former rather than the latter.
General rules also play

major role in Hume's concep-

a

tion of reason and rational method.

confined himself to
"reason"

(

viz

.

,

a

Although he generally

particularly narrow usage of the term

"the discovery of truth

and falsehood"),

a

legitimate question to ask is whether his views display
^^ything akin to

a

natural conception

broader and, what we would consider, more
of reason.

The answer is clearly, yes.

The extensive and constant principles of the imagination are
not

based on reason in the narrow sense, because we cannot

show that such principles are likely to result in true
judgments.

wise

and

Yet,

throughout the Treatise

judicious

reasoners

adhere

,

to

while foolish and vulgar reasoners do not.
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Hume insists that
these

principles,

"Wise men" guide

their judgments by properly
formed general rules;
of "solid sense and long

experience"

beliefs to the evidence.
principles, which
minds

”

(p.

In Chapters

of

ing

in

and

is

A judgment

to scientific

dence.

proportion their

to

take place in weak

.

reasonableness

judgment.

men

The vulgar are guided by
irregular

"are observ'd only

225)

thus

iv,

based
is

i

on

explained how Hume's notion
his

conception of warranted

warranted when

it

is formed accord-

method— proport ioning beliefs

to the evi-

we proportion our beliefs to the
evidence by employ-

ing general rules.

of rational

Thus, general rules embody the standards

judgment.

These standards are simply the prin-

ciples operative in the extensive and constant
operations of
the understanding.
not
he

Although Hume acknowledged that we can-

show that these principles will lead to true
judgments,
did not

conclude that we have no reasonable grounds for

preferring
judgments

them.

According

to

mutually consistent,

Hume,

of judgment
ing

can

keep our

(2)

reasoning mutually consistent, and

we

(3)

(1)

keep our

principles

of

attain the stability

necessary for coherent experience only by form-

judgments according to the extensive and constant prin-

ciples

.

Although

Hume

believed

that

we

have good grounds

for

preferring the scientific method of proportioning beliefs to
the

evidence to the irregular principles of "mere imagina-
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tion”, he did not place
unlimited confidence in the
former,
nor did he entirely reject
the latter.
if our inability to
show that our fundamental
principles of reasoning are likely
to result in true judgments
is not enough to curb any
pretentions of our understanding,
then the consideration
that it is only a "trivial
propensity of the fancy" that

prevents the fundamental principles of
our thought from
undermining

all

belief

should

lead

us

to

"always

preserve

our scepticism".
In

Chapters

area of Hume's

IV

and

v,

discussed

l

important

philosophy influenced by general rules

theory of passions and sentiments.

sentiments

another

cannot

be

true

or

— his

Our moral and aesthetic

false;

thus,

they

cannot

be

considered the product of reason in what Hume understood
as
the "strict and philosophical sense" (p. 459).
But our

passions
objects

and
and

sentiments

can

be

depend

considered

arise from warranted judgments.

tion of Hume's

on

our

reasonable
This

is

judgments
insofar

about

as

they

another illustra-

broad conception of reasonableness.

We

cannot show that our matter of fact judgments about objects
are

by

likely to be true.

the evidence,

Yet,

as

long

as

they are warranted

Hume considered both the judgments

themselves and the sentiments that arise from them reasonable .
In

and

addition

to

their

role

in

regulating our passions

sentiments by guiding our judgments about objects.
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general

rules

are essential

to Hume's

theory of value.

Moral and aesthetic judgments
depend on determining the
"just value" of objects.
Determining the just value of
objects requires more than the
ability to accurately distinguish their qualities and calculate
their usual effects; it

requires developing "general inalterable
standards: that are
not influenced by "spite or favour".
These standards are

simply general

rules,

disregard

circumstances

selves"

those

and

View".

By

fixing
them

from subjective

make

on

we

"some

steady

distinguish

rules

that

genuine value

corresponding

that

are

general

objective

our-

point

value

taste.

to

to

of

judgments
it

is

his

allows Hume to claim that we

judgments

sentiments,

learning

"peculiar

and

expressions of personal

theory of general

can

which we develop by

thus

even when we have no

preventing his moral

theory

from degenerating into any sort of pure subjectivism.
Finally,

have

a

in Chapter V,

substantial

role

in

I

have shown that general rules

Hume's political

theory.

What

Hume terms the "laws of nature" are simply general rules of

justice developed according to our experience.

Our natural

propensities toward self-interested behavior and our biased
affections combined with the scarcity of goods and instability of possessions are destabilizing

We

recognize

satisfy

our

from

experience

interests

and

the

197

that

influences on society.

we

interests

are

best

able to

of

those

we

love

society.

This

leads

us

to

form general rules that

redirect our propensities to better
realise these interests.
Once these rules are established
within a conventional order
and the benefits of adhering
to them generally recognized,
they elicit moral approval.
Transgressions of the rules
then become vice, adherence to the
rules, virtue.
have tried to show that general
rules play a fundamental role in Hume's philosophy.
They are essential to his
naturalism, his views on the nature of
reason, his skepticism, and his moral, aesthetic and
political theories.
it
was with good cause that Hume spoke
of the "mighty influence" of general rules on the actions and
understanding.
I
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appendix

Hume's argument

in

the

section "Of scepticism with

regard to reason" has drawn
almost universal criticism from
Hume commentators. 1
Some typical comments on the
argument
include
self-refuting", "question-begging",
and "sophistical
[2]
An examination of the criticisms
reveals an almost
equally universal tendency to misinterpret
Hume's argument.
I
cannot possibly discuss every criticism
here.
Instead l
shall concentrate on some of the
major criticisms and
attempt to show that they are not
particularly damaging to
Hume's argument.
]

[

.

For

convenience

three categories.

I

will

divide

these

criticisms

into

The first are focused on the initial

stage of Hume's argument, where he claims that
reflection on

past

errors

in

judgments reduces our conviction in our

present judgments.
of Hume's

The second are focused on the next stage

argument,

of our judgments

where he argues that the unreliability

infects our judgments about our judgments,

thereby adding further doubt to our initial belief.
ly,

Final-

the third group of criticisms accuse Hume of begging the

question by ignoring the possibility that some judgments are

intuitively certain and thus not subject to any initial
doubt
The first type of criticism is made by Robert Fogelin:
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certain

or

uncertain we

are
calculate proba^ proposition has a certain
(tautologically)
is
the probability it has.
For example, in
<^3se we may be uncertain
whether to assign the
probability 1 or 0
to a mathematical proposition,
does not affect the first-level yet this
assign-

7

value

intermediate
.

[3]

Hume would certainly agree that,
if

certain probability,

then

But,

probability

presumably,

the

that

the

is

a

proposition has

probability

has.

it

proposition has

a

a

is

not

necessarily the probability we happen
to assign it.
We do
sometimes make mistakes in our probability
assignments and
Hume claims that, given this fact, we
should not
be

confident

in

probability.

the

judgments

we

More generally,

make

about

a

fully

proposition's

the problem with

this criti-

cism IS that it does not address the point Hume
is trying to
make.
To see this it is important to keep in mind
Hume's

conception of judgment.
whereby we
belief.

form

a

A

judgment is an "act of mind"

conception with

"By probability

[I

mean]

still attended with uncertainty"

guishes two senses of

a

particular degree of

that evidence,

(p.

124).

'probability':

[4]

which is

Hume also distin-

"Probability is of two

kinds, either when the object is really in itself uncertain,
and to be determin'd by chance, or when, tho'

already certain,
444)

yet

'tis

the object be

uncertain to our judgment ..."

.
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(p.

claiming that "all knowledge
degenerates into probability
Hume IS not claiming that
mathematical propositions
become merely probable.
He is claiming that the felt
conviction of our mathematical
judgments is reduced to some
lesser degree of belief.
The uncertainty here is in our
:udgment, not in the object.
"m all demonstrative sciences
the rules are certain and
infallible; but when we apply
them, our fallible and uncertain
faculties are very apt to
depart from them, and fall into error"(p.
,

180).

Hume's
fact

concern

that

we

is

make

with

epistemic

errors

conviction should we have
"if

a

proposition has

logically)
The

chard

is

a

probability.

in

short,

Given

the

our judgments, what degree of

in
in

our

judgments?

certain probability,

To note

that

that

(tauto-

the probability it has” is totally irrelevant.

second

type

of

criticism is represented by Pri-

:

If we judge that the faculty by which
we, considering the nature of two and
two, judge it to be four is infallible
only to the extent of three-quarters, we
inevitably are judging as a matter of
certainty that two and two is probably
four to the extent of three-quarters and
we cannot then take further account of
the fallibility of our faculties, for we

have already taken full account of
it. [5]

First of all, this is a misuse of the terms
and 'infallible'.

A faculty cannot be infallible

of making errors)

to the extent of three-quarters.
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'fallible'

(incapable
If it

is

capable

o-f

fallible.

making

errors

second,

at

all

it

Hume would

not

claio,

equalling four is only probable.
IS

only probable

is

that,

is,

by definition,
that

two

and

two

He would clai. that what

when we make

methematical

a

judgment that we believe to be
correct, our judgment actually

is

correct.

probable

Finally, when we judge that
it is only
we correctly judge that two
and two

that

equals

four,

we

are

certainty".

inevitably
But

judging

this

Hume's whole point

as

is

"matter

a

to question

of

the

legitimacy of taking this judgment as
certain.
Suppose we accept as fact that all
judgments, with the
e_xception of
one, are uncertain.
We then have no real
problem.
We simply take account of this fact
when making
judgments by modifying our degree of belief
or conviction.
According to Hume, those who are considered
to have good

judgment

normally operate on

supposition.

But,

that

the

basis of

general

exception:

reliability of our

important factor to consider in determining
of conviction,

our

judging

just

such

a

he asks, what possible justification can

we have for making the above

view

the

If we

accept the

judgments
a

is

an

proper degree

then we must make some sort of evaluation of

ability.

Yet

there

appears

to

be

no

non-

arbitrary way to exclude the judgment involved in this
evaluation

from

the

verdict

of

the

evaluation.

Passmore

correctly characterized this aspect of the problem as fol-
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:

lows

This analysis demands that
we stop at a
certain point (the examination
of our
faculties) in the estimation
of reliaprovide
xplanation why, if we must proceed no
to
that point, we should not for
precisely
the same reasons continue to
a further
point, and then again to a further
one,
with no possibility of ever reaching
a
point at which we can properly rest.
[6]
The third type of criticism accuses
Hume of begging the
question by failing to consider the
possibility of intui-

tively certain judgments.

The criticism is directed at the

following passage:

Tis easily possible, by gradually
reducing the numbers, to reduce the

longest series of addition to the most
simple question, which can be form'd, to
an addition of two single numbers; and
upon this supposition we shall find it
impracticable to shew the precise limits
of knowledge and of probability, or discover that precise number, at which one
ends and the other begins.
But knowledge and probability are of such contrary and disagreeing natures, that they
cannot well run insensibly into each
other, and that because they will not
divide, but must be either entirely present, or entirely absent.
Besides, if
any single addition were certain, every
one wou d be so, and consequently the
whole or total sum; unless the whole can
be different from its parts. (p. 181)
'

Fogelin's response

is

typical

of

cism:
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the

third

type of criti-

argument assumes

nat a long
probablltiy.

addition can yield onlv
Then, by a slippery slope
direct ionsf, HuL

addition however simple.
The reply, of
course, IS that this ignores
the possiity that our grasp of a simple
"proposition concerning numbers" may
not involve calculation at all but,
instead,
an immediate insight.
this way, the
fallibility that infects our calculations (and demonstrations) need
not
touch our intuitive understanding
.[ 7]

m

have

I

long

already argued that Hume does not

addition can yield only probability

assume

in

the

that

sense

Fogelin ascribes to him.

There is no uncertainty (probabil-

ity,

the object;

the

in

Humels sense)

judgment.

So,

in

if

an

the uncertainty is

addition has

that is necessarily the sum it has.

certain sum,

a

Hume

s

point

thought

can

be

made

then

But, of course, the sum

we judge it to have is not necessarily
the sum it has.

Fogelin'

in

without

the

But

supposition

that

mathematical propositions only probable.

The

basic criticism is that Hume ignores the possibility
of
intuitively certain judgments.
Consider the form of Hume's argument.

If

each simple

addition were certain, then the whole would be certain.
whole

is

not

certain;

therefore,

simple addition is certain.

it

is

not

true that

The

each

As one critic has pointed out,

this argument cuts both ways:
If we were to accept a premiss of one of
his arguments, namely, that
any sin -
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.

t a 1

^

were certain, every one
consequently the v;^le

sum we should,

ir^cTTw

choice on the evidence
h = n;^ but to
at hand
affirm the antecedent and
conclude that he is, despite
himself,
providing an argument for the
infallileast some total sums as
opposed to the fallibility of
immediate
inference per se, as he had intended.
[8]
That

we

sometimes

err

long

in

addition

simply

shows
that sometimes the whole is not
certain and, thus, sometimes
simple additions are not certain.
But this does not eliminate the possibility that sometimes
simple additions are

Intuitively certain and that the long additions
composed of
such intuitively certain simple additions
are likewise certain
The case can be made in a more straightforward
way by

noting that,

although we sometimes make mistakes in simple

additions, this does not warrant the conclusion that
no
simple addition is certain.

tainty can claim that

instances we do not
or

inattention can

does

not

mean that

The defender of intuitive cer-

such errors merely show that

judge with
lead
in

us

intuitive certainty.
judge

to

that

1 + 1 = 3,

some

in

Haste

but

this

more attentive moments we cannot

grasp with intuitive certainty that 1+1=2.

If,

as defenders

of intuition claim, this is the actual situation, then it is

false that all knowledge "degenerates into probability".

Hume's critics are correct
to

address

this

possibility.

in

But

208

accusing him of failing
the

assumption that

the

proper

criterion

for

establishing

he

reliability of

judgments is experience is in keeping
with Hume's basic principle; thus this failing can
be easily remedied.
There is no
necessary connection between feelings
of intuitive certainty
and correct judgments.
Not only is there no necessary
connection, but experience proves
that there is not even a
constant conjunction'.
People have held (and continue to
hold) all manner of false and even
absurd judgments to be
intuitively certain.
Thus, the feeling of intuitive certainty is no guarantee of truth.
The extent to which it is
an indication of truth is determined
entirely by experience.

might

It

well

be

that

judgments

in

intuitive certainty are highly reliable

which

we

feel

an

(usually true),

in

which case we are warranted in being highly
confident about
them.
ity,

But this confidence is based on experienced
reliabilnot on any assumption about the self-certifying
nature

of intuition.

Whatever decision one makes about the ultimate merits
of

Hume's

argument,

this

veals an important point.
as

discussion of the criticisms reThe aim of the argument

the critics seem to assume,

is

not,

to question or eliminate the

distinction between knowledge and probability

(however

one

characterizes this distinction).

Hume's aim is to show the

limitations of rational method.

Although we can show that

proportioning beliefs to the evidence is more rational than
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.

other
adopt

methods
it

as

of

forming

beliefs,

we

cannot,

Hume

argues,

perfectly general principle of
reason.
What
we consider rational methodology
at one level of judgment
cannot be extended to all levels
of judgment without undermining all belief and conviction.
The reasonableness of
scientific method depends on limiting
its scope of appllcat

a

ion
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NOTES

Wilson'i a''rtlcle’'"Htme'rsce..i^
^dies 9, NO. 2 (November

1^

hrstoLVl'’Lsfir;?s\ncoLTt".‘

criticisms

is

Fred

—

Passmore indicates that Hume's
argument is selfrefuting in Hume s Intentions
p. 137; Robert Imlay calls it
question-begging in his article "Hume's
'Of Scepticism wi fh
^
Contrasting
Themes," Hume
Stud^e^s
No^^2^/N
1981): 124; MacNabb refers tTTt
H^ "snn hl;^
gj^^^y^lQPedia of Philosophy article
Hume
ed. P. Vi
Edwards (New York: Macmfri alT 1967) 4 :84.
'

,

,

1

,

[3]
[6]

Fogelin, p. 18.

One should note that, in Hume's usage
[4]
"evidence"
often refers to the evidence ojf something,
i.e., how evident
it is, not to the evidence for
something, i.e., what
provides proof or support for it.
[5]

(London

H.A. Prichard, "Hume" in Knowledge and
Perception
Oxford Univ. Press, 1950) ~p. 195.
,

Passmore, pp. 135-36
Passmore is not as acute in
explaining the point of Hume's argument: "The real outcome
of Hume's argument is that 'antecedent' scepticism
is illogical.
The 'reliability of our faculties' cannot be the test
of a proposition's probabi lity" (p. 136).
As I have repeatedly emphasized, Hume is not assessing the probability
of
propositions, where this is understood as some property that
such 'objects' possess.
Furthermore, assuming that Hume's
argument is supposed to show that 'antecedent scepticism' is
illogical makes complete nonsense out of the entire section.
Hume claims that reason can discover no error in the
argument and it is this claim that serves as a basis for his
skepticism about reason at the end of the section.
.

[7]

Fogelin, p. 15.

[8]

Imlay, p. 124.
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